Before this draft, consult the text and pick out all the pages that are relevant to the discussion you are going to have. This requires that your topic be fairly constrained. Reread the passages carefully, keeping in mind the overall structure of the argument the author advances. Write down all the page numbers, and copy out a set of quotations that you think are important for the paper. You may not use all the quotations that you copy down, but it is useful to have them all in front of you for reference
BERKELEY PAPER
FIRST DRAFT
| This paragraph is taken directly from the initial notes, with page references added. (This student is working from the Hackett edition.) |
At some point in the dialogues Hylas tries to defend his belief in matter by claiming that we have an abstract idea of matter. I think that he does this because every time he appeals to his particular idea of a thing, Philonous shows that it’s only a perception of that thing, and that perceptions are in the mind. (If perceptions are in the mind, and every idea is a perception, then every idea is in the mind. If all of our ideas are in the mind and ideas are all we have, then everything is in the mind. At least, that appears to be the main strategy, as in the argument with the vessel of water (pp. 14-15), or the argument about the color of the clouds (p. 20 .))
This next paragraph is essentially from the notes, with slight elaboration. |
So, if Hylas can avoid committing to a particular idea, which would always be a sensation, he might be able to make some headway against Philonous. Hylas seems to have a point. We do seem to have abstract ideas of things. If I could show that our idea of matter is abstract, then Philonous’ main argument would be short circuited.
| Here is the substance of an emerging idea. At this point, the thesis can be somewhat vague. There does not need to be a structured argument. The key is that the writer has been thinking the issue over and has been talking about it with her classmates. |
After talking with a couple of people about abstract ideas, I came up with this thought: Maybe there’s a way that we think about things without specifying the exact sensible properties of that thing. Like, sometimes we can think about a car without thinking about a particular kind of car (Toyota or Ford or Acura, etc.) and without thinking about a particular shape or color. It seems that we do this sometimes, as when I say, “are you going to buy a car this year?” In my question, I don’t have a particular kind of car in my mind since I don’t know what kind of car you would buy in the future (how could I have any idea at all what kind of car you would buy, in terms of its specific properties, when you haven’t bought it yet?) So, there must be some way that the mind works to specify a ‘container’ for particular aspects of an idea like color, shape, texture etc. When I say “a car” I’m activating the container in my mind, without activating particular properties. Maybe the container is what Hylas needs for his theory of abstract ideas. What I need is some way to say all this that is clear.
The student has located a number of passages that discuss abstract ideas. For each one, she will give a couple of sentences summarizing the main point. |
Anyway, there are two places where Hylas and Philonous talk about abstract ideas. The first argument about abstract ideas takes place on page 28 and 29:
Phil. …Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of.
Hyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.
This is where Hylas needs a theory of abstract ideas. Philonous has challenged him to frame an abstract idea of something ‘divested of all those sensible modes.’ In other words, he is challenging Hylas to come up with an idea of something without at the same time coming up with an idea of a particular thing. The conversation goes on:
Phil. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion, from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term secondary?
Hyl. What! is it not an easy matter, to consider extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?
Then they discuss math. I think that Hylas brings up math because that seems very abstract.
Notice that the summaries do not need to be deep or detailed. That is because not all the passages identified at this point will be used in the final paper. |
Phil. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any other; and in this sense to consider or treat of them abstractedly. But how doth it follow that because I can pronounce the word motion by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? Or because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention of great or small, or any other sensible mode or quality; that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.
Philonous is saying here that even though we can talk about abstract mathematical things, or treat abstract quantitites, that we can’t form ideas of them. But then how do we work with them at all? Philonous never tells us, but I don’t think I have any ideas either for math. It seems like math is an especially hard case.
Hyl. But what say you to pure intellect? May not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?
Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain, I cannot frame them by the help of pure intellect, whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as virtue, reason, God, or the like, thus much seems manifest, that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures therefore and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect. But for your further satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities.
Hyl. Let me think a little–I do not find that I can.
Phil. And can you think it possible, that should really exist in nature, which implies a repugnancy in its conception?
Hylas says that he can’t frame an abstract idea. Philonous concludes that he shouldn’t believe in them then.
In the second dialogue, on page 56 they talk about abstract ideas again.
It pays to be scrupulous about page references at this point. A scholarly paper should give the reader ample information about the text and how to locate the discussion. |
Hyl. We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them. But to prevent any further questions, let me tell you, I at present understand by matter neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but something entirely unknown, distinct from all these.
Phil. It seems then you include in your present notion of matter, nothing but the general abstract of idea of entity.
Hyl. Nothing else, save only that I superadd to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas that I perceive, imagine, or in any wise apprehend.
Here, Hylas is trying to defend his theory of abstract idea by defining it as the absence of any particular quality.
Phil. Pray where do you suppose this unknown matter to exist?
Hyl. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for if I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed, that place or extension exists only in the mind: but I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you: and you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about matter.
Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its existence.
Hyl. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives, nor is perceived.
Phil. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?
Hyl. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its existence, or how it exists.
Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.
Hyl. Hold, let me think a little–I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance methought I had some dilute and airy notion of pure entity in abstract; but upon closer attention it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of matter, its where, its how, its entity, or any thing belonging to it.
Phil. When therefore you speak of the existence of matter, you have not any notion in your mind.
Hyl. None at all.
Hylas tries his best to defend an abstract idea by taking everything away from an idea. But then he’s left with nothing, and Philonous really presses him.
They talk about abstract ideas a little bit in the Third Dialogue, but Philonous doesn’t seem to offer any new arguments against it.