Inequality between social classes is both a historical and modern issue, and the disparity between rural and urban communities in China over the last half century is one example of this quandary. The root of inequality gap is a nuanced issue, but majority of it stems back to the modernization of China’s coastal cities after the reform and open up (改革开放) , and housing registration systems imposed by the Chinese government during from 1950-1998 (Gaetano, 16). This led to a gap in the general quality of life between rural and urban China, which can be seen in Spring Grass’s destitution compared to city dwellers. In addition, the drastic increase in the employment of migrant workers as a cheap labor substitute starting in 1978 furthered this gap as migrant workers were subjected to unequal working conditions. The Chinese rural populations’ idolization of and unfamiliarity with the urban working lifestyle, and the cultural and historical stigmatizations regarding rigorous work expectations allowed the Chinese government and corporations to take advantage of cheaper labor from migrant workers, leading to the vast inequality gap between rural and urban districts.
After the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China began to open up to the world as the modernization of coastal cities began. As these cities became more and more advanced, they were viewed as a “gateway to foreign lands” (Gaetano, 16), while rural towns were left behind. By 1950, there was already a wealth gap forming between the two geographic identities, which would only be exacerbated by household registration policies and the hiring of migrant workers. This led to the social desire to migrate from a rural town to an urban town, as seen in not only the great desire for hypergamous marriage during the 20th century (Zhou, 880), but also through Spring Grass. When her younger brother gets accepted into a top university in Beijing, which would ensure his eventual assimilation into the urban life, he was “turned into the object of everyone’s worship”, and it became an achievement “not just for the Mung family, but for the entire village” (QiuShan, 9.1). Spring Grass dreams constantly of escaping the village, and Rivers Ho also views the urban cities as a place of opportunity, swayed by the “capital idea” of selling quilts in the “world outside” (QiuShan, 11). From these three perspectives, the urban sphere is a separate and almost mystical realm to the rural population, representative of escape, freedom, and success. However, this is not always the case, as Rivers Ho and Spring Grass’s fantasy of urban life is far from reality.
When Rivers Ho first visits his uncle, he is surprised at the size of their meager house, imagining an engineer like his uncle would “have a European-style villa, like in the movies” (QiuShan 12.6) as opposed to their small two bedroom house. This is not the only time he had his fantasy shattered by his first actual visit to city life, as he and Spring Grass learn the difficulty of starting a business without a license and communicating with customers in different dialects (QiuShan 13.4). In addition, many aspects of the city life are wildly unfamiliar to the pair, as seen in Spring Grass’s experience with her first train ride. She was sweating due to “fear, panic and anxiety” (QiuShan, 12.1) upon boarding the train, and even went so far as to scream in fright when the train entered the tunnel. In fact, the only thing puts her at ease is “helping the attendant sweep and mop” and tending to the other passengers (QiuShan, 12.4). This desire to work is reflective of a larger societal and historical stigma emphasizing the importance of labor.
Through a historical and cultural lense, Spring Grass’s personal extreme work ethic is reflective of a larger societal pressure. Her mother attempted to instill many traditional Chinese values, one of which is for a woman to have extremely demanding labor expectations on both the domestic and agricultural front. She is constantly harassed by her mother whenever she has a free moment to toil around the house, and this is instilled upon her, as in her young twenties she still has an exceptionally strong work ethic and desire for money, even going so far as to want to name her kids “Cash” and “Fortune” (QiuShan, 13.11). This can also be seen in modern China regarding the normalization of 996 (九九六), a work style in which labor is toil from nine am to nine pm, six days a week. This style of work-life was highly normalized, and is still prevalent today. Ma Yun, co-founder of Alibaba, even has gone so far to say that working a 996 workweek is a sign of good fortune for a young person. It is only in recent years that this work life has been brought under scrutiny, as it damages personal well-being.
The desire to escape rural districts, coupled with the unfamiliarity with urban work life and societal stigmas regarding work balance, allowed for the mass discrimination against migrant workers.
