Reading Notes on Ringer (the “Modernization Dilemma”), Vahdat (“God and Juggernaut”) and Mirsepassi (“Negotiating Modernity”)

Class,

Please make sure you read the brief and melancholy story of “The Little Black Fish” in Laura Secor’s magnificent Children of Paradise.  We started the course with an abridged, almost fantastical history of the 1979 Revolution (Shah of Shahs), written in prose that regularly slipped into poetry.  This week Secor helps us to raise the curtain on many if not most of the major themes and players that we’ll come across over the course of the semester, including Al-e Ahmad, Shariati, Motahhari, and of course the author of The Little Black Fish, Behrangi.

Monica Ringer’s concept of “the dilemma of modernity”

What happens when the impetus for change is also the source of desired knowledge?  By the 19th century, Europe, and in particular Russia and England, posed existential threats to the continued existence of Iran as an independent, sovereign country.  Reformers inside and outside of the Qajar monarchy sought solutions to Iranian weakness and decline by looking west, as it were, to the seemingly miraculous achievements of the Europeans in numerous realms of knowledge (the gaze was turned east as well, to India and especially Japan, but that is another story for another time).  This effort to “become European while remaining Persian” raised the specter of the loss of the “true self,” what Monica Ringer describes as the “dilemma of modernity.”  How might Iran import the fruits of European modernity without becoming European, or losing its authenticity?  Does an authentic self exist?  Can the technology and science of modernity (military, political, and natural) be segregated from modernity as a cultural and philosophical experience.  Is it possible to have one without the other?

We’ll see that the response to the European threat came in the form of a negotiation, one in which the call to embrace Europe in all of its glory, completely, was met by admonitions that the good that foreign knowledge must be articulated into local practices and customs, in other words, made “native.”

Farzin Vahdat, God and Juggernaut

Our first cut at conceptualization raised a number of elemental questions:  What does it mean to be modern?  How useful is the term and concept, and what might constitute modernity’s alternative or antecedents?

This week we accelerate the interrogation, running through the proverbial wall, Wile E. Coyote style.  Lots of German and French jargon, with twisting 10-dollar words thrown in for good measure, when a 5-cent phrase will do.

Please, do not freak out!  You’ll have to sit with the words for a time, and if you see fit to study these theories beyond this class, the sitting will last for years.  There’s no way around it, the learning takes time.  That doesn’t mean that we can’t get the gist of what’s being argued by Hegel, Kant, or Foucault.

Vahdat lays out a series of oppositions in the opening of his book, and you may want to start thinking critically whether this approach leads to unnecessary and false binaries.  Thus, he pairs modernity as a “good” and emancipatory force for liberation, unprecedented in human history, against its tendency to take on disciplinary and dominative form, made manifest in the pathologies of positivism, colonialism, oppression along racial, ethnic, economic, and gender lines.

He also pairs, in somewhat confusing fashion, “subjectivity” with “universalism,” which he fits together Power Ranger style and calls “universal subjectivity.”

We’ll take each of these pairings in turn during discussion on Monday.  Don’t get bogged down in the verbiage of Vahdat’s sometimes clumsy presentation. His argument is actually straightforward:  Everything begins with the recognition of human agency, with the movement away from the sacred to the profane, a movement that begins in Europe but then quickly spreads to the rest of the world as a global phenomenon.  It’s impossible to overstate how unprecedented this transformation in the social, cultural, economic, and political lives of communities was, or how disruptive it was and remains throughout the world (see the reference to Marshall Berman/Karl Marx in Mirsepassi, “all that is solid melts into air”).

Agency implies no limits on the individual, yet it remains an open question whether absolute freedom and agency is possible outside of the presence of limits and boundaries.  If that sounds like a paradox, then you’re on the right path…This tension is what Vahdat aims to capture, and it’s the dilemma that the early modernizing intellectuals of Iran will face in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Please take note of the names and basic approaches of men like Malkum Khan and Afghani.  I don’t expect you to memorize dates and full biographies, but these thinkers played an outsized role in the development of Iran, and were critical interlocutors between European modernity (or at least an imagined and simplified version of Europe) and Iran as it moved into the modern era.

Ali Mirsepassi, Negotiating Modernity

We’ll be bouncing between the two poles of Vahdat (God and Juggernaut) and Mirsepassi (Negotiating Modernity) this week and for the remainder of the term.  Mirsepassi, as I’m sure you’ve noticed, delivers a much darker rendition of modernity than that found in God and Juggernaut.  Whereas Vahdat holds out hope for a truly universal and perhaps limitless outcome, Mirsepassi goes to great lengths to historicize and ultimately castigate—if not straight up condemn—the project of modernity.

