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Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art, Part 2

 You might be interested in the problems Hegel has — by his own admission — beginning his lectures on art. He feels like he should begin by giving a definition of art, though that’s not quite the way he puts it, and the difference matters. What, he asks, is the “concept” of art? Can we give a philosophically elaborated definition? A professor writing in the 2020s would probably just say a “theory of art,” except that the word “theory” almost always suggests something provisional. (“I have a theory” means “I’m about to say something ingenious, but it might not be right.”) But the “concept,” as Hegel understands it, isn’t provisional. Just the opposite. In order to work out the “concept” of art, you would need to be able to say what makes it “necessary.” You could think of it this way: Every human society that researchers have ever encountered has something that we would call art. Art is basically ubiquitous — and in that sense a human necessity — and the question would be why? Why do human groups everywhere always produce art (of some kind)? The philosophical approach to art turns on that question.

         The problem is, Hegel now says, that you can’t answer this question if all you’re talking about is art. If you want to say what gives rise to art, you have to look beyond art (to the nature of the human mind, say) in order to say what need the former is fulfilling. And at this point he says: But I don’t want to have to produce an entire theory of the mind — I don’t want to talk you through my whole system all over again. The point of these lectures is to talk about art. So for now, let’s just take art as given, and let’s begin by reflecting on the semi-philosophical things that people already believe about art. And if you ever work through my entire system, then maybe you’ll be in a position to understand the “concept” of art. But not now.

So off he goes. Hegel clears some pages to consider some once common  ideas about art. He begins by pointing out that art isn’t naturally occurring, that it is human and perhaps even akin to work. “Not only has art at its command the whole wealth of natural forms in the brilliant variety of their appearance, but also the creative imagination has power to expatiate inexhaustibly beyond their limit in products of its own.” (9) You might notice how this aligns art with technology: it is the ability to produce in new ways, beyond nature.

As English-speakers, we can remark here that the word “art” used to mean “skill” and that the word “artist” still has the word “artisan” as one of its closest cousins. That observation brings the question of “craft” in its train, and the question of craft is itself a question of rules. Can you learn to make art just by  learning a craft or just by following the rules? Can you give somebody an art-making instruction booklet? And to this Hegel says: No. The work of Geist cannot be brought under a rule (or a law). This jumps out, in the German context, because Germany was the cradle of the Protestant Reformation, and some Protestants have always taken very seriously the idea that Christians are saved by the spirit (Geist) and not by the law — that Christianity is not a matter of following rules. Hegel points out that if you consult writing manuals or handbooks of art, they will try to give you rules — and some of those rules will be valid enough, but a lot of them will by stupidly underdetermined (ie, they won’t actually tell you what to do and in that sense will hardly count as rules).

Hegel next says that the neoclassical emphasis on rules and correctness eventually generated a backlash in the cult of the genius — the Great Creator not bound by rules. That’s the old German notion of “genius”; the word used to mean something like “outsider artist,” someone who creates great art without having been trained. The notion of “talent,” similarly, is akin to grace in the religious sense: It is the gift you can’t give yourself. The silliest idea promoted by the theorists of genius is that some artists can create without at all reflecting on what they are doing—wholly immersed and intoxicated and riding the rush. The idea here is that artists create in a fit of Begeisterung — Knox’s translation has “inspiration,” which isn’t bad, but it’s actually the German word for religious “enthusiasm,” and it’s the word that Germans used to hurl at Protestant religious fanatics — people who thought they’d been struck by the spirit. Anyway, Hegel’s point is that even though it’s wrong to think that art can be reduced to rules, it does nonetheless require some craft or technique. That probably sounds commonsensical, but his reasoning is still distinctive: Art is a matter of the spirit/the mind/Geist, and Geist can’t be bound by rules. He’s already said, in fact, that art enacts a certain freedom, “escaping the fetters of rule and regularity”—it is the adventure of fantasy and invention. But at the same time, art is Geist-made-real, Geist actualized, Geist in object form. That’s the whole point of art: Art allows for a certain reunion or reintegration, “cheering and animating the dull and withered dryness of the idea, reconciling with reality its abstraction and its dissociation therefrom, and supplying out of the real world what is lacking to the concept.” “Art gives actuality” and begins when somebody feels compelled to find a way of representing something that is not given to the senses. And in the passage to material form, Geist can’t simply reject all rules. The artists have to remember that they were once artisans.