In economic terms, due to those characteristics migrant workers had extremely high willingness to work, or very inelastic labor curves. This meant that corporations were able to set poor working conditions, lower pay, and other discriminatory practices specifically against migrant workers, and they would still accept jobs. Most migrant workers worked “3-D jobs”: jobs that were dangerous, dirty, and degrading (Gaetano, 21). Migrant women were often victims of sexual harassment and discrimination in domestic urban jobs, while men worked long arduous hours in dangerous factory jobs under unsafe conditions (Gaetano, 22). In fact, a survey in Hunan, Suchuan discovered that “migrant workers work twice that of their urban counterparts. But at the same time, they only receive 60% of urban workers’ average salary” (Jiang, 23). Although Spring Grass and Rivers Ho did turn a profit at the end of chapter 13, most migrant workers did not. A 2002 survey discovered that the average residency check for a migrant worker among a few coastal cities ranged between 500-1000 RMB, while the average migrant workers paycheck was only 539 RMB(Jiang, 25). This discrimination was also facilitated largely by social discrimination and government policies.
Social discrimination towards rural communities in China has ties even back to the early 20th century. The term for peasant (农民) developed around then, and began to carry negative connotations as cities became more advanced (Gaetano, 16). In terms of marriage, hypergamous couplings became extremely desirable among rural populations, but looked down upon by urban dwellers, as one’s hukou status was determined by one’s maternal parent. The hukou status was just one of many government policies that allowed for discrimination against migrant workers. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the Chinese government changed household registration systems and adjusted migrant worker laws in order to best fit what the Chinese economy required. Up until 1958, the restrictions regarding migrant workers were strictly controlled and enforced by the hukou system, and migrant workers were described as “leaving the land but not the home” (Jiang, 21). As the prosperity of this system became more and more apparent, corporations required more cheap labor, so the goal of housing registration policy shifted in the 1980’s to “leaving both the land and the home” (Jiang, 21), and finally in the late 1990’s as the full potential of the rapidly growing Chinese economy required more cheap labor, the goal of housing registration policy shifted lastly to one of “positive guidance” toward migrant workers. In economic terms, this greater usage of cheaper migrant workers is extremely logical. Chinese corporations get to undercut international prices, which drives up total revenue. In addition, urban families are granted more leisure time as more of the workload is dumped onto migrant workers, allowing urban families to spend more and stimulate the economy (Gaetano, 14). However, this economic growth built on the backs of migrant workers led to a vast inequality between rural and urban populations, not only seen in fiscal measurements but also through measurements of well-being.
Measurements of China’s inequality between rural and urban populations all tell a similar tale: the gap between the two social castes has been widening ever since the increased employment and discrimination of migrant workers by large city based corporations. China’s Gini-Coefficient, one of the most renowned measures of wealth inequality, has increased by more than 50%, while the Human Development Index (HDI), a measurement of wellbeing, shows that “regional imbalances are severe and growing” (Jiang, 17).
Due largely in part to the rural Chinese dwelling citizens desire to escape to the cities, their unfamiliarity with urban work style, and social stigmas surrounding intense working hours, Chinese corporations were able to exploit and discriminate against migrant workers, facilitated by current housing registration laws. This led to a rapid increase in economic growth, but at the cost of a large inequality gap.
Word Count: 1480
Works Cited:
Qiu, Shanshan. “Spring Grass” Chapters 11-13
Jiang, Wenran. “Prosperity at the Expense of Equality: Migrant Workers are Falling Behind in Urban China’s Rise”, Confronting Discrimination and Inequality in China, pp. 16-29.
Gaetano, Arianne M. “Rural Women and Migration under Market Socialism”, Out to Work, pp. 14-27.
Zhou et. al. “The Gender Gap Among School Children in Poor Rural Areas of Western China: Evidence from a Multi-province Dataset”, International Journal for Equity and Health, pg 1-11