For the final paper, it is crucial to read the entire work several times. You may wish at this point to add descriptive section headings.
AN ACCOUNT OF ABSTRACT IDEAS
Maria Jimenez
Introduction
In Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley attempts to show that believing in mind-independent matter leads to absurdity and skepticism. Berkeley invites us to accept instead the doctrine of idealism, where the only things that exist are minds and ideas. Philonous – the spokesperson for Berkeley’s considered view – uses several different kinds of argument to convince Hylas of idealism. In this paper I will investigate one type of argument that Philonous offers. Philonous claims that we cannot form abstract ideas, and suggests that the impossibility of abstract ideas deprives Hylas of an otherwise promising conception of mind-independent matter (pp. 28-30). I will show that, contrary to Philonous’ claims, abstract ideas are possible. This will not by itself prove that matter exists. If I am right, however, then Hylas can argue that our idea of matter is an abstract idea.
Idealism and Abstract Ideas
Berkeley must offer some reason to reject abstract ideas. In order to understand the importance of this for Berkeley’s project, we need to consider Philonous’ primary strategy of argumentation. In the first dialogue, Philonous invites Hylas to consider his ideas of sensible things. In plainer language, we may say that Philonous invites Hylas to consider the kinds of ideas that his senses give him. Unsurprisingly, senses deliver sensible ideas such as smells, tastes and visual images. Philonous then points out that on this conception of sensible things, Hylas does not have a sensible idea of the cause of his sensible ideas (p. 10). For example, in considering the heat of a fire, Philonous argues that Hylas has a sensible idea of heat (as a pain) and a sensible idea of the appearance of the flame, but that there is no sensible idea of the cause of the heat (p. 11). Likewise, Hylas’ idea of a sound is not an idea of the motion of the air (p. 17). Even though we think that the motion of the air is the cause of sounds, motion is merely another sensible. We do not have an idea of the motion as a cause of sound. At best, science can uncover that the sensible idea of sound and motion in the air always appear together. This is not the same as discovering that the motion causes the idea of sound. If it is the case that Hylas has no sensible idea of the cause of the heat or sound, then Hylas will be in no position to defend his belief in a mind-independent matter that underlies the heat or sound. That is, if Hylas has no idea of fire beyond his sensible idea of the heat, then he will have no grounds for believing in fire as anything but a sensible idea. The problem for Hylas is that this argument works equally well for anything. So, there appears to be no grounds for believing in mind-independent reality beyond sensible ideas.
Hylas suggests that the nature of matter might be better understood as an abstraction from the particular sensible qualities that we attribute to matter. The reason that Hylas’ maneuver is attractive is that Philonous’ argument to this point has been to show that we only have access to our ideas and that we do not have an immediate sensible idea of the cause or basis of our ideas. Philonous has shown that if we only have access to our ideas, there could never be evidence for matter that is independent of ideas. If, on the
other hand, Hylas could show that we have an abstract idea of the qualities of matter, then he would not be forced into discussing particular sensible qualities such as the pain of heat. Thus, perhaps matter itself could be an abstract idea.
Philonous needs some way to address the possibility of an abstract conception of matter. The following passages are the heart of Philonous’ argument against abstract ideas:
Phil. …Without a doubt you can tell, whether you are able to frame this is or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of (p. 28).
Later, Philonous says, “…try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities” (p. 29; for further discussion, see p. 56 ). If Hylas finds that he cannot, Philonous will conclude that it is repugnant to believe that there should exist something in nature that we cannot conceive. Philonous is challenging Hylas to frame in his mind an idea of something without also framing in mind particular sensible qualities such as shape, color or texture. In order to see the kind of challenge Philonous is presenting, take, for example, the idea of a person. We may ask whether or not it is possible to bring to mind the abstract idea of a person, without bringing to mind a person of a certain height, a certain
build, or a certain color. Any example of an abstract idea would be dangerous for Philonous, as it would show that it is possible to imagine something devoid of sensible qualities. Since Philonous’ entire project is based on showing that we have no sensible idea of matter, Hylas is trying to show that we have some other kind of immediate idea of matter.