Finally, he says some art is contentless, notably music—which means it can be mastered by the young and the stupid. (I think he means Mozart.) But if you want to write poetry, you will have to know the world in its detail; you need to possess a worldly intelligence. (And that, he says, is why older writers are generally to be preferred to younger one.) There is a question here of Vollkommenheit—a rationalist aesthetics of plenitude or concordia discors. Music is basically empty (though, surely, one wishes to say back to Hegel,  it is capable of achieving Vollkommenheit on formal grounds alone). Literature, however, takes the sundry materials of the world and arranges them into intricate mental forms.

Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art, Part 1

I would like to give some encouragement to readers who have been thinking about maybe tackling Hegel’s Aesthetics aka his Lectures on Fine Art. Hegel had a lot to say on the topic; his collected lectures clock in at more than 1,000 pages. Let’s now worry about the sheer daunting expanse of the thing. For now, I will be content to offer some commentary on its much thumbed introduction, following the Knox translation.

But first some groundwork. Anything that Hegel has to say about art is only going to make sense in the context of his system as a whole. Hegel holds that the task of philosophy is to help us conceptualize what he calls the Absolute, by which he means the world apprehended as a network of distributed and mutually constitutive points. But the Absolute is not just any network; it is Hegel’s term, rather, for a network with mind; a thinking network, therefore; a network capable of reflecting on itself and setting its own ends. This distinction—between networks with and without mind—is fundamental to Hegel’s project. It is the difference, saliently, between a free market and a market whose actors are invited to reflect on the economic system in which they are swept up, to make judgments upon that system, and to assign to it moral and political ends. That second kind of network we might not even think to call a “market” any more.

That’s the first important point. The next thing to understand is that Hegel thinks that there are three human endeavors that will all help us apprehend the Absolute. The first is philosophy. The other two are religion and art:

-religion, because, followed through to a certain terminus, it will fix our attention on the work of mind in the world (or spirit in the word—mind and spirit are the same word in Hegel’s German) and so bring us close to the Absolute, which is the fusing of material networks with mind;

-art, because, more simply, it is the mind or spirit in material form.

This last is Hegel’s master claim about art, which we can, for a start, specify in three ways:

1) If I remark now that the reconciliation of subject and object is central to Hegel’s philosophy, then I am once again circling around the Absolute. The canonical early modern philosophers tended to treat subject and object as opposed terms. This was clearest in the matter of epistemology, which was central to European philosophy for several generations. Is the world knowable? How do we know things? How do we know that we know things? Perhaps you can see without special explanation that those questions tend to position the mind as separate from the world—and also to make of the world a Big Puzzle in need of solving. To reconcile the opposition of subject and object requires that we not organize our philosophy around such questions. Is it possible to think of the mind and the world as integrated or unified – not as strangers to each other?

2) Hegel’s big claim about art is that it is great because it has clear ways of doing this (in ways that Kant, Schiller, and the Schlegels had already made identified). But then, Hegel goes on, lots of things can do this—can bring together the material world and the mind: revolution can do this, and so can thoughtful practice, and so likewise can religion. This is one of the ways Hegel is unlike the philosophers he otherwise resembles. He doesn’t think we are especially stuck in this regard. There are several different ways of reconciling subject and object. “Art is one of the means which dissolve and reduce to unity the … opposition and contradiction between … self-concentrated Geist and nature.” (56)

3) And when all is said and done, these other things are probably better than art.

 

 

Immanuel Kant’s Manifesto for Dad Rock

•1.

