Who needs the law?

Apparently the residents of Chelsea, Massachusetts, do not. In 2006, When Chelsea Energy LLC proposed a diesel-fueled “peak” power plant for the majority-hispanic, largely-impoverished community, the people did not sit back and watch as their environment was further attacked. An area resident, Alejo Sanchez, summed up the situation nicely, remarking through an interpreter, “I have enough problems breathing; this is certainly not going to help” (Kelley). Chelsea resident Carolyn Boumilla-Vega expressed her concern, addressing the fact that “the plant would be across the street from my sons’ school and the only public Elementary School in the City,” adding, “it’s such a ludicrous proposal. I hope the state rejects it immediately” (Kelley). Countless others shared similar sentiments. Community leaders in Chelsea, as well as adjacent East Boston and Revere, started a powerful opposition campaign that would go on to kill the project during the environmental review stage of the process, before legal action was necessary. However, many steps were required to reach that point.

This case exemplifies the potential significant impacts community organizing can have. Two non-profit organizations, Chelsea Collaborative’s Chelsea Green Space and Recreation Committee and Alternatives for Community & Environment (ACE), who were “experienced with the MEPA review process…provided technical and legal assistance” (Estrella-Luna). The community was supported by “local officials, including Senator Jarrett Barrios, Representative Eugene O’Flaherty, the Chelsea City Council and the Revere City Council” (Kelley). They even obtained meetings with the Massachusetts Governor, Deval Patrick. As one resident put it, “they always want to put their dirty industries in communities like Chelsea…but Chelsea has already taken enough. I hope Deval Patrick will put his money where his mouth is about environmental justice” (Kelley). The movement was so effective, he never had to.

The community was swift with action, especially the Chelsea City Council. The Boston Globe reported that “in October 2006…the City Council voted 7 to 4 to adopt a resolution…opposing the power plant” (Conti). This was two months before the proponent filed a petition with the state for the project. Even prior to the October resolution, on September 25, 2006, the City Council stated “that it will not approve the tax relief sought by the developer” (Estrella-Luna). The Boston City Council passed a resolution on January 31, 2007 opposing the power plant. Clearly this movement actively implemented what anthropologist Stuart Kirsch calls the “politics of time” (Estrella-Luna).

One of the most common forms of action taken against the project was presence at meetings to both become informed and challenge the proponent. In opposing the project, Chelsea residents cited the area’s poor air quality and the proposed plant’s proximity to the Mary C. Burke Elementary School Complex. 80-year old Henry Lea spoke at a Chelsea City Council meeting on January 22, 2007 (Casino). They visited the site and organized workshops to fight the plant. According to participant Neenah Estrella-Luna, “community members of Chelsea Green Space, had met and challenged the proponent in their own meetings as well as at meetings the proponent attended with other non-profit groups in the area” (Estrella-Luna). The citizens maintained an online blog that advertised meetings with the shareholding company, Energy Management, Inc. (EMI), state-sponsored public rallies, and meetings of the City Hall Conservation Committee (“STOP Energy Management Inc.”). These people showed up. They asked questions and made themselves heard.

The community used numerous additional strategies to challenge the proponent. Street protests took place in July, 2006 (Estrella-Luna). Community members disrupted a speech by Jim Gordon, the president of EMI, at the World Oil Conference at Boston University in October, 2006 (Estrella-Luna). The activists partnered with the media to disseminate their message.

Estrella-Luna describes, “the Boston Globe wrote two articles about the project before the EENF was even submitted. An additional five articles were published during the 6 months of review. The Boston Globe editorial board also wrote an editorial arguing against the power plant” (Estrella-Luna). Those opposed to the project also did research and spoke with energy consultants to better educate themselves and the community about the issue. Two petitions, including one in Spanish, received a total of 94 signatures. And finally, over 1,800 postcards were sent to Chelsea City Council requesting action (Estrella-Luna).

