WILLIAMS COLLEGE
RELIGION 288 / PHILOSOPHY 288
Spring 2016

THE EMBODIED MIND: MEDITATIVE PRACTICES,
THE MIND SCIENCES AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

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Course Requirements

You are expected to come to class prepared to raise questions about the material, answer questions and
discuss the issues involved. A missed class will require a summary and response paper to the readings
for that week. 4-6 pages.

Essay 1 on the empirical study of consciousness, 5-7 pgs...30% of final grade
Essay 2 on meditation and meditation journal, 5-7 pgs......30% of final grade
Final Research Essay, 12-15 pgs........................................40% of final grade

You are required to practice meditation regularly and to keep a meditation journal.

No laptops or food in the classroom. The honor code applies fully to this class.

Required books

Wallace, The Attention Revolution
Plus a 2 volume reading packet available at the Class of ’37 House, 51 Park Street (Behind Paresky)

Outline of Class Topics and Readings

Class 1 Methods
Clark, Mindware, Introduction & Chap 1 packet
Tye, “Ten Problems of Consciousness,” 3-18 packet
Gallagher & Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, chap. 1&2 section 1
 (“Fantasies in the Science of Consciousness”).
Meditation: Introduction to concentration
Class 2  The practice and study of meditation
   Olendzki, “Buddhist Meditation,” packet
   Solé-Leris, *Tranquility and Insight*, 21-26, packet
   Wallace, *The Attention Revolution*, 1-116
   Tricycle, “Meditation Nation” packet
   Faure, “Buddhist Meditation and Neuroscience” packet.
   Suggested: Lomas & al., “A Qualitative Analysis of Experiential Challenges Associated with Meditation” packet
   Meditation: Concentration

Class 3  Meditation and the difficulties of studying attention
   Thompson, *Waking, Dreaming, Being* packet
   Lutz, et al., “Attention regulation and monitoring in meditation” packet
   Google: *change blindness, hemi-neglect, stroop effect, binocular rivalry.*
   Meditation: Concentration.

Class 4  Phenomenological method, consciousness and its structure.
   Husserl, *The Essential Husserl*, 87-91, packet
   Meditation: Mindfulness of breathing.

Class 5  Consciousness, mindfulness and introspection
   Dreyfus, “Is Mindfulness Present-Centered and Nonjudgmental Awareness?” packet
   Schwitzgebel, “Introspection” sections 1-2.2.1, 3, 4.2 packet
   (skip sections 2.2.2-2.3.4 & 4.1-41.3).
   Meditation: Mindfulness.

Class 6  Naturalizing phenomenology or quining qualia?
   Dennett, “Quining Qualia,” 43-57, packet
   Dennett *Consciousness Explained*, 101-115, 153-162, packet
   Carman, “Dennett on Seeming,” packet
   Meditation: Mindfulness.

   **Essay 1 (Due Thursday, March 17 at 5pm by email to Cruz):** It is standard to claim that consciousness eludes explanation by traditional cognitive approaches to the mind. In this essay explain in detail why this is thought and evaluate whether the arguments for the elusiveness of consciousness are correct.

Class 7  Embodiment as a gateway to consciousness
   Prinz, “Is Consciousness Embodied?” packet
   Mandrigin & Thompson, “Own-Body Perception,” packet
   Meditation: Mindfulness and body scan
Class 8 Can consciousness be grasped?
Fasching, “Consciousness, self-consciousness and meditation,” packet
Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, chap. 4;
Wallace, The Attention Revolution, 80-94;
Kiverstein, “Consciousness, the Minimal Self and Brain,” packet
Meditation: Open presence style of concentration.

Class 9 Subjectivity: self or no-self?
Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, chap. 10;
Dreyfus, “Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way Approach,” packet
Clark, “Soft Selves and Ecological Control,” packet
Suggested: Case, “Stages in the Development of Young Children’s First Sense of Self.”
Meditation: mindfulness of the body-mind complex.

Essay 2 (Due Thursday, April 21st at 5pm by hard copy to Dreyfus mailbox in Hollander):
Answer this question including substantial references to your personal experience of meditation without limiting yourself to this dimension: “What is the use, if any, of meditation in the study of consciousness?” Include separately some excerpts from your meditation journal.

Class 10 Subjectivity and agency
Wegner, “Apparent Mental Causation,” packet
Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, chap. 8
Meditation: mindfulness.

