

Joe Cruz

Williams College Department of Philosophy
Stetson Hall
26 Hopkins Hall Drive
Williamstown, MA 01267
(413) 597-2484
jcruz@williams.edu

Professional Appointments

Professor of Philosophy, Williams College Department of Philosophy, Williamstown, MA. From Spring 2013 to the present. Chair, Williams College Program in Cognitive Science from Fall 2012 to the present.

Assistant and Associate Professor of Philosophy, Williams College Department of Philosophy and Program in Cognitive Science, Williamstown, MA. From Fall 2000 to Spring 2013.

Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Cognitive Science. Hampshire College Cognitive Science, Amherst, MA. From Fall 1997 to Spring 2000.

Areas of Specialization

Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
Cognitive Science (especially Cognitive Development, Neural Network Modeling, Embodied Cognition)

Areas of Competence

History of Modern Philosophy

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 1999.
Dissertation: "Epistemology in the Scientific Image." Committee: Alvin Goldman (director), John Pollock, Keith Lehrer, Karen Wynn, and Merrill Garrett.

Fellow at NEH Seminar in Theory Theory and Simulation Theory, St. Louis, MO.
Seminar directed by Robert Gordon. Summer, 1999.

Fellow at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science, SUNY Buffalo, NY. Summer, 1994.

B.A. with Honors in Philosophy, Williams College, Williamstown, MA, 1991.

Research Experience

Research Assistant to Karen Wynn. Infant Cognition Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Spring 1995 - Spring 1996.
Member of research lab for the OSCAR artificial intelligence project with John Pollock, University of Arizona, Fall 1994 - Spring 1997.
Research Assistant to C. J. Marsolek. Visual Memory Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Fall 1994.
Research Assistant to Center for the Study of Rationality for Robert Cummins, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Fall 1993.
Co-Author, NEH Research Proposal ("The Reassessment of Reason: Paradigm Shifts in the Concept of Individual and Social Rationality"), with Robert Cummins as principal investigator, University of Arizona. Grant awarded Spring 1993.

Honors

Whiting Foundation Fellow, 2007-2008.
Distinguished Campus Visiting Scholar, Whitman College, November 2004.
Adsit Fellow in residence, Williams College, 2003-2004.
Faculty development grant (NEH funds administered by Hampshire College), Summer 1998 and Summer 1999.
Cognitive science research grant, University of Arizona, 1996-1997.
Emil R. Riesen departmental prize for most outstanding essay by a Philosophy graduate student, University of Arizona, 1995.
Graduate merit fellowship, University of Arizona, 1994-1995.
Graduate minority fellowship, University of Arizona, 1991-1994.
Miller Prize for most outstanding student in Philosophy, Williams College, 1991.
Ford-Mellon Fellow, Williams College, Summer 1990, and 1990-1991 academic year.

Referee

Nous, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Synthese*, *Brain and Mind*, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Science*, and *Law*, MIT Press, Oxford University Press, Wadsworth Philosophy & Wadsworth Psychology, Routledge Philosophy, Society for Philosophy & Psychology Annual Conference

Extramural Service

Selection Committee for the Davidson Fellows Scholarship Program.
External Review Committee for the Department of Philosophy, Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts.

Past Board member of the Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities (a program of the NEH).

Past Secretary/Treasurer and ex-officio board member of The Society for Philosophy and Psychology.

Publications

"Knowledge and Reasons" in *Philosophy Now*, issue 96, May/June 2013.

"The Triple System Theory of Concepts" (with Safa Zaki) commentary in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33, pp. 230-231 (2012).

"Is There Reason for Skepticism?" in *Knowledge and Skepticism*, O'Rourke, M. and Keim-Campbell, J. (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2010).

"The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism" (with John Pollock), in *The Externalist Challenge: Studies on Cognition and Intentionality*, Richard Schantz, (ed.). New York: de Gruyter (2004).

"Epistemology" and "Simulation Theory" (the latter with Robert Gordon) in *The Nature Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science*. London: Macmillan (2003).

Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (with John Pollock), Rowman & Littlefield (1999).

"Mindreading: Mental state simulation & cognitive architecture." *Mind & Language*, (1998) 13:3, pp. 323-40.

"Simulation and the psychology of sociopathy." Commentary in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, (1997) 20:3, pp. 525-7.