Mirsepassi frames the question of modernity differently than Vahdat, and he does so right away in the opening pages.  Modernity is in its essence a matter of politics, totalizing and exclusionary, a question of power.  The malign project of the Europeans against the rest of the world, whether the latter is treated as a foil in the form of a retrograde “other,” or as an object and site for the extraction of material resources, renders modernity false, a false prophecy.  The domination of others is its original sin and Mirsepassi, by my reading, leaves unclear whether modernity and its European progenitors can ever be absolved.

Worst of all, Europe’s dominative impulse provokes a politics of authenticity in places like Asia and the Middle East, a defensive “return to self” that Mirsepassi sees as ultimately being self-defeating, if understandable.  What is at stake here is whether modernity can be experienced as a local phenomenon or whether it remains, inherently, a project of western ambition and domination.  Even the most radical and sympathetic of theorists come up short, pulled down by the weight of history and the internal logic of modernity.  According to Mirsepassi, “this weakness [of modernity] is a historical one” (pg. 4).

For Mirsepassi, the troubled genealogy of modernity is inescapable, and perhaps insuperable.  Modernity ascends as a liberating force in human history via the imposition of domination, colonialism, and racism, spread around the world by Europe and her merchants and armies.

There is no better passage that gets at this point than the one found on pg. 35.  Here, Mirsepassi throws down the gauntlet:  “Modernity was not a divine Spirit that ‘chose’ Europe.  There was no Spirit secretly European in nature, using the world’s people in its ascent to the summit of subjective self-realization.  The human world is not a tool box for manipulations by a single overarching Cosmic Consciousness, especially when that gigantic mask can be shattered to reveal the ordinary, self-interested men who stand behind it.”

We end by returning to the “so what?”  Please consider how we might come to terms with origins.  If what Mirsepassi claims is correct, what is left to us, we moderns?  What hope do we have?

Ok, that’s enough for now.   See you soon.

Professor Malekzadeh

Where Did You Come From; Where Did You Go; Where Did You Come From, [Modernity]?

This week, I have realized that my definition of modernity is not a common one. I define modernity as being the belief that capital-T Truth is neither universal nor local, but rather individual – that is to say that one person’s Truth might differ from another person’s Truth, and that both can coexist as valid equals. If “modernity” had the complex connotation that it has today in Machiavelli’s day, he likely would have defined it as the belief that one’s own (which is to say, the prince’s own) interests trump all other notions, which contains the belief that the ultimate “good” for oneself as the prince is one’s continuing to rule over one’s principality. Many would define “modernity” as being exposed to and holding as equally valid other cultures and belief systems. Overall, one thing that these definitions have in common is their belief in the individual’s ability to define one’s own purpose and Truth. (According to this definition, I am no modernist.) To be clear, I realize that these definitions are narrow and, perhaps untruthfully or paradoxically, exclude Rubashov because he has little to no care for himself or for any particular individual until his bitter end.

Now that the definition of modernity for the sake of this blog post has been nailed down, I must say that modernity comes from lowercase-h history. The French citizen became a modernist when they realized that they could claim their own destiny and, using their reason, define what the state ought to be and what the individual “Good Life” consists of. The young Chinese farmer became a modernist when they decided that, against their family’s will, they leave to live in the city and design their own life apart from tradition. The cleric’s child became a modernist when they decided that, despite their upbringing, they were going to use their individual reason, as opposed to their family’s authority, in order to chase after Truth on their own accord.

Modernity’s source?

I think modernity is based on the collective in the sense that groups of people do not and cannot decide as individuals to enter modernity- this is inconceivable, as modernity is a state and way of viewing the world, removed from the realm of individuals’ decisions. In a broader sense, though, it is not rooted in the collective (a group of individuals) in any meaningful way. It is neither the group nor the individual who brings modernity from nothing or provides its source. I do not think modernity requires any set of ‘fixed truths’ of a sacred authority, as the argument that such truths do not even exist is itself a modern idea. Perhaps the individual reaching for their own truth, finding the things they value and want to live by, is a very modern practice, but it is not modernity’s source. No one can opt-in to modernity, and no one can simply choose to opt-out. In fact, to even try and do so would be a very modern choice indeed, as the individual would be viewing themselves as able to view and interact with the world in a way very distinct from those around them.

