While reading about and discussing the case of Chile’s revolution, I repeatedly drew connections to Egypt’s experience during the Arab Spring uprisings. To be fair, there are distinctive differences between Egypt and Chile’s experiences and contexts, but I think the comparison still merits attention: two revolutionary forces (socialist in Chile and Islamist in Egypt) sought to transform each country peacefully and through democratic channels, only to be ousted quickly through coups d’état of the military, which then retained control of political society in a harsh, repressive way.
In the case of Egypt, the political tumult that ensued during the brief Muslim Brotherhood presidency under Morsi was not a right backlash against the left, but rather a left backlash against the right. Further, Egypt was not democratic in any real sense of the word (yes, there were multi-party elections in 2005 under Mubarak, but there was never any question that Mubarak would win the presidential election by a landslide.), but rather an authoritarian regime in which the military occupied a privileged position politically and socioeconomically. Egypt attempted to transition to democracy after the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011, which ushered in the Muslim Brotherhood through the country’s first largely free and fair election. However, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a socially conservative Islamist organization, sought to transform Egyptian society and the political system into an Islamic republic with Shari’a Law as the supreme law of the land. For a country which had been staunchly secular, this would be a radical overhaul of the political and social organization of the country, particularly considering that Egypt also has a sizeable (though still minority) Christian population. While these differences are numerable, the following should hopefully clarify the similarities that exist between the Chilean and Egyptian experiences.
In Egypt, after the overthrow of Mubarak through largely peaceful demonstrations, the largest of which occurred in Tahrir Square in Cairo, the military ushered in a transitional government that set the stage for the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 2011-early 2012. As in Chile, in which a coalescence of perceived economic exasperation, political frustration of several segments of the middle and lower classes (in Egypt, worker unions favored the Muslim Brotherhood), and a desire for transformative change, enabled for a more extremist party to gain power, Egypt elected the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood into office. However, it quickly became apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood, like Allende’s Unidad Popular, sought to transform political society in ways inimical to key, powerful segments of the population – namely, the sociopolitical elites of Egypt and Chile (in Egypt, this was wealthy businessmen and others connected to Mubarak’s inner circle and/or the military-police apparatus). Similarly to Allende, the Muslim Brotherhood under Morsi was never able to capture and gain control over, or at the least, some form of cooperative relationship with these key segments of society. As a result, in aiming to push through revolutionary initiatives and programs through democratic channels (i.e. the legislature, executive branch, judiciary), Morsi and his party members in power found it very difficult to do so, facing stiff resistance internally within the legislature and through non-compliance of the judiciary, military, and police apparatuses from even more extreme right-wing groups (Salafi Jihadi Movement) and from left-wing groups (Strong Egypt Party, The Social Democratic Party, etc) and externally from other countries, especially the U.S.. Nonetheless, Morsi and his allies hurriedly drafted a new constitution that was put to a referendum, which while showing that roughly 2/3 of those who voted were in favor of the new constitution, such numbers far overestimated the popular support it received, for many opposition groups advocated for and carried out a boycott of the referendum vote. The new constitution was hailed by critics as either to Islamist and to favorable to the Muslim Brotherhood on the left, while on the right, the Salafis believed it was not extreme enough. Regardless, the approval and institutionalization of the new constitution is largely viewed in retrospect as the final straw that ushered in the military coup d’état led by Al-Sisi (who was a key player in the transitional military government post-Mubarak and pre-Morsi) coupled with the inability of Morsi’s government to resolve economic issues, security problems (the military and police did not cooperate with Morsi), energy shortages, and the breakdown of Egypt’s short-lived democratic experiment (increasingly violent protests by and clashes between supporters and opponents continued throughout Morsi’s presidency and played a role in the government’s relative paralysis), though such crises and government deficiencies were in part a result of the internal and external opposition Morsi faced. As a result, just over a year after Morsi’s election, the Egyptian military, who had the most to lose with Morsi’s ascendancy, led a coalition of opposition forces to arrest Morsi and many of his supporters and to suspend the newly implemented Constitution.
In the wake of Al-Sisi’s coup, which the U.S. refused to denote as such, but rather viewed favorably, Al-Sisi and his coup supporters ushered in a period of repressive military rule under which human rights abuses have increased dramatically, the economic situation has deteriorated further, the nation has been in a quasi-permanent state of emergency, and civil society has been severely debilitated. Al-Sisi, like Pinochet, created a military dictatorship which, at least as of right now, does not seem to be reinstating democratic principles, though like Pinochet, developed and instituted its own constitution. Instead, there are many concerns that Al-Sisi will continue to consolidate his rule and return to the Mubarak-era practice of “president for life.”
To highlight the similarities more concisely:
1. Both revolutions attempted to bring about revolution through non-extralegal, democratic channels.
2. Both revolutionary governments came into power relatively peacefully.
3. Both faced severe opposition internally (from opponents to and extremists within their respective parties) and externally (from the U.S. and other countries).
4. Both faced demonstrations and protests that became increasingly violent in support of and in opposition to the revolutionary government in power.
5. Both governments faced increasing resistance to their revolutionary movement by key, previously very powerful segments of the elite (and increasingly over time, previous marginal supporters – lower-middle class workers unions in particular) as the government further implemented its revolutionary program.
6. Both governments were overthrown by the military as demonstrations by the opposition groups intensified to a maximum.
7. Both military coups ushered in periods of repressive military dictatorships that did not seek to reinstate democracy, but suspend it in favor of consolidating further power for themselves.
In this way, though there are differences in the dynamics and characterizations of the forces involved in the political tumult and in the cultural, political, and historical contexts of the two countries, both revolutions through democratic means failed to achieve revolutionary transformation, but instead resulted in military coups d’état that overturned steps taken to fulfill the respective revolutionary aspirations. The questions that arise, then, is whether revolution is a) possible through democratic means and b) if it is, does it require, as Milliband and Débray seem to believe, a total smashing of the state once the revolutionary group is in power?