Perhaps Chelsea residents’ most impressive and effective strategy was their letter-writing campaign during the state-mandated environmental review process.

Under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), the proponent had to submit forms detailing expected environmental impacts for review by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs, Ian Bowles (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). This stage occurs even before the permitting process, and Bowles describes at least eleven permits that the company would need to obtain for the project to continue. He explains that “MEPA subject matter jurisdiction exists over virtually all of the potential environmental impacts of the project” because “those aspects of the project…are likely to directly or indirectly cause Damage to the Environment and that are within the subject matter of required or potentially required state permits or agency actions” (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). His exact legal power is quite limited, however, as he notes, “MEPA is not a permitting process, and does not allow me to approve or deny a project. Rather, it is a process designed to ensure public participation in the state environmental permitting process, to ensure that state permitting agencies have adequate information on which to base their permit decisions…and to ensure that potential environmental impacts are fully described and avoided, minimized and mitigated to the maximum extent feasible” (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). The opponents to the project utilized his limited power to its full effect.

The goal of the letters was to both express opposition to the injustices of the problem and address areas of the filing that were problematic, in hope that Bowles would be thorough in critiquing the proponent. In total, Bowles received 761 comment letters critiquing EMI’s Expanded Environmental Notification Form and the Draft Environmental Impact Report (Estrella-Luna). The contents of the letters varied. The majority expressed concerns with health, the environment, and the proximity to the elementary school complex (Estrella-Luna). Other common themes were the “existing disproportionate environmental burden and existing high levels of poor health” and that “the power plant would be a setback to efforts to revitalize the city of Chelsea” (Estrella-Luna).  Citizens as young as 15 wrote letters. Some comments merely read “No power plant in Chelsea.” One person wrote, “Personally, I think it’s bullshit” (Estrella-Luna). Some letters included detailed analyses of the documents themselves, noting issues in the filing process. The aiding environmental organizations helped these people sift through the documents, making the community members themselves the experts.

On May 18, 2007, Ian Bowles wrote that “at its proposed location, the project appears unlikely to be able to be permitted. If the proponent chooses to continue through the MEPA process, it does so at its own risk” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). He added that “many commenters have written with thoughtful and detailed recommendations regarding additional information and analysis needed, and I appreciate all the comments received” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”) Merely six months later, EMI pulled out from the project. Perhaps they had not anticipated such intense resistance (Conti).

But this was not the first time Chelsea defeated the big corporation. In 1997, “residents denounced plans by a company to convert waterfront oil tanks into asphalt batching centers…later signed into law by then-acting governor Paul Cellucci, banning asphalt batching and storage plants from being placed near residential neighborhoods in three communities, including Chelsea” (Conti). The people of Chelsea have a fire within them, understandably from the years of environmental abuse they have received. Their persistence and strength in numbers shows that sometimes a judge is not required to save the community. As T.J Hellman, coordinator of Chelsea Collaborative’s Chelsea Green Space and Recreation Committee, put it, “it was beautiful to see so many in the community so united around this issue. You had people from second-graders at the complex writing letters to the governor, to people in their walkers protesting outside City Hall, and jam-packed meetings going to 11 o’clock. It was nice to see so many people mobilized around protecting Chelsea and Chelsea’s environment” (Conti). It was not lawyers protecting Chelsea– it was the people.

Works Cited

Bowles, Ian. “Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report.” Env.state.ma.us. May 18, 2007. Accessed April 16, 2016.http://web1.env.state.ma.us/EEA/emepa/pdffiles/certificates/051807/13927deir.pdf.

Bowles, Ian. “Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Expanded Environmental Notification Form.” Env.state.ma.us. January 29, 2007. Accessed April 16, 2016. http://web1.env.state.ma.us/EEA/emepa/pdffiles/certificates/012907/13927eenf.pdf.

Casino, Paul G. “Meeting Notes.” Chelsea City Council, January 22, 2007, 0-30.

Conti, Katheleen. “No Power Plant, and Chelsea Cheers.” The Boston Globe, November 18, 2007. Accessed May 3, 2016. http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/11/18/no_power_plant_and_chelsea_cheers/.

Estrella-Luna, Neenah. Environmental Review in Massachusetts the Relationships, the Decisions, the Law: A Dissertation. PhD diss., Reproduction De: Dissertation (Ph. D.): Law, Policy and Society: Northeastern University, 2011.

Kelley, Scott. “Boston Area Residents Rally Against Proposal to Build Diesel Power Plant in Chelsea.” Boston Indymedia. January 9, 2007. Accessed May 3, 2016. http://boston.indymedia.org/feature/display/196128.

“STOP Energy Management Inc. From Building a Diesel Power Plant in Chelsea, MA.” Blogspot (blog), January 4, 2007. Accessed May 3, 2016. http://www.savechelsea.blogspot.com/.

A fact is a truth. It is undeniable, unyielding, and perfect. There is no wiggle room within it. And yet…

Jim Gordon’s Energy Management, Inc., through Chelsea Energy, LLC (CE), did an excellent job in 2007 of blurring the lines between fact and fiction in their attempt to gain approval for a 250-watt, diesel-fueled peak power plant on the banks of the Chelsea River, only 1,000 feet from the only elementary school in Chelsea, Massachusetts. Many elected and appointed officials argued that CE misrepresented information, and as we will see, this large corporation employed numerous strategies to warp and manipulate science – facts– of the case to support their environmentally unjust cause. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, Ian Bowles, would need to choose a side: the officials or the company.

Under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), Chelsea Energy had to submit an Expanded Environmental Notification Form (EENF), detailing the project’s expected environmental impacts, to the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs. Ian Bowles, reviewed the document. In an effort to shortcut proceedings, Chelsea Energy asked for permission to submit only a Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR), which Bowles denied, requiring both a Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) and an FEIR. Bowles also reviewed the DEIR (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”), writing that “at its proposed location, the project appears unlikely to be able to be permitted. If the proponent chooses to continue through the MEPA process, it does so at its own risk” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). Many believe these words prompted EMI to terminate its pursuit at the site mere months later.

But how and why did we get to this point? Before Ian Bowles advised the company to discontinue the project, Chelsea Energy, LLC used many tactics to frame the case in ways that would make the plant more likely to win approval.

In both the EENF and the DEIR, Chelsea Energy attempted to cast the diesel-powered plant as a positive addition to the area. The main argument made was that “the project will achieve net air quality benefits by displacing existing ‘spinning reserve’ sources of electricity, including the Mystic 7 and Salem 4 turbines at Mystic Station in Everett and the Salem power plant,” (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”) because “power plants in the NEMA [New England, Massachusetts] area are being operated at environmentally and economically inefficient modes solely for the purpose of providing reserve capacity that could be better met by the quick start capability of the project” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). EMI tried to justify this additional “dirty” energy by essentially saying, “it’s not as bad as everything else that’s there,” a flawed argument at best. They also seem to believe that this plant will be replace the aforementioned turbines’ production rather than just adding to it.

Many government officials called BS to this. As Chelsea City Councilor, Paul R. Nowicki, noted, “the other peaking stations will continue to operate as long as they can provide energy at a profitable rate. The development of this facility could even force the older stations to convert to supplying energy beyond just peak periods, spewing additional pollutants into the air” (Casino). At a meeting in January, 2007, a representative of the proponents stated that “Mystic 7…would operate 23% less and therefore reduce total air impacts by 52%,” but Chelsea City Council President, Roseann T. Bongiovanni, writes that “when Boston Generating, the operators of the Mystic Station, was approached with this data, they responded that “Mystic 7 will not be displaced or shut down if the proposed new plant is built” (Casino). Further, that same Chelsea Energy spokesman said that “Salem 4…would operate 42% less and therefore reduce total air impacts by 42%,” and “when the Independent Systems Operators of New England (ISO-NE) were contacted about this project and the statements made by the proponents, ISO-NE stated that when there is a need for energy during peak times, ISONE will call on all of the sources necessary to produce the energy needed” (Casino). So rather than the proposed plant reducing the production of pre-existing plants, all three would potentially operate at the same time. Ian Bowles further added that “no supporting information is provided within the EENF to document that the use of spinning reserve units will change or that commercial and industrial facilities will significantly reduce the use of emergency engines generators” (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). Clearly the proponent has no real basis for its assertions and merely attempted to spit out some numbers and percentages in order to pacify any resistance. As we will see, this tactic failed a number of times.

EMI attempted to put a positive spin on the project in many other instances. In the DEIR, the proponent “asserts that the project will have minimal impact on the community and the environment through the use of Ultra-Low Sulfur Distillate (ULSD) fuel, Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), and a variety of mitigation measures to offset environmental impact” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). Chelsea Energy, LLC also “concludes that the net change in vessel supply traffic is unchanged, with or without the project,” to which Bowles responded, “given that project will increase demand for ULSD beyond existing conditions, I believe that this assumption may be flawed” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). They further assert that “the project will help the City attract high technology businesses and retain existing food production, warehousing, and other businesses” (Casino). All of these neutral or positive results have little or no merit. Placing a diesel-run power plant in an already-environmentally-damaged community merely dirties it. The project is not glamorous or shiny. It will not attract anything– it will repel everything.

Another common ploy used by the proponent to manipulate the story was the use of hypothetical limits of activity to estimate impacts of the project. EMI stated on countless occasions that they “will limit facility operation to no more than 1,600 turbine hours per year” (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”) and “a maximum 8-hour operating time per day (or 24-hour period)” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). Limiting the plant is not an issue, but how it uses these spoken limits can be problematic. First, in the EENF they do not explain exactly how they plan on maintaining the 1,600 hour limit (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). Nowicki points out that “the plant is ‘expected to operate only during peak energy demand periods.’ The use of the word ‘expected’ appears to leave the door open for operating over above such ‘peak demand periods’” (Casino). Second, and most importantly, they use their made-up limits to calculate environmental impacts rather than worst-case-scenario data. When estimating how much water the plant would use per day, they used an assumption of four-hour days (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). Perhaps the greatest issue comes with their use of the SCREEN3 model to calculate estimated impacts over different time period. The proponent pro-rated the test, meaning they scaled the results based on their hypothetical time limits for the plant rather than maximum possible usage, which is an issue “because there are no guarantees that the proponents will operate the power plant for less than 8 hours per day or less than 24 hours in one time frame” (Casino). Furthermore, “according to a widely recognized air expert…the proponents should be ‘embarrassed that they attempted to do so’” (Casino). Nowicki claims that “the results of the total SCREEN3 test would exceed EPA limits, if not pro-rated” (Casino). So this misuse of self-created restrictions improperly cushions what would be serious environmental impacts.

Chelsea Energy, LLC tends to present its data in general forms, often lacking explanations of how they arrived at their conclusions. Bowles writes that in the EENF, “much of the information is provided in summary form, and many fundamental questions remain about the proposed project,” as well as “the lack of…more substantial air quality data and analysis within the Expanded ENF does not allow me to evaluate whether all feasible means to avoid potential environmental impacts have been identified and evaluated” (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). They only said how much traffic would increase, failing to indicate how they came to this (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”). The DEIR also failed to quantify the annual CO2 emissions, despite indicating that they “would total less than 1% of the Massachusetts emissions cap” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). They additionally omit significant, even critical information, including the emission rate of particulate matter 2.5 (PM2.5), which is “linked to increases in mortality, chronic bronchitis, heart attacks, chronic lung disease, asthma, pneumonia, lower and upper respiratory symptoms, days lost at work and emergency room visits” (Casino). The proponent also “assumed that all PM10 was also PM2.5, thereby assuming a worst-case scenario in light of limited data and specific air quality modeling techniques for PM2.5” (“Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report”). Overall, these generalizations tend to cover up holes in the data, while, once again, attempting to satisfy critics.