If there is one point that should be reasonably clear to anyone who has read “The Culture Industry,” it is that Adorno and Horkheimer do not reject popular culture. That essay, it’s true, gives us reasons to question any number of things that we typically hold dear: free time (for being unfree time, nearly as programmed as the work from which it nominally releases us), laughter (for being the consolation prize you get for not having a life worth living), style (for funneling all social and historical content into a pre-arranged matrix or inflexible scheme of aesthetic quirks and twitches; for holding out the promise of artistic individualism—the personal signature in literature or music—and then transposing this into its opposite, the iterative, unresponsive art-machine). Most of us remember “The Culture Industry” as anti-pop’s cahier de doléance, its encyclopedia of anathema, the night in which all bêtes sont noires. But alongside the essay’s admittedly austere bill of grievances, it is easy enough to compile a second list, an inventory of things that Adorno and Horkheimer say they like and suggest we might admire: Charlie Chaplin, the Marx Brothers, Greta Garbo, the circus, old cartoons, Felix the Cat (maybe), Gertie the Dinosaur (perhaps), Betty Boop (for sure, because they name her). Just to be clear: “The Culture Industry,” Exhibit A in any case against critical theory’s Left elitism, is also the essay in which Adorno attacks Mozart while praising “stunt films,” which we might more idiomatically translate as “Jackie Chan.” One can thus cite authentically Adornian precedence for an attitude that distrusts classical music and celebrates kung fu movies, and this will be hard to believe only if you prefer a critical theory shorn of its dialectics, stripped of the contradictory judgments that thought renders upon contradictory material—only, that is, if you prefer the Adorno of joke Twitter feeds and scowling author photos: bald, moon-faced, a Central European frown emoji inexplicably mad at his own piano. One suspects that readers have generally refused to take seriously the essay’s central category. For the culture industry is neither an epithet nor a gratuitously Marxist synonym for popular culture, but rather a different concept, distorted every time we paraphrase it in that other, more comfortable idiom, as a calumny upon pop culture or pop. There is plenty of evidence, in the essay itself, that Adorno and Horkheimer were drawing distinctions between forms of popular culture, and not just pitting the Glenn Miller Orchestra against Alban Berg.[1]

Such, then, is one way of taking the measure of Nicholas Brown’s Autonomy.[2] This is one of those books that you might have thought no-one could write anymore: four chapters that mean to restate the old, left-wing case for art, unapologetically named as such, as the artwork—and not as text or culture or cultural production—the idea being that art represents the survival of independent human activity under conditions hostile to such a thing. No longer homogenized under those master terms, art can again take as its rival entertainment, a word whose German equivalent derives from the verb unterhalten, which even English speakers can tell means “to hold under,” as though movies and TV shows existed to keep us down, as though R&B were a ducking or a swirlie. That the English word borrows the same roots from the French only confirms the point: entre + tenir, to keep amidst or hold in position. Entertain used to mean “to hire, as a servant.”

Autonomy is also the book in which a next-generation American Marxist out-Mandarins Adorno, who, after all, begins his essay by insisting that the cultural conservatives are wrong. There has been no decline of standards, no cultural anarchy let loose by the weakening of the churches and the vanishing of the old, agrarian societies, hence no permissive culture in which anything goes. Just the contrary: Magazines and radio and Hollywood form a system with its own rigidly enforced standards, a highly regulated domain in which almost nothing goes. Adorno’s way of saying this is that there is no “cultural chaos.”[3] But Nicholas Brown prefers the chaos thesis, endorsing the position that Adorno has preemptively rejected as both reactionary and implausible: “The culture industry,” Brown writes, couching in Frankfurtese his not-at-all Adornian point, is “the confusion in which everything worth saving is lost” (135).

