Evidently, a great percentage of the American populace has lost faith in the U.S.’s system of republican government. Some of the reasons for the changing public opinion include rising income inequality, the perception that the government no longer serves the majority, and the loss of the hope that each successive generation will fair just as well, if not better, than the last. Presumably, the people’s perception of government is shaped so much by technology and the modern media that provides non-stop coverage of the public goings-on of Congress and the presidency. With all the coverage, this may heighten the belief that government is ineffective, and make it seem as if it is moving at a snail’s pace. Undoubtedly the loss of confidence in republican government has led to a surge in support for more pure democracy in America, which both Plato and the Founding Fathers were wary of. While being a system of fewer checks and balances and a higher likelihood of a shift towards tyranny, pure democracy is an enticing idea for many people who seek more tangible results from their government, rather than having to wait for many of the back-room deliberations and political maneuvering. Further, it is apparent that a shift away from the United State’s democratic republicanism would not necessarily be reviled by the people. While most of the foundations of the country’s government remain revered, like the Constitution and Declaration of Independence, a transition to a more authoritarian government may not receive the backlash one might think if politicians devised ways to keep the people happy. Overall, while the foundations of American government remain strong, it is important to keep in mind the growing dissatisfaction of the people.

The recent trend of the United States towards illiberalism can be explained by the increase in political polarization. Zakaria distinguishes a liberal democracy as one that respects the rights of the political minority. Certain countermajoritarian structures are by necessity built in – think the Constitution in the U.S context, the domain of the by design least democratic branch of the government: the judiciary. But others existed informally, shot throughout our democracy. The Senate had traditions, never codified, that dictated how the chamber operated; those are now eroding rapidly, as exemplified by the ending of the judicial filibuster soon after Trump’s election. The norms of American democratic life more broadly are to diffuse to summarize, but they too have been lost, as seen in the World Values Survey cited in the Foa and Mounk reading that claimed Americans have lost faith in democracy and its institutions.

Why has this occurred? The first explanation provided by Foa and Mounk seems persuasive. Citizens are less materially secure than they were in previous generations. That insecurity has translated to a distrust of institutions –  government and the system can no longer be relied on to provide the benefits that once made life stable. This sets up one of the antidemocratic conditions Professor Malekzadeh talked about in the lecture: people believe that every election might have dire consequences for their way of life. If your ideological foes win, history might end. This partisanship is translated into who citizens vote into the Senate. The partisanship currently seen is not contrary to the people’s wishes – it is reflective of it. While most Americans are dissatisfied with Congress as a whole, they hold their own Congressperson in high esteem. They are fine with uncompromising positions, and even prefer them, as can be seen in the spate of primary challenges from the outer ideological fringes of the parties. Party apparatuses are now seen – correctly or incorrectly – as checks to the strident ideological demands of their voter bases. I don’t see this changing until the voters themselves return to a level of security close to the one currently enjoyed by members of Congress.

Fareed Zakaria and other scholars have made the point to distinguish the different gradations of freedom. Zakaria makes the distinction between a liberal and an illiberal democracy, making the point that democracy is about the process for choosing leaders, while liberalism refers to a state in which individual rights are “paramount”. The issue with democracy and politics, as we have discussed, is dealing with difference. When societies are fragmented in terms of their beliefs and backgrounds, how does a state uphold the norms of liberal democracy? Throughout history, the logical form of dealing with difference has been to have the most representation for the majority. Though the United States was weary of this manifestation of democracy from the outset (ie. the creation of the immutable Bill of Rights), it seems that nowadays the trend towards populism has created “too direct a connection between popular passions and public policy”, as Zakaria states. This trend can be seen all around the world, especially when looking at the rise of populists in the United States (Donald Trump) and in European countries like France and Germany. I think that we are going to notice this trend for years to come and see many governments be led by populist, authoritarian leaders such as Trump and Putin. Zakaria’s assertion that these leaders keep a balance between liberalism and illiberalism that keeps people satisfied is a concerning prospect. However, I’m not yet convinced that this sort of balancing game is sustainable. In part this comes from a gut feeling and an innate belief in liberal democracy, however in another way this doubt stems from 20th century history. Most of the rule under military juntas and authoritarian regimes was undone in one way or another. Some people, as in the case of Germany, actually preferred to be ruled by such powers for cultural and economic reasons (ie. an ethos of collective freedom and the devastating effects of inflation and the stock market crash). However, these beliefs were ultimately checked by the forces of liberal democracy. In this case, it was World War II, but in other cases it comes back to an understanding of basic human rights. The “No” vote in Chile was our version of “Yes We Can”, as writer Ariel Dorfman put it.  Perhaps this is too much of an optimistic view, but I do not believe that populism is the end of history as we know it. I think we are going to see periodic shifts from bondage to freedom (and all that comes in between). Hopefully, the consideration of liberal values will come sooner rather than later.

These two rather pessimistic articles both brought up points that were scarily relevant to today’s politics. A lot of the signs of a failing democracy, such as increased illiberalism and populism, are certainly manifested in the age of Trump. Not only do polls show an increased lack of respect for democratic institutions, our president actively tries to undermine institutions such as the judiciary court for his own political purposes. There is also a rising distrust in the press, and a lack of value in the freedom of speech and the press. “Fake news” has made certain groups of people willing to compromise their rights in order to obtain what they feel is unbiased information.

However, none of this feels any more historically significant than movements of the past. Populism swept the country in both the 1890s and the 1930s. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt threatened to pack the Supreme Court in order to push his New Deal reforms. During times of poverty and danger, people have always been willing to relinquish their rights in exchange for security. This is not a new phenomenon. Foa’s point that “parliamentary procedures long reserved for extraordinary circumstances… are now used with stunning regularity” seems to me not a sign of failing democracy. Legislation is manipulated in new ways all of the time, in order to suit the desires of the incumbent Congress.

While I feel that the warning signs pointed out by both the articles are worth paying attention to, I do not think they are signs that America is doomed. This conclusion is also somewhat based on a gut feeling, knowing my own attitudes on American democracy and the attitudes of the people around me. I think that all of the trends discussed in the articles are negative and should be countered, but I do not find them to be any more alarming that historical trends of the past.

From Civil Wars to heart wrenching battles on foreign ground, from economic depressions to the huge industrial and technological boom, and now, having a political atmosphere so polar it is hard for anyone to agree, it is almost shocking that the American government has lasted as long is it has. However, it still stands a individualized but unified country. For a country built on principles purposefully excluding people if you were not white or male, you can expect there to be some major flaws with how our country runs its machine.  Our government and land have yet to collapse (though maybe teetering), but the people in our country have become very strongly separated.This gridlock of views can create a temporary peril in the nation as one side can never seem to compromise with the other. This causes the population to be entrenched in what they believe and only that. Compromise is lost, compassion is hard to find, and our country stands on a teeter-totter of collapse. One could say, yes, American democracy is doomed. However, Americans (on some level) are living here right now because they feel stable here. If the quality of their lives are still on the positive side of the scale. American democracy would truly start to fail if the people and the majority of the people rose up and revolted; if they caused complete havoc forcing it to collapse and turn to turmoil.

While the prospect of American democracy’s possible decline and potential collapse have gained traction over the last decade, and even more so over the last year, the flaws that are currently metastasizing also reveal that American democracy was never a mythical ideal to begin with, and that its built-in contradictions have plagued it throughout its history. While the structure of the constitution has been vital in reproducing institutions and transferring power, the content of that constitution as originally conceived was fraught with the ramifications of building a liberal democracy while maintaining a violently illiberal slave economy. The original compromises of the constitutional convention, from the bicameral legislature to the three-fifths compromise to the Electoral College, all stem from the necessity to capitulate political power to an inherently undemocratic slaveholding south, and that geographic tension has long been the defining divide of partisan politics (political parties, incidentally, were a feature the founders failed to anticipate). The abolition of slavery was only possible with the total breakdown of democracy in a bloody civil war, the subsequent protection of black rights only possible while the South was militarily occupied and the Confederate elites disenfranchised. Periods of consensus and low polarization inevitably relied on compromises with illiberal policies; the Gilded Age allowed terror to sweep the South, the New Deal Coalition codified welfare for whites only. And our current hyper-polarization stems largely from the rise of the post-Reagan right, a backlash against the open embrace of Civil Rights that led to the first black president being succeeded by a man who equivocates on the evils of white supremacy. The question, then, is if American liberal democracy can ever survive without sacrificing a society that is liberal for all, or if those invested in white supremacy will see it fall before letting that happen.