The further question Josh raises of the importance of the status of the leader of a revolutionary movement is very appealing to me and reminds me of other cases of revolutionary leaders we have analyzed, such as the Baader Meinhof case. We often see the visionaries of the revolutionary movements rise to leadership positions within the movements. Thus, as we’ve seen within the Baader Meinhof case, the most radical members of a movement end up leading the movement, which leaves the movement susceptible to becoming much more extreme than what the initial supporters are willing to stand for and brings up the worry that the movement will lose the support that it once had behind it, the further it progresses. On the other hand, if the leader of a movement lessens their radical aims in order to create soft change, they face the issue of potentially losing support because they’ve become “institutionalised” and no longer represent the needs of the people, as MLK has been criticized for in the later parts of the Civil Rights movement by followers who left to support the actions of SNCC, Malcolm X, or the Black Panthers instead. In a lot of ways, the radicality of a leader is important in preserving the fire behind a revolution and keeping the support alive, so it is a difficult reputation to abandon. This brings into question the durability of a campaign led by a highly radical leader, as with Allende, when the exceptional radical opinions of the leader necessarily imply that they don’t represent the more moderate views of the masses behind the rebellion. Therefore, does a “revolutionary” leader need to concede their vision in order to maintain support and have any hope for achieving moderate change, or in giving up their revolutionary status do they also risk losing the original supporters that brought them to their leadership positions? It seems like a lose-lose situation for creating distinct revolutionary change unless a revolutionary leader is willing to (and somehow has the support to) use their minority of radical support to ignore the claims of the masses to further their vision. Otherwise, as Jake and Josh pointed out, maybe gradual, institutionalized change is what’s necessary, though it may come at the cost of losing their original supporters.

I find it difficult to compare the Cuban case to that of Chile given the different circumstances that existed within the two nations. I do think, however, that the varying circumstances that each country faced, ultimately influenced the level of success that each country could experience. In Cuba the revolution was consistently viewed as a movement that would fail, allowing the movement to grow and become successful before there was more complete intervention by the more conservative forces within Cuba. Additionally the revolutonary forces seperation from the urban areas and isolation within the Cuban mountains, prevented the government from being able to fully destroy the Cuban revolutionary forces. The slow, stated, non-violent strategy of the Allende government can be argued presented the neccessary circumstances for the revolution to fail. That’s not to say that it was the cause for its failure, but the conservative forces were given time to respond and the exposure of Allende and his supporters allowed for the military to intervene in a way that was successful in deposing Allende and his supporters from power. Therefore while the response by the military to Allende’s program was not guaranteed, he left his movement extremely vulnerable by not arming a wing of its supporters and being slow to enact any of his proposed reforms.

For me, it is hard to dissociate Allende’s tactics, strategy, and faith in liberal democracy from the political context around him. I agree with Jake that violent struggle to bring about change in Chile would have been unwise. With a considerably stable history of democracy throughout the twentieth century and with demands that did not outright require the overthrow of government, violent struggle would have destabilized the state, antagonized a military class already predisposed to be against Allende’s goals, and–most importantly–would have left Allende with the task of rebuilding a state alongside implementing reforms that, based off of electoral results, were not ubiquitously desired.

With a military campaign that appears, at least on its face, doomed, how might have Allende better implemented his policy? As had been stated countless times throughout class and the readings, Allende had little effective control over his military even before the coup. Despotism thus would seem out of the question since the best apparatus for authoritatively controlling state was not under his direct control. Gradualism provides an alternative; though just as Jake noted as well, such a strategy might have “stripped Allende of his revolutionary status.” This prompts me to ask, why do we care about such status? Throughout case studies this semester, we as a class have come across countless individuals and actors whose revolutionary desires superseded the development of an effectual avenues for redress. The lack of ideological coherence amongst the various leaders of Haiti’s revolution has in part left Haitians with an ineffective state. Mao, Lenin, and Stalin all saw the needs to build the state and its economic, political, and social capacities before they could realistically implement socialist reform. To me, this question boils down to a cost benefit analysis of liberal democracy against some form of more authoritarian socialism. Rooted in gradualism and public participation, liberal democracy may be a tenuous and slow route; however, smashing states and rebuilding them to the liking of a cohort of revolutionary individuals elicits way more fear from me.

Throughout Debray’s interview with Allende it was made clear that he questioned the legitimacy of Allende’s strategy, especially as an “revolutionary” within the institutional framework. I found Allende’s ideals very Gramscian. Similar to critiques that we’ve discussed on Gramsci, Allende’s tactics, in the same way worked within the framework of hegemony in order to create counter hegemony. Though this revolutionary process is unique, can we consider the idea of a counter hegemony to actually be revolutionary in nature? Using civil society as the most powerful tool in creating consensus and capturing the state, like Gramsci, Allende’s tactics are restricted to the confines of the established institutions. But at what point do we consider Allende’s methods to be reform rather than revolution? Though Allende claims revolution is simply, “the transfer of power from a minority class to a majority class,” it is hard to call methods which derive within the framework of the oppressive powers very revolutionary at all. First, As Debray questions Allende, “Don’t you feel that you are gradually becoming institutionalized?” And then As Debray claims, “it has acted within the established institutional framework, and it can therefore be said that what there has been to date is reform.”

However, I’m hardly convinced that democracy was part of Allende’s long term plans. As he responds, “I believe we have used those which open the road to revolution…All the measures we have adopted are measures which lead to the revolution.” In this way, I think that Allende didn’t exactly care about democracy or even creating a democratic popular Government but rather he was interested in utilizing the democratic process as a stepping stone in which to open the door, unlock the gate to a revolution and eventual socialism. Sure Allende may have been attracted to the allure of being revolutionary by unique, peaceful, and democratic tactics, but how much revolutionary change could he have expected to create working within the same institutional framework as his opposition?

The case study of Chile serves as an interesting example of whether or not the implementation of a Marxism is possible through democratic means. In the case of Chile, it would have been unwise to attempt to bring about transformative change through the use of violence. Additionally, if the result of Allende’s election was any indicator, the majority of Chileans were against such radical change. Despite this, to advocate for the stance that violence should have been employed as a tactic for crushing Allende’s opposition, ignores the fact that war would have simply precipitated a swift and overwhelming reaction from the Chilean military. A government is only as strong as its ability to actually enforce its agenda. Without ever maintaining control of the military, or maintaining a majority of society to signal greater legitimacy, the implementation of a radically transformative Marxist agenda seemed destined to fail. It seems to me that Allende was simply too radical for his time, and that Chile was simply not ready for the Marxist agenda that Allende was propagating.

Without the military’s backing, or the majority of society’s support, what could Allende have done after getting elected? A frontal assault on Chiles military would have been fatal, yet history has shown that Allende’s strategy of utilizing an institutional approach had failed as well. Perhaps the solution should have been to actually move slower and more gradually. Of course, this would have stripped Allende of his revolutionary status, but in my estimation, it is better to do some good, moving slowly in the right direction, instead of attempting to move too fast, and getting ousted. In Allende’s own words, “Socialism cannot be imposed by decree”. Since the majority of Chileans did not want socialism, maybe Allende should have exercised more caution in his approach.

I do think the veracity of Ché’s claim is fairly high. No one who is sane just seeks out violence. However, in order to get the thing that they want—in this case, a revolutionary moment—violence may be the only means in which to achieve that goal; nonetheless, if it proves to be possible to reach the same end without putting people in danger then that will always be the route most preferred. Whether a movement is a violent one or not hinges mainly on the reactionary forces—those who are attempting to remain in power. Once they deem it necessary to use violence in order to suppress activism, a whole new can of worms has been opened.

Like an animal backed into a corner, the revolutionary coalition will be free to fire back—usually harder and with much more reckless abandon. As Goodwin would point out, this reversion to violence by the hegemonic group could also prove to be detrimental by the simple fact that the perceived injustice done upon the revolutionary forces will bolster more support from the masses. In this way, violence would serve not to repress the troublesome rebels, but actually to empower them and give them even more numbers.

Interestingly enough, the revolutionary leaders need the masses just as much—if not more— than the masses need them. Without the prospect of mobilization, or simply the means to stage any sort of effective demonstration, an entire movement can go up in flames. Having said that, it is imperative that once the masses are acquired, they be led stage by stage in order to ensure that the correct steps are being taken to give the group the best chance at a favorable result. This can be a slippery slope, as the responsibility (and power) that comes with leading such a large group can lead to bigheadedness and even an eventual tyrannical pursuit of authority. This is what Ché, Allende, and even Baader—any movement leader really—must contend with and learn to balance.

While reading about and discussing the case of Chile’s revolution, I repeatedly drew connections to Egypt’s experience during the Arab Spring uprisings. To be fair, there are distinctive differences between Egypt and Chile’s experiences and contexts, but I think the comparison still merits attention: two revolutionary forces (socialist in Chile and Islamist in Egypt) sought to transform each country peacefully and through democratic channels, only to be ousted quickly through coups d’état of the military, which then retained control of political society in a harsh, repressive way.

In the case of Egypt, the political tumult that ensued during the brief Muslim Brotherhood presidency under Morsi was not a right backlash against the left, but rather a left backlash against the right. Further, Egypt was not democratic in any real sense of the word (yes, there were multi-party elections in 2005 under Mubarak, but there was never any question that Mubarak would win the presidential election by a landslide.), but rather an authoritarian regime in which the military occupied a privileged position politically and socioeconomically. Egypt attempted to transition to democracy after the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011, which ushered in the Muslim Brotherhood through the country’s first largely free and fair election. However, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a socially conservative Islamist organization, sought to transform Egyptian society and the political system into an Islamic republic with Shari’a Law as the supreme law of the land. For a country which had been staunchly secular, this would be a radical overhaul of the political and social organization of the country, particularly considering that Egypt also has a sizeable (though still minority) Christian population. While these differences are numerable, the following should hopefully clarify the similarities that exist between the Chilean and Egyptian experiences.

In Egypt, after the overthrow of Mubarak through largely peaceful demonstrations, the largest of which occurred in Tahrir Square in Cairo, the military ushered in a transitional government that set the stage for the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 2011-early 2012. As in Chile, in which a coalescence of perceived economic exasperation, political frustration of several segments of the middle and lower classes (in Egypt, worker unions favored the Muslim Brotherhood), and a desire for transformative change, enabled for a more extremist party to gain power, Egypt elected the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood into office. However, it quickly became apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood, like Allende’s Unidad Popular, sought to transform political society in ways inimical to key, powerful segments of the population – namely, the sociopolitical elites of Egypt and Chile (in Egypt, this was wealthy businessmen and others connected to Mubarak’s inner circle and/or the military-police apparatus). Similarly to Allende, the Muslim Brotherhood under Morsi was never able to capture and gain control over, or at the least, some form of cooperative relationship with these key segments of society. As a result, in aiming to push through revolutionary initiatives and programs through democratic channels (i.e. the legislature, executive branch, judiciary), Morsi and his party members in power found it very difficult to do so, facing stiff resistance internally within the legislature and through non-compliance of the judiciary, military, and police apparatuses from even more extreme right-wing groups (Salafi Jihadi Movement) and from left-wing groups (Strong Egypt Party, The Social Democratic Party, etc) and externally from other countries, especially the U.S.. Nonetheless, Morsi and his allies hurriedly drafted a new constitution that was put to a referendum, which while showing that roughly 2/3 of those who voted were in favor of the new constitution, such numbers far overestimated the popular support it received, for many opposition groups advocated for and carried out a boycott of the referendum vote. The new constitution was hailed by critics as either to Islamist and to favorable to the Muslim Brotherhood on the left, while on the right, the Salafis believed it was not extreme enough. Regardless, the approval and institutionalization of the new constitution is largely viewed in retrospect as the final straw that ushered in the military coup d’état led by Al-Sisi (who was a key player in the transitional military government post-Mubarak and pre-Morsi) coupled with the inability of Morsi’s government to resolve economic issues, security problems (the military and police did not cooperate with Morsi), energy shortages, and the breakdown of Egypt’s short-lived democratic experiment (increasingly violent protests by and clashes between supporters and opponents continued throughout Morsi’s presidency and played a role in the government’s relative paralysis), though such crises and government deficiencies were in part a result of the internal and external opposition Morsi faced. As a result, just over a year after Morsi’s election, the Egyptian military, who had the most to lose with Morsi’s ascendancy, led a coalition of opposition forces to arrest Morsi and many of his supporters and to suspend the newly implemented Constitution.

In the wake of Al-Sisi’s coup, which the U.S. refused to denote as such, but rather viewed favorably, Al-Sisi and his coup supporters ushered in a period of repressive military rule under which human rights abuses have increased dramatically, the economic situation has deteriorated further, the nation has been in a quasi-permanent state of emergency, and civil society has been severely debilitated. Al-Sisi, like Pinochet, created a military dictatorship which, at least as of right now, does not seem to be reinstating democratic principles, though like Pinochet, developed and instituted its own constitution. Instead, there are many concerns that Al-Sisi will continue to consolidate his rule and return to the Mubarak-era practice of “president for life.”

To highlight the similarities more concisely:

1. Both revolutions attempted to bring about revolution through non-extralegal, democratic channels.

2. Both revolutionary governments came into power relatively peacefully.

3. Both faced severe opposition internally (from opponents to and extremists within their respective parties) and externally (from the U.S. and other countries).

4. Both faced demonstrations and protests that became increasingly violent in support of and in opposition to the revolutionary government in power.

5. Both governments faced increasing resistance to their revolutionary movement by key, previously very powerful segments of the elite (and increasingly over time, previous marginal supporters – lower-middle class workers unions in particular) as the government further implemented its revolutionary program.

6. Both governments were overthrown by the military as demonstrations by the opposition groups intensified to a maximum.

7. Both military coups ushered in periods of repressive military dictatorships that did not seek to reinstate democracy, but suspend it in favor of consolidating further power for themselves.

In this way, though there are differences in the dynamics and characterizations of the forces involved in the political tumult and in the cultural, political, and historical contexts of the two countries, both revolutions through democratic means failed to achieve revolutionary transformation, but instead resulted in military coups d’état that overturned steps taken to fulfill the respective revolutionary aspirations. The questions that arise, then, is whether revolution is a) possible through democratic means and b) if it is, does it require, as Milliband and Débray seem to believe, a total smashing of the state once the revolutionary group is in power?