EMI also tended to ignore the pre-existing environmental conditions when creating data. Bowles notes that “there is no discussion in the EENF of monitored ambient air quality and the potential cumulative effect of the project and existing air quality stressors,” (“Expanded Environmental Notification Form”) and that they “should provide baseline data on public health conditions in order to effectively assess potential future impacts as a result of air emissions from the project” (“Draft Environmental Impact Report”). One of the greatest injustices of the project is that it victimizes communities already in dangerous environmental conditions, and the proponent attempts to ignore those facts.

Bowles’s recommendation for the proponent to discontinue the project at the location came after the determination that the project was not indeed water-dependent as the proponent had indicated, and that an alternative site in Everett was feasible. Chelsea Energy, LLC purported that it would obtain its fuel via boat, making it water-dependent. The fuel would be delivered via boat, but to the Gulf Oil tank located adjacently to the site (“Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report”). Delivery to the actual plant would take place via truck, not boat, hence the ruling. Further, an inland site plan, in Everett, a majority white community, was “not demonstrate[d]” to be “infeasible” (“Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report”). The proponent’s desire to remain at this site and this site only led them to further manipulate the case’s facts and eventually caused them to be advised against the project altogether.

A fact is corporate tool. It is malleable, disputable, and imperfect. There is infinite wiggle room within it. It is the mask behind which the villains hide.

Works Cited

Bowles, Ian. “Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report.” Env.state.ma.us. May 18, 2007. Accessed April 16, 2016.http://web1.env.state.ma.us/EEA/emepa/pdffiles/certificates/051807/13927deir.pdf.

Bowles, Ian. “Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Expanded Environmental Notification Form.” Env.state.ma.us. January 29, 2007. Accessed April 16, 2016. http://web1.env.state.ma.us/EEA/emepa/pdffiles/certificates/012907/13927eenf.pdf.

Casino, Paul G. “Meeting Notes.” Chelsea City Council, January 22, 2007, 0-30.

Jim Gordon.

An article in Fast Company, a business magazine, proclaims, “Jim Gordon May Have an Answer to our Energy Problem,” (Kermit) while another periodical praises “the dogged, dauntless determination of Jim Gordon” (Struck). So who is this guy and why do people say he is our energy savior?

Jim Gordon is the president of Energy Management, Inc. (EMI), “a privately held energy company” that “has earned a reputation for completing environmentally superior facilities,” (“Project Ownership Info”) supposedly. They claim that “in 2000, EMI’s principals sold their interests in its portfolio of natural gas-fired facilities and changed their focus to developing renewable energy projects” and that “Energy Management, Inc. is proud to be known as a developer with a history of building clean, community-friendly power plants” (“Project Ownership Info”). Gordon has been said to have “zeal and conviction,”  and be “a brilliant marketer,” “a big thinker,” a pioneer, and even a hero (Kermit)(Struck). He has been critical of the not-in-my-backyard mentality, critiquing “some of the wealthiest, most politically influential people in the world” who “simply don’t want to see wind turbines as they gaze out from their verandas” (Struck).

He has landed himself on the map with his bold, “tenacious” (Kermit) plan for Cape Wind. The project is Gordon’s attempt to create the first offshore wind farm in the U.S. (“Cape Wind Project Overview”). He wants to build 130 wind turbines in Nantucket Sound, just off the coast of Cape Cod, that “cleanly produce 75% of the electricity used on Cape Cod and the Islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket with zero pollution emissions” (“Cape Wind Project Overview”).

This is undeniably an important project in this day and age of climate change, but just to pry a little, we will try to determine why Nantucket Sound was the lucky area selected for this ambitious venture. He claims that “nobody will ever embargo it, nobody will ever manipulate it…This is our own domestic resource we’re blessed to have off of the coast here. We’re hoping Cape Wind can inspire other communities to look at their indigenous energy resources” (Kermit). The Cape Wind project asserts that the site is “the most technically optimal offshore wind power site in the United States” (“Cape Wind Project Overview”). So Gordon is an environmental hero, right?

Not so fast. Some statistics jump out at me as possible indications of Gordon and EMI not being as “clean,” per se, as they would like to demonstrate. According to Census 2000 data, Cape Cod is nearly 96 percent white. Half the population is older than 45 years old, and the 7 percent poverty rate is lower than the Massachusetts average (“Socio-Demographic Profile of Barnstable County, Massachusetts”). So, essentially, Cape Wind, this undeniably positive project, serves, generally, somewhat older and wealthier white people. This is not a huge issue, as long as less-wealthy minority populations are receiving at least the same, environmentally-friendly treatment from Gordon and company. So are they?

Chelsea, a city north of Boston, is “a historically industrial…densely developed city.” In 2007, Latinos comprised 48 percent of the city’s population, and 23.2 percent of the total population lived beneath the poverty line (“Brownfields 2007 Grant Fact Sheet: Chelsea”). The city faces already high levels of pollution, with diesel exhaust rates five times the national average (Durrant). The most prominent body of water, Chelsea Creek “is lined with liquefied natural gas tanks and other fuel depots, a couple of small marinas, a number of wharves, barges, and piers in various states of disrepair, plus a huge pile of salt and a satellite parking lot serving Logan Airport” (“Cape Wind Parent Co. Seeks to Build “peak Power” Plant in Chelsea”). Asthma rates exceed the national as well (Huisingh).

Gordon had a plan for Chelsea, but it was not for wind turbines or solar panels. In 2006, EMI, through Chelsea Energy LLC, proposed a 250-megawatt, diesel-fueled power plant. The planned “peak plant” would serve 180,000 homes during “peak” hours– typically hot summer afternoons and cold winter evenings (Howe). Two 150-foot smokestacks would tower over the city, adding to already-dangerous levels of pollution. Oh yeah, and the plant site would be right on the creek, only 1,000 feet from the Burke Elementary School complex (Howe).

Naturally, the residents of Chelsea and the surrounding communities were not in a hurry to thank Mr. Gordon. These actions were rightfully seen as hypocritical, and EMI was even accused of having “a pattern of discriminating, looking for places where people don’t have the political power to push back against these polluting power plants” (Struck). With Chelsea, EMI made a mistake in site selection. The people of Chelsea pushed back and pushed back hard.

There are a few issues at play here. The most obvious of them being the inequalities between the predominantly white communities of Cape Cod and the predominantly minority communities of the Chelsea area. Environmental conditions were unequal to begin with. Chelsea already is an environmentally toxic area, known to produce health risks like asthma, whereas Cape Cod, being less industrial, has a much less hazardous environmental situation. These pre-existing inequalities come from many complex sources, but still very real ones. Institutional racism, acting through the housing market, health care services, and other systemic organizations, created the initial situation. Energy Management, Inc. is only exacerbating environmental inequality in eastern Massachusetts. The proposed power plant would have increased health issues in Chelsea. Furthermore, the diesel-run power plant would deter investment from a community already struggling economically. On the other hand, wind turbines further advance the positive image of the Cape as well as health. Not only would residents receive clean energy, but they would have gigantic wind turbines that could be seen from miles and miles away, an immediate sign of a striving, eco-friendly community that would be a great place to live. Jim Gordon and EMI are only furthering inequality that exists between minority, low-income and wealthy, white communities.

Citizens of Chelsea were vocal in opposition. “Chelsea and its residents deserves better!” writes the Vice President of the Chelsea City Council (Casino). He adds, “We do not need any additional pollution in our air that would cause additional harm to our children and residents of this city.” Another community member expressed concern over psychological effects: “This … will convince the children that they live in a dump of a city, where the government dumps whatever trash they have” (Estrella-Luna). Some were most direct, simply stating, “No power plant in Chelsea.” This was a serious issue for the people.

Perhaps a more subtle yet important issue here is another involving image: the image of Jim Gordon and Energy Management, Inc.. The idea of a wind farm is inherently positive (ironically some rich white people oppose it because of view obstruction, which goes into even deeper issues of privilege), and so the Cape Wind project has given EMI a largely positive appearance in the environmental world. This front of clean energy pacifies the public so they no longer feel the need to ask questions. A wind farm is a wind farm is a wind farm, or so they seem to think. But we cannot just accept this; we must ask the questions and delve deeper. Who benefits from the wind farm? Who doesn’t benefit from the wind farm? What else is this company doing in other areas? Once we begin to ask these questions, we begin to see the truth behind it all– the man behind the mask that is Jim Gordon.

This is not to say that Cape Wind is a bad project. With the state of the environment and where it is heading, changes must be made, and the use of wind power is of course a part of that change. But attempting to build one wind farm should not be enough. It should not excuse the big company from trying to dump disease and illness on those who they believe cannot fight back. We must ask the questions. We must demand more of these companies. And we cannot allow the image of a wind farm and wealth to negate an image of soot and poverty.

Jim Gordon is no hero. Praising him as one is more dangerous than any power plant.

Works Cited

“Brownfields 2007 Grant Fact Sheet: Chelsea.” Environmental Protection Agency. Accessed March 17, 2016. http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/P1008GST.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index=2006+Thru+2010&Docs=&Query=   &Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=& QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp =0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data%5C06thru10 %5CTxt%5C00000020%5CP1008GST.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password =anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C-&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/ x150y150g16/i425&Display=p%7Cf&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack= ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages =1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL.

“Cape Wind Parent Co. Seeks to Build “peak Power” Plant in Chelsea.” Cape Cod Today. July 3, 2006. https://www.capecodtoday.com/article/2006/07/03/11184-Cape-Wind-parent-co-seeks-build-peak-power-plant-Chelsea.

“Cape Wind Project Overview.” Cape Wind. Accessed March 17, 2016. http://www.capewind.org/what/overview.

Casino, Paul G. “Meeting Notes.” Chelsea City Council, January 22, 2007, 0-30.

Durrant, Colin. “Developer Pulls Plans for Chelsea Power Plant.” Conservation Law Foundation. November 14, 2007. http://www.clf.org/newsroom/developer-pulls-plans-for-chelsea-power-plant/.

Estrella-Luna, Neenah. Environmental Review in Massachusetts the Relationships, the Decisions, the Law: A Dissertation. PhD diss., Reproduction De: Dissertation (Ph. D.): Law, Policy and Society: Northeastern University, 2011.

Howe, Peter J. “Cape Wind Developer Pulls Plans for Oil-powered Plant.” Boston.com. November 15, 2007. http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/11/15/cape_wind_developer_pulls_plans_for_oil_powered_plant/.

United States of America. Massachusetts Department of Public Health. Executive Office of Health and Human Services. Burden of Asthma in Massachusetts. By Carrie Huisingh. April 2009. http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/com-health/asthma/burden-in-mass.doc.

Pattison, Kermit. “Jim Gordon May Have an Answer to Our Energy Problems.” Fast Company. June 7, 2007. http://www.fastcompany.com/76794/jim-gordon-may-have-answer-our-energy-problems.

“Project Ownership Info.” GRU. Accessed March 17, 2016. https://www.gru.com/Portals/0/Legacy/Pdf/futurePower/Appendix 10 – Project Ownership Info.pdf.

“Socio-Demographic Profile of Barnstable County, Massachusetts.” BC Human Services. Accessed March 17, 2016. http://www.bchumanservices.net/library/2010/04/thc2001IRORFAV1sdprofile.pdf.

Struck, Doug. “The Dogged, Dauntless Determination of Jim Gordon.” The Daily Climate. October 13, 2014. http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2014/10/jim-gordon-cape-wind.