Theory of Abstract Ideas
There appears to be a way to think about things without specifying the exact sensible properties of that thing. We can think about a car without thinking about a particular kind of car such as Toyota, or Ford, or Acura, and without thinking about a particular shape or color. It seems that we do this when we ask, “are you going to buy a car this year?” When I ask this question, I do not have a particular kind of car in my mind since I do not know what kind of car you would buy in the future. After all, how could I have any idea at all what kind of car you would buy, in terms of its specific properties, when you have not bought it yet? So, there must be some way that the mind works to specify a ‘core’ of an idea such that the core is able to have particular properties
attached to it. On this view, when I say “car,” I am activating the core of the idea in my mind without activating particular properties that can be attached to that core.
One way of thinking about Berkeley’s overall strategy is that he thinks that our mental life is homogeneous. He thinks that everything we find in our minds is an idea, and that ideas are indivisible things in the universe. (I will put aside Berkeley’s use of the term ‘notion’ for the purposes of this paper.) It is possible, though, to relax this assumption. Suppose, following the suggestions above, that we view an idea as having two components: the first component is the core of the idea, while the second is the set of properties that apply to that idea. Again, the core of the idea is what the particular properties get attached to. Indeed, the properties may change, but the core stays the same. So, for example, a bicycle may be painted red for many years but will eventually rust. The color as a property of the bicycle changes, but the core of the idea of the bicycle does not.
Of course, Philonous will view this as begging the question. That is, he will think that by supposing that ideas have cores, I am simply assuming that the view that ideas are entirely composed of sensible particulars is false. We find evidence for my view, however, in a simple game played by children. In the game “twenty questions,” one player—the imaginer—forms an idea in her mind
– usually of some noun – while another player—the questioner—is challenged to determine what that idea is. The questioner is allowed to ask up to twenty diagnostic ‘yes or no’ questions in order to arrive at the idea that the imaginer has in mind. There are two strategies that the questioner can follow. She might ask particular questions such as, “Are you thinking of a platypus?” This is clearly not a good plan, as the questioner will quickly reach twenty questions and only has a small chance of correctly guessing what the imaginer has in mind.
A much better strategy is to start with abstract questions such as, “Is the thing you are thinking of an animal?” When the questioner pursues this strategy, it does not seem plausible to think that she, the questioner, has a particular idea in mind. That is, the questioner does not have a particular animal in mind. She is using the word ‘animal’ as a place-holder for all animals. We can be confident that the questioner has formed an idea in her mind. This is because she is able to refine the idea further and further based on the responses that the imaginer gives. Suppose that the imaginer’s answer is ‘yes.’ The questioner then has an idea in her mind of something that is an animal, but not a particular animal. If it were a particular animal, then the questioner would lapse into the particularist strategy by asking, for example, “Are you thinking of a wildebeest?” The questioner might make this move after the first question, but she need not. Again we can see that a better strategy would be to remain at the level of the abstract by asking, for instance, “Are you thinking of a mammal?” The point is that the idea is guiding abstract questions, so it must itself be an abstract idea.
Are Abstract Ideas Merely Words?
Is our ability to play twenty questions a mere artifact of the words used in the game? Philonous apparently thinks that we must “lay aside the words” in order to “contemplate the bare ideas”(p. 29). It seems that Philonous is worried that the ability of words to convey abstract ideas is misleading with respect to the question of whether or not we can have ideas of abstractions. When Hylas brings up the case of mathematical objects, Philonous claims that the ideas are particular even if the words (such as triangle, line, or sum) seem abstract.
Notice, however, that the words the questioner uses in the game are not central to the issue. Rather, the ideas in the mind of the questioner are what guide the game. We know this because the moment before the questioner asks whether or not the imaginer is thinking of an animal, the questioner must have some idea of what she is going to ask. Without such an idea, she would not know what words to formulate the question with. So the animal, as an idea, must be in her mind before she utters the words of the question. I conclude that abstract ideas – construed as cores of ideas – are not merely words. Further, I conclude that Hylas has a more promising strategy in resisting idealism by defending abstract ideas than Berkeley allows.
References
Berkeley, George. (1994/1713) Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. R. Adams, ed. Indianapolis: Hackett.
For additional help see
Remarks on Writing by Peter Lipton, the philosopher who taught me how to write.
Professor Jim Pryor’s Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper.