Author Archives: Danielle Grier

The Cases of Chile & Egypt

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While reading about and discussing the case of Chile’s revolution, I repeatedly drew connections to Egypt’s experience during the Arab Spring uprisings. To be fair, there are distinctive differences between Egypt and Chile’s experiences and contexts, but I think the comparison still merits attention: two revolutionary forces (socialist in Chile and Islamist in Egypt) sought to transform each country peacefully and through democratic channels, only to be ousted quickly through coups d’état of the military, which then retained control of political society in a harsh, repressive way.

In the case of Egypt, the political tumult that ensued during the brief Muslim Brotherhood presidency under Morsi was not a right backlash against the left, but rather a left backlash against the right. Further, Egypt was not democratic in any real sense of the word (yes, there were multi-party elections in 2005 under Mubarak, but there was never any question that Mubarak would win the presidential election by a landslide.), but rather an authoritarian regime in which the military occupied a privileged position politically and socioeconomically. Egypt attempted to transition to democracy after the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011, which ushered in the Muslim Brotherhood through the country’s first largely free and fair election. However, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a socially conservative Islamist organization, sought to transform Egyptian society and the political system into an Islamic republic with Shari’a Law as the supreme law of the land. For a country which had been staunchly secular, this would be a radical overhaul of the political and social organization of the country, particularly considering that Egypt also has a sizeable (though still minority) Christian population. While these differences are numerable, the following should hopefully clarify the similarities that exist between the Chilean and Egyptian experiences.

In Egypt, after the overthrow of Mubarak through largely peaceful demonstrations, the largest of which occurred in Tahrir Square in Cairo, the military ushered in a transitional government that set the stage for the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 2011-early 2012. As in Chile, in which a coalescence of perceived economic exasperation, political frustration of several segments of the middle and lower classes (in Egypt, worker unions favored the Muslim Brotherhood), and a desire for transformative change, enabled for a more extremist party to gain power, Egypt elected the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood into office. However, it quickly became apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood, like Allende’s Unidad Popular, sought to transform political society in ways inimical to key, powerful segments of the population – namely, the sociopolitical elites of Egypt and Chile (in Egypt, this was wealthy businessmen and others connected to Mubarak’s inner circle and/or the military-police apparatus). Similarly to Allende, the Muslim Brotherhood under Morsi was never able to capture and gain control over, or at the least, some form of cooperative relationship with these key segments of society. As a result, in aiming to push through revolutionary initiatives and programs through democratic channels (i.e. the legislature, executive branch, judiciary), Morsi and his party members in power found it very difficult to do so, facing stiff resistance internally within the legislature and through non-compliance of the judiciary, military, and police apparatuses from even more extreme right-wing groups (Salafi Jihadi Movement) and from left-wing groups (Strong Egypt Party, The Social Democratic Party, etc) and externally from other countries, especially the U.S.. Nonetheless, Morsi and his allies hurriedly drafted a new constitution that was put to a referendum, which while showing that roughly 2/3 of those who voted were in favor of the new constitution, such numbers far overestimated the popular support it received, for many opposition groups advocated for and carried out a boycott of the referendum vote. The new constitution was hailed by critics as either to Islamist and to favorable to the Muslim Brotherhood on the left, while on the right, the Salafis believed it was not extreme enough. Regardless, the approval and institutionalization of the new constitution is largely viewed in retrospect as the final straw that ushered in the military coup d’état led by Al-Sisi (who was a key player in the transitional military government post-Mubarak and pre-Morsi) coupled with the inability of Morsi’s government to resolve economic issues, security problems (the military and police did not cooperate with Morsi), energy shortages, and the breakdown of Egypt’s short-lived democratic experiment (increasingly violent protests by and clashes between supporters and opponents continued throughout Morsi’s presidency and played a role in the government’s relative paralysis), though such crises and government deficiencies were in part a result of the internal and external opposition Morsi faced. As a result, just over a year after Morsi’s election, the Egyptian military, who had the most to lose with Morsi’s ascendancy, led a coalition of opposition forces to arrest Morsi and many of his supporters and to suspend the newly implemented Constitution.

In the wake of Al-Sisi’s coup, which the U.S. refused to denote as such, but rather viewed favorably, Al-Sisi and his coup supporters ushered in a period of repressive military rule under which human rights abuses have increased dramatically, the economic situation has deteriorated further, the nation has been in a quasi-permanent state of emergency, and civil society has been severely debilitated. Al-Sisi, like Pinochet, created a military dictatorship which, at least as of right now, does not seem to be reinstating democratic principles, though like Pinochet, developed and instituted its own constitution. Instead, there are many concerns that Al-Sisi will continue to consolidate his rule and return to the Mubarak-era practice of “president for life.”

To highlight the similarities more concisely:

1. Both revolutions attempted to bring about revolution through non-extralegal, democratic channels.

2. Both revolutionary governments came into power relatively peacefully.

3. Both faced severe opposition internally (from opponents to and extremists within their respective parties) and externally (from the U.S. and other countries).

4. Both faced demonstrations and protests that became increasingly violent in support of and in opposition to the revolutionary government in power.

5. Both governments faced increasing resistance to their revolutionary movement by key, previously very powerful segments of the elite (and increasingly over time, previous marginal supporters – lower-middle class workers unions in particular) as the government further implemented its revolutionary program.

6. Both governments were overthrown by the military as demonstrations by the opposition groups intensified to a maximum.

7. Both military coups ushered in periods of repressive military dictatorships that did not seek to reinstate democracy, but suspend it in favor of consolidating further power for themselves.

In this way, though there are differences in the dynamics and characterizations of the forces involved in the political tumult and in the cultural, political, and historical contexts of the two countries, both revolutions through democratic means failed to achieve revolutionary transformation, but instead resulted in military coups d’état that overturned steps taken to fulfill the respective revolutionary aspirations. The questions that arise, then, is whether revolution is a) possible through democratic means and b) if it is, does it require, as Milliband and Débray seem to believe, a total smashing of the state once the revolutionary group is in power?

 

On a Spectrum

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For me, there is no one set model of a revolution, but rather revolutions can occur along a spectrum, each with its own subset of a laundry list of ingredients, though all, regardless of particulars, seek to radically upend the existing framework of cultural, social, economic and/or political relations in favor of another — whether or not the revolution actually does so, is a matter of its success or failure. The following is a very basic definition of the extreme points of the revolutionary spectrum, and so is neither fully comprehensive nor fully fleshed out, but I think hits at what I see as the main points defining the boundaries of the revolutionary spectrum.

At one extreme is revolution as a particular and distinct strain of a social movement, either imposed top-down by elites or brought about from the bottom-up through public participation (how much can vary), in which there is no violence and which does not necessarily, but can, involve transitions of power (through nonviolent means). Revolutionary social movements nevertheless aim to radically transform the existing regime infrastructure and broader society through peaceful means. At the other end of the spectrum, is revolution as a particular form of civil war (a revolutionary civil war, some might say), whereby there is extreme, all-consuming violence (perhaps total warfare) between various groups contending to be sole sovereigns over a regime – which will be subject to radical transformation as a group is able to consolidate (or re-consolidate) their hegemony over the other contending groups. The rate of (active) popular participation in the extreme case of the revolutionary social movement is likely to be less than in the extreme case of the revolutionary civil war. While there are other variables that surely come into play – demographics of the revolutionaries, urban or rural-based, particular historical conditions, current context of the pre-revolutionary state (i.e. how “transitioned” is it – agrarian, semi-agrarian, semi-industrialized; weak state, strong state; etc.), etc. – these are, in my mind at least, variables of revolutions that likely effect the direction and nature of the revolution, but not the definition of what revolution is itself.

The UN as Embodying Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Narratives

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Within the UN, there has been a growing challenge to Western power by the BRICS countries, economically and politically, for as the BRICS countries increasingly develop economically, they have been able to shift the balance of power, thereby challenging Western hegemony. The UN, as a bastion of Western neoliberal ideology, was instituted with the rise of American hegemony and has been viewed as largely furthering Western interests and ideas of rule of law, market economies, and human rights in the name of peace. However, given the disparities in the ability and willingness–economically, politically, militarily, etc.–to implement and enforce such policies, many developing countries have begun to form an oppositional bloc to Western powers, namely the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe.

This is has manifested itself in terms of resistance to Western financial institutions and free trade policies, which are viewed as propagating Western interests at the expense of the economic well-being of developing countries, and instead have advocated for policies that relax free trade provisions, and environmental and labor standards for developing countries. Also part of the growing counter-hegemonic narrative of the BRICS countries is evident in the divergence in the interpretation of human rights and on how and when they should be implemented within countries. The West espouses a very different doctrine of human rights, particularly concerning civil and political rights, than do BRICS and developing countries, whose emphasis is almost always on economic and cultural rights with at times blatant disregard for civil and political rights. This is particularly evident through the East Asian understanding of human rights put forth by East Asian statesmen, who state that East Asian values privilege the collective over the individual, stability over conflict, welfare over freedom, and authority over self-assertion (see Bell, Nathan, and Peleg, 2001). Therefore, the Asian Values debate has produced a counter-hegemonic narrative within human rights, in which East Asian states and other developing countries that have joined the bloc, have argued for a relativist interpretation of human rights over universalism that prizes economic development, sovereignty, and political stability, such that accordingly Western human rights values long espoused and institutionalized in the UN under the UDHR, are inimical to developing countries’ priorities, cultural practices, and objectives. Thus, even though the UN is viewed as a neoliberal institution serving the interests of Western powers and propagating Western global hegemony, there has been a growing counter-hegemonic narrative put forth by the increasingly economically and politically powerful BRICS countries, which has attracted other developing countries to present a mounting counter-hegemonic discourse to Western international organizations and ideology.