Class 11 Buddhism and the science of positive affects
Readings:
Prinz, Gut Reactions, 3-20, packet
Goleman, Destructive Emotions, 118-176, packet
Meditation: mindfulness of the body-mind complex: identification vs. disidentification.

Class 12 From subjectivity to intersubjectivity
Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, chap. 9;
De Vignemont & Jacob, “What Is It To Feel Another’s Pain?” in Philosophy of Science, packet;
Meditation: compassion and loving-kindness.

Final Research Essay Due Saturday, May 21st at 5pm by email both to Dreyfus and Cruz
Final paper suggested topics

Write a research paper using original sources and course material on one of the listed topics. You are welcome to write on your own topic, you must consult with the instructors on its theme and scope.

1) What is the nature of the self? How can the cognitive sciences help advance the problem? Does the opposition of bundle vs. ego theories of the self make the issue more tractable? Where do various Buddhist views fall within this opposition? What is the difference, if any, between the self and the subject? Does Buddhism and/or phenomenology help to conceptualize this difference?

2) What is at stake in the opposition between neurophenomenology and heterophenomenology? Does neurophenomenology have a value or is heterophenomenology sufficient?

3) What is the role of the body in the formulation of our sense of self? How does proprioception provide a basis for our sense of self? What more is needed beside proprioception to develop a sense of self? Is our sense of self purely conceptual and linguistic? What are the different dimensions that a theory of the self needs to account for?

4) Does the embodied cognitive approach gain plausibility or evidence in light of phenomenology or meditation? Can one combine the phenomenology of consciousness, which seems to be presupposed by meditation, with the mechanistic view of EC? How so?

5) What is the nature of agency? What is its connection with consciousness and the sense of the self? Are Buddhist thinkers right to argue that agency is connected to the self? And if they are, how can a person liberated from the illusion of the self (the Arhat) act? Are actions possible without a sense of self?

6) What are the prospects of mapping the invariant properties of phenomenality on to structural features of the nervous system or the environment? What kinds of theoretical tools are going to be required?

7) How can we understand the knowledge of other’s mind in the light of phenomenology/ cognitive sciences/ meditation. What do the cognitive sciences suggest? Do they provide a basis for conceptualizing our relations to others? Do they clarify the notion of intersubjectivity?

8) Can a principled scientific distinction be made between individual cognition and processes in the “external” environment? In what way does phenomenology or meditation shed light on this question?

9) Can the notion of experience sustain critical analysis or is it just a grand illusion, as argued by Dennett and his followers? How can consciousness in general and perceptual presence in particular be explained? How important is the notion of experience to understand meditation?

10) Can dualism be defended in the light of recent advances in the mind sciences? How have contemporary thinkers argued for dualism? What are persuasive in their arguments? Are there promising avenues for modern dualism?

11) What is the usefulness of meditation for the study of attention? How is attention conceptualized and what are the problems that this raises? Can the study of meditation help (re)conceptualize attention? Does it throw light on the interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes?
12) Is there a role for meditation (not as an object of study, but as a source of scientific insight) in classical cognitive science?

13) What is the nature and limitations of introspection? Can meditation remedy to these limitations and make introspection a more reliable tool in the study of the mind? What is the role of introspection in meditation? How does it relate to mindfulness and what does this relation suggest as far the study of consciousness?

14) Can the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representations provide a basis for a viable cognitivist account of experience? How can this distinction be drawn? How feasible are some of the standard accounts (Peacocke, Dretske, Bermudez, etc.) of non-conceptual experience?

15) What are the prospects and challenges of the scientific study of meditation? What kinds of meditation have been studied? How have they been studied? How reliable are such studies? What can we hope to learn through such studies? (Be sure that you provide a critical analysis and not just a description of the studies.)

16) What are the prospects for the therapeutic use of meditation? What are the results obtained so far? Which kinds of pathology are likely to be treatable through meditation? Why? What are the difficulties involved in the study of the therapeutic effects of meditation? (Be sure that you provide a critical analysis and not just a description of the studies.)

17) What are the nature, scope and limitations of introspection? How do these limitations affect the project of neurophenomenology? Can the study of meditation remedy the limitations of introspection, or is the study of meditation of a different order?

18) Is free will an empirical question? What is the debate about? What are the different views on this question? What can cognitive science contribute to the debate?

19) What are the issues at stake between proponents of extended cognition such as Clark and their internalist opponents? How does this debate connect with the Embodied Cognition paradigm? Does the latter imply the externalist view that cognition is extended and that cognitive systems and processes are not inside the brain?