The case study of Chile serves as an interesting example of whether or not the implementation of a Marxism is possible through democratic means. In the case of Chile, it would have been unwise to attempt to bring about transformative change through the use of violence. Additionally, if the result of Allende’s election was any indicator, the majority of Chileans were against such radical change. Despite this, to advocate for the stance that violence should have been employed as a tactic for crushing Allende’s opposition, ignores the fact that war would have simply precipitated a swift and overwhelming reaction from the Chilean military. A government is only as strong as its ability to actually enforce its agenda. Without ever maintaining control of the military, or maintaining a majority of society to signal greater legitimacy, the implementation of a radically transformative Marxist agenda seemed destined to fail. It seems to me that Allende was simply too radical for his time, and that Chile was simply not ready for the Marxist agenda that Allende was propagating.
Without the military’s backing, or the majority of society’s support, what could Allende have done after getting elected? A frontal assault on Chiles military would have been fatal, yet history has shown that Allende’s strategy of utilizing an institutional approach had failed as well. Perhaps the solution should have been to actually move slower and more gradually. Of course, this would have stripped Allende of his revolutionary status, but in my estimation, it is better to do some good, moving slowly in the right direction, instead of attempting to move too fast, and getting ousted. In Allende’s own words, “Socialism cannot be imposed by decree”. Since the majority of Chileans did not want socialism, maybe Allende should have exercised more caution in his approach.
I agree with Ashwin’s desire to see more discussion about institutional incentives and other possible routes Allende could have taken, but I think your blog post does a great job of getting at the larger question here: gradualism vs. attempts at immediate efficacy. For me, the job of state building requires rational and mediated thought with an eye looking towards creating institutions that understand and actively combat the ability of tyranny to take hold. I am far more uncomfortable with living in a state that has a governmental mandate rooted in a belief that if something cannot change immediately, the state must implode.
II liked your response and agree with most of it, but I wanted to tease out more from your point that without military’s or popular support Allende’s plan was destined to fail. You are right to point out that a frontal assault on the military certainly seems like it would end in disaster. I would also contend that this would have been the case regardless of popular support of his policies from the majority of Chileans. If that is the case, does popular support for socialism really change the ultimate outcome of this scenario? Certainly Allende’s ambitions resonated with a significant part of Chile’s population before hyperinflation and other strategic failures turned popular support away from him. In looking at the causes for failures of revolutionary leaders through electoral means, I think its important to highlight institutional factors that prevent a truly functioning democracy.