Rather, it is a gradual shift (happening little by little– there is not a single moment of mental shift in which a person suddenly becomes modern) based on changing group experiences giving birth to new conceptions of self in relation to the world; it a self-perpetuating reality unto itself. While an entrance to modernity can be especially marked by, or apparent in, certain events, it cannot be directly tied to a very specific date or year as Lerner tries to do by saying ‘they had entered History” in the summer of 1950.

Authority and Modernity

 

Modernity as a historical category was marked by the advent of the Age of Reason. With the Age of Reason came a rejection of tradition and the prioritization of individualism, freedom and egalitarianism. Once these overarching historical changes came, so too did modes of thoughts which brought modernity to individuals in society. The logic of modernity and modern modes of thought have their own inertia and thus modernity now does not need a singular source, it is a self-reinforcing cycle. Further, the inherently skeptical nature of modernity means that any singular source would be questioned and distrusted. The individualism, freedom, and egalitarianism of modernity also means that authority in modernity is less centralized and must be legitimized through the consent of the people. No more can a leader claim authority exclusively through religion and tradition

Why Leave the Cave?

The ultimate source of the modern is the individual. That said, the wellspring is not some guy who escapes the cave and discovers the true form of everything, but rather, it is the individual who notices that he’s in a cave and seeks to understand it. This, in my mind, is the function of Machiavelli in the history of modernity. He accepted the limitations of his world and his reasoning but sought to discover and to reason nonetheless. He did not seek to refute his religious parameters but reasoned within them. In this way, modernity can be achieved regardless of whether the individual is in a cave of religion, history, or culture.

The great irony of the parable of the cave and the philosopher king is that it places incredible faith in the individual but zero trust in the many, forgetting that the many is fundamentally a collection of individuals. The reality of The Republic and its great failing is of course due to the fact that Plato was an elitist snob who had a strong distaste for the lower classes. Misled by this elitism, many revolutionaries have assumed that the masses cannot help create modernity, that they must be forced through the desert with whips in the manner Rubashov espoused; that the true form of modernity (or true justice in Plato’s mind), must be handed down to the utterly clueless masses from the unattainable heights of the philosopher kings.

Clearly modernity begins with the individual, but by what mechanism is it disseminated to the masses? This seems to be the question that many modern revolutions have struggled to answer. The top down approach of Plato and Rubashov does not seem to work. Perhaps the answer is merely one of time.

The Teachings of Modernity

Globalism and interconnectedness are the basis of modernity. Multiculturalism is it’s source. The individual’s role is to share their experiences, and, more importantly, to listen to those of others. Individuals who strive to achieve broader world views, and to share their learnings with their communities are the basis of modernity. They share what they can of the world, spreading modernity through the ability to empathise with and acknowledge others’ ideas. True modernity, in my opinion, is the recognition that there is no singular truth, if I might borrow a bit from Jay, but a multitude of truths that are all equally valid and important to understanding the world around us. I feel neither history nor religion are sources of modernity, but the present beliefs and cultures of the communities of the world. While it is important to acknowledge the history and religion that shaped these cultures, the ultimate goal is to be able to respect others’ views without necessarily understanding them. The modern individual is capable of drawing on the experiences of many to decide for themselves how an action or entity or concept should be labeled. The authority of the individual to draw their own path is part of the process of learning. Each person must make a conscious effort to exist as a modern individual, in this increasingly modern world.

On What Basis, Modernity?

The fragility of control plays a prominent if under appreciated role in Machiavelli’s The Prince.  In contrast to Lerner’s triumphalism (“I had it on top authority that during the summer of 1950 they had entered History”) or the harrowing implacability of “the Party” in Darkness at Noon, Machiavelli describes a world of constant variability and uncertainty.  No prince, no matter how savvy or cruel, can rest easy on his throne, circumstances and the variability of being his constant and insuperable foes.

Machiavelli leads us to the conclusion that there are no universal solutions, no easy recipes or checklists to follow in pursuing “the modern,” however defined.  Origins, the circumstances of coming combine with unforeseen events to make modernization a project forever uncertain and under siege.

We might ask, then, On what basis modernity?  The matter of legitimacy and authority has been at stake these past two weeks, whether of the Shah, of the multitude who comprise “the many,” or of the reasoning individual, who having adjusted his or her sights to the light outside of the cave, comes back to dispense capital-T Truth.  What or who is the source of modernity?  Might it be the individual, reaching for truth in the realm of the profane?  Or does modernity require the ballast of “fixed truths,” of a sacred authority that lies outside of the will and reason of the individual?  Might History be that source, or religion itself?  How might authority be reconciled to the individual will?

The Fundamental Lack of Modernity in the Modern World and How They Coexist

In a world where communication is becoming practically instantaneous regardless of physical location, any entity that claims to be modern must be a part of that global connection. However, even in a supposedly thriving metropolises of modernity like the U.S. there are entire communities without access to broadband internet. Can a person who has never traveled beyond the ten mile radius of their small town really be considered a part of the modern world? How could they not, though, when they regularly consume products and knowledge manufactured thousands of miles away? Thus, I feel that maybe the concepts of modernity and pre-modernity can coexist within the same community or even the same individual.

Such is the case in Lerner’s “The Grocer and the Chief” in which the grocer, is seen to be capable of and even eager to embrace the cultures found outside of Balgat, yet never lives to see anything beyond his rural, secluded life. On the other hand, the chief, who has the more stereotypically “traditional” views and is content with his small life in his little village is the one who comes to be living in a modern city with radios and haberdasheries and buses. Both characters are distinctly modern, and yet, distinctly lack a fundamental aspect of modernity. Although they are presented as opposites in the beginning of the essay, it is through such a lens that they are revealed to be fundamentally the same, in their equally modern and pre-modern worlds.

Matter over Mind: Brute Strength and Revolutionary Russia

It’s a common refrain that revolutions start with ideas; that it is philosophers, scholars, and other intellectuals that influence true change.  I see this theory as largely correct; after all, Montesquieu’s works were sitting in the center of the table when America’s founders drafted the constitution, while Voltaire and Rosseau’s ideas were crucial in fomenting the French Revolution.  However, I also believe that to elevate it as a universal truth is naive.  While revolutions begin with ideas, they are generally enacted through brute force, in turn creating a climate in which it is the strongest and most resilient, not the ideologically “right” or “pure” are likely to emerge victorious.

Rubashov is the hero of Darkness at Noon and it is easy to see him as victorious. After all, he dies in noble silence in the same room where others had perished kicking, screaming, and begging.  However, just because he maintained a poise and inner peace at his fatal hour does not mean he did not enter that hour a broken man.  Rubashov was not only killed by the movement that he viewed himself as working tirelessly to support but was cowed by interrogation tactics that he had vowed to overcome.  His ideological conviction in his innocence was thoroughly destroyed; he died having confessed to a series of crimes that, when originally arrested and still of sound mind, he knew he had not committed.

I think it is impossible to posit any of the characters as “right” or “wrong.”  One rarely finds the comfort of “black and white” when attempting to objectively study a war or revolution; instead, there is “strong and weak,” those who have the power to enforce their personal convictions or motives and those who don’t.  Through this lens, Gletkin is the book’s winner.  Whether in pursuit of what he saw as ideologically right or simply of personal advancement, he destroyed both Rubashov’s will to survive and will to believe, turning him into a subservient and near-robotic product of the movement that he ironically helped to create.  In my opinion, the defining quote from the book is Gletkin’s: “we have only one duty: not to perish.”   This is far from a romanticized perspective; far from a statement that can ideologically inspire.  However, it is a summation of world politics and conflict, which follow hierarchical not horizontal principles.

 

The Chief as Lerner’s True Modernist

The most common reading of Grocer’s “Lerner and the Chief,” at least as it pertains to modernity, is that the grocer is the story’s true hero.  The grocer, as is ultimately acknowledged by the residents of his village, had a quasi-prophetic nature; less than four years after he died Balgat resembled more the world of his dreams than the one that scorned him for his “pretentious” ways.

To claim that the grocer is the story’s most powerful symbol of modernity, however, is to disregard some of the basic mechanisms by which society changes.  The grocer’s relationship with the village was better defined by a hostile dichotomy than a cooperative evolution.  Just because the grocer foresaw and appreciated “modernization” does not mean that he influenced it.  Indeed he ostracized himself from society and looked condescendingly down at his fellow villages rather than fostering an environment of mutual respect in which he could “raise them up.”

Thus the grocer was a prophet and not an agent of change.  In stark contrast, the chief, despite holding convictions that the grocer would consider antiquated, actively oversaw the “modernization” of his village, supporting and helping his people in the transition that swept over them following political change in Ankara.  In my opinion, especially in today’s complex and multicultural societies, this is what represents true modernity.  Society can only peacefully and effectively evolve through the construction of bridges between new and old worldviews, not through the Soviet-style scorn and then meteoric destruction of a previous way of life.  “The Grocer and the Chief,” while problematic in some ways, can still be said to have import on “modern” societies.  As we storm further into this 21st century of rapid change, we would be wise to heed the graceful and compromising attitude of Lerner’s wise chief.