Civil War Revolutionaries or Revolutionary Civil Wars?

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At the end of the selection from Armitage’s piece on the Civil War in an Age of Revolutions, he writes that “when tracing the genealogy of modern revolutions, we should seriously consider the hypothesis that civil war was the genus of which revolution was only a species” (p. 158). This is an interesting assertion, for it posits that all revolutions are in fact civil wars, or rather wars between groups belonging to the same political entity, but which, even if not initially, seek to fundamentally change the distribution of power and to gain sovereignty for or over a particular group of people (rather than over a specified territory).

The key words, I believe, are sovereignty and people. Sovereignty is one of those weighty words in political science and international relations, but at its most basic is supreme authority, whether that is supreme authority within specified borders, for a particular group of people, or over one particular aspect of the state. In any event, sovereignty in whatever form is then inherently focused on changing the distribution of power, though in regards to what and how and for or over whom may remain unresolved questions even after the war. If this is so, then is revolution the act of struggling to attain sovereignty for or over a group of people? Or is it the actual fulfillment of sovereignty for or over a group of people, or does it encompass both?

Either way, the critical point is that revolutions are civil wars, but also that civil wars can become revolutionary. They become revolutionary through an assertion of sovereignty for or over a group of people that were once part of the same political entity as the other group(s). This analysis subsequently raises a host of further questions, such as what is the legal status of revolutionary civil wars? How and why does a group of people come to the collective determination of establishing sovereignty (however defined and envisioned)? Is sovereignty inviolable,or should it be? Why or why not? Does sovereignty provide civil war revolutionaries with a strategic, legal, or other advantage that would otherwise be unattainable if it were any other type of civil war? So, instead of asking why revolutions, perhaps the question should be why sovereignty?

The Psychology of Revolution?

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In order to answer the question of “Why revolutions?”, the social sciences must incorporate human psychology into their structural, economic, and geopolitical arguments. Such existing arguments are surely part of the equation, but are also not the whole picture even if evaluated together. Rather, human psychology is a critical part of understanding why any social movement happens.

The human psyche responds to and is shaped by the surrounding environment in which it finds itself. Take for example, the natural instinct of fight or flight when put in life-threatening situations. Surely while living under a repressive military-police state, there are very literally life or death situations. However, there are also life or death situations in the more figurative sense: who they were, who they are, and who they want to be may very well be under siege, thus creating a psychology of fight or flight.There are always legal, financial, linguistic and cultural barriers to exit regardless of regime-type, which may prevent an individual from fleeing in the literal sense. An individual may be able to find short-term “flight,” perhaps through an easing of repressive regime tendencies as in Iran under the Shah, but the reality of one’s situation will inevitably reassert itself, particularly when there is no outlet for expression or pressure release.

The human psyche, moreover, is known to opt for the path of least resistance, which may well be incremental change within the current system, but if such is no longer an option (due to regime self-preservation, perhaps), then the individual may feel backed into a corner with no way out. What happens? They fight their way out, even if it means death – literal or figurative. It is a sudden, intensely violent action (which does not necessarily imply the use of weapons) meant to preserve one’s self, one’s identity, one’s way of life at all costs when all other options are exhausted or removed. It is in this idea of fighting for preservation, in which traces of the “old” manifest themselves in the “new.” Therefore, if revolutions occur because the human psyche perceives that flight is impossible and that fighting is the only option for preservation of an identity, a way of life, dignity, etc., then it makes sense that elements of what was show up in what comes after revolution.

Further, if I am right in my assessment of human psychology, it also helps to explain in part why a critical mass develops. Each individual has a different breaking point at which the person feels that fighting is the only option, such that some individuals agitate for revolution earlier or later than others. Nonetheless, there is likely to be a sort of convergence to a mass breaking point. Perhaps this is because as more people choose to fight, fighting becomes the path of least resistance, thereby creating Kapuscinski’s moment of viability and supporting the critical mass theory of crowd behavior. In other words, preservation becomes most likely through fighting rather than through flight.

So, why revolutions? The human psyche’s response to its surroundings is inevitably influenced by social science’s explanations of state breakdown, economic distress, and geopolitical considerations, and so are likely to enter into a person’s decision to fight or to flee. However, there exists some point at which the human psyche ultimately chooses to fight if all other viable options are exhausted or removed. It is at the point of critical mass confluence of individuals’ psychological calculations that fight is preferable to flight when there erupts a sudden burst of intense violence on a massive scale – a revolution – thereby enabling for self- or group-preservation.