Similarly, readers are usually surprised to find Adorno writing in defense of “mindlessness.” His hunch is that Kantian aesthetics might find its niche among the lowest art forms and not, as we more commonly expect, among the most elevated. Sometimes I encounter an object and find it beautiful, and in that moment of wonderment, my attitude towards the object is adjusted. I stop trying to discern what the thing is for or how to use it. Where a moment ago, I was still scanning its instruction manual, I am now glad for the thing just so. Perhaps I am even moved to disenroll the beautiful thing from the inventory of useful objects, or find myself doting on it even having ascertained that it’s not good for much. But then sometimes this purposiveness without a purpose is going to strike me not as beautiful, but as stupid, and Adorno’s point is that the stupid can do the work of the beautiful, that the beaux arts are If anything outmatched by the imbecile kind. The activities that we do for their own sake, for the idiot joy of our own capacities, are the ones that our pragmatic selves are likely to dismiss as dopey: someone you know can pay two recorders at once with her nose; a guy you once met could burp louder than a riding mower; you’ve heard about people who can vomit at will and recreationally. Kantian Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck enters the vernacular every time we mutter “That was pointless.” It is in this spirit that Adorno sticks up for “entertainment free of all restraint,” “pure entertainment,” “stubbornly purposeless expertise,” and “mindless artistry.” His claim, in fact, is that the culture industry is hostile to such “meaninglessness,” that Hollywood is “making meaninglessness disappear.”[4] It might be enough here to recall the difficulties that the major studios have in making comedies that are funny all the way through, preferring as they do to recruit their clowns from improv clubs and sketch shows, to promote them to the rank of movie star, and then to impound them in the regularities of the well-made plot, complete with third-act twists and character arcs, gracelessly telegraphed in the film’s final twenty-five minutes, to make up for all the time squandered on jokes, and tending to position the buffo’s comic persona as a pathology to be cured, scripting a return to normalcy whose hallmark is a neutralized mirthlessness. Hollywood’s comic plots model the supersession of comedy and not its vindication.

But Nicholas Brown is not on the side of meaninglessness. “In commercial culture,” he writes, “there are no works to critique and no meanings to be found”—and he does not mean this as praise (10). In Autonomy, there is no liberating nonsense, but only the English professor’s compulsion to discern meaning, his impatience with any art for which one could not readily devise an essay prompt. Whatever independence the book’s title is offering us, it is not the freedom to stop making sense. It feels bracing, in fact, to read a book so willing to discard the institutionalized anti-elitism of cultural studies and 200-level seminars offering to “introduce” 20-year-olds to horror movies. When Brown rolls his eyes over Avatar because of some dumb thing its director once said in an interview, or when he calls off a wholly promising reading of True Detective by announcing that it is “nothing more than an entertainment,” we need to see him as turning his back on the aging pseudo-Gramscians of the contemporary academy, all those populists without a movement, the media-studies scholars who imagine themselves as part of a Cultural Front that no-one else can see, a two-term alliance consisting entirely of Beyoncé fans and themselves; the shopping-mall Maoists of the 1990s who couldn’t tell the difference between aller au peuple and aller au cinema (71). Adorno, of course, was concerned that the desires and tastes of ordinary audiences could be manipulated or even in some sense produced. “The Culture Industry” prompts in its readers the still Kantian project to figure out which of the many pleasures they experience are authentically their own. Which are the pleasures that will survive your reflection upon them, and which are the ones that you might reject for having made you more object-like, for having come to you as mere stimulation or conditioning? The autonomy that Adorno is trying to imagine is therefore ours, in opposition to a mass media that muscles in to tell us what we want before we have had a chance to consider what else there is to want or how a person might want differently, to work out not just different objects of desire, but different modes of desiring and of seeking satisfaction. Brown, by contrast, complains repeatedly that artists more than ever have to make things that people like. The autonomy that he is after is thus not our autonomy from an insinuating system but the artist’s autonomy from us. It is no longer surprising for a tenured literature professor to disclose, in writing, that he’s been listening to early Bruno Mars records. The unusual bit comes when Brown says he doesn’t think they’re any good (24).

[PART TWO IS HERE.]

[1] See Adorno and Horkheimer’s “Culture Industry,” in The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944/1947), translated by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 94 – 136. On free time, p. 104; on laughter, p. 112; on style, pp. 100ff; Chaplin and the Marx Brothers, p. 109; Greta Garbo, p. 106; the circus, p. 114; Betty Boop, p. 106.

[2] Nicholas Brown, Autonomy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019); subsequent citations will be given by page number in parentheses.

[3] Adorno and Horkheimer, p. 94.

[4] Ibid., p. 114.