Invited Talks

"Knowing How to Reason." Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Skills (Bled Philosophical Conferences), Bled, Slovenia, June 3rd, 2017.

"Attention and Reason." The Intersection of Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind (Bled Philosophical Conferences), Bled, Slovenia, June 4th, 2015.

"There Is No Mind/Body Problem." Lenox Library Distinguished Lecturer Series, Lenox, April 28th, 2013.

"Irrational Thought." First Conference in Honor of John Pollock, University of Arizona, Tucson, March 4th, and Bled, Slovenia, June 5th, 2012.

"Mind in Community." Williams College, Williamstown, October 30th, 2010.

"Cycling the Globe." International Studies colloquium, Williams College, Williamstown, September 21st, 2010.

"Naturalized Epistemic Norms." Keynote address presented at the 2nd Annual Conference on Argumentation as a Cognitive Process, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, Poland, May 15th, 2010.

"Two Worlds." Part of Models of Mind Gallery Talks, Williams College Museum of Art, Williamstown, March 2nd, 2010.

"Objects of Mind." Texas A&M, College Station, Texas, February 26th, 2009.

"Mind through body in the recent Cartesian history of Western philosophy," Fulbright Alumni Lahore Chapter, Lahore University, Lahore, Pakistan, September 23,

2007.

- "Against Certainty." Alumni Reunion Invited Lecture, Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, June 8th, 2006.
- "Is There Reason for Skepticism?" Invited presentation at the 7th Annual Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, Moscow, Idaho, May 1st, 2004. Also presented at SUNY Albany, Albany, New York, November 14th, 2003, Williams College, Williamstown, December 2nd, 2003, and Whitman College, Walla Walla, November 12th, 2004.
- "Skepticism and Resilient Epistemic Principles." Presented at a symposium on skepticism at the University of Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Quebec, October 4, 2003.
- "Epistemic Norms and Externalism in Epistemology." University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont, February 8th, 2003.
- "How Connectionism Constrains (Some) Psychological Explanations." Presented at a conference on cognitive science in the new millennium, Long Beach, California, 2002.
- "Why Cognitive Psychology Needs Philosophy." Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts, North Adams, Massachusetts, November 18, 2001.
- "Coherentism and the Role of Epistemic Norms." Presented at a symposium on coherentism at the Dominican College, Ottawa, Ontario, September 28, 2001.
- "In Defense of Cognitive Psychology (The Mind Does So Work That Way)" University of Hertfordshire, Watford, Hertfordshire, England, November 23, 2000.
- "The Failure of Naturalised Epistemology." University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England, November 20, 2000. Also presented at the University of Hertfordshire, Watford, Hertfordshire, England, November 23, 2000.
- "Epistemology's Ill-Advised Turn to Psychology." Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, October 14, 1999.
- "Normative Reason in Psychological Explanation." University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, February 26, 1999. Also presented at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, January 27, 1999.
- "A Connectionist Argument for the Simulation Account of Mental State Attribution." Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy & Psychology, San Francisco, California, May 29-June 2, 1996. Also presented at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Seattle, Washington, April 3-6, 1996.
- "Connectionists don't have to pretend that they can't." Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy & Psychology, Stony Brook, New York, June 7-11, 1995.
- "Computational incompatibility in neural network models of vision may not rely on spatial relations." Presented at the McDonnell-Pew Neuroscience Conference, University of Arizona, November 19, 1994.

Invited Comments

- "On Teleosemantics and Natural Maps" (Comments on work by Rob Cummins et al.). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Winston-Salem, June 11, 2005.

- "Skepticism and Epistemic Principles" (Comments on work by Jonathan Vogel, Catherine Elgin, and Michael Bergman). Presented at the Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick, May 2, 2003.
- "Noise, Dynamic Systems Theory, and Cognitive Modeling" (Comments on work by Whit Schonbein). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Cincinnati, June 14, 2001.
- "A Humean Psychological Alternative to Kant and Wittgenstein" (Comments on work by Karsten Stueber). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 4, 2001.
- "Knowledge and Neuroscience" (Comments on work by Paul Churchland). Presented at a Conference in Honor of Alvin Goldman, Tucson, Arizona, January 26, 2001.
- "Does Connectionism Impose Methodological Constraints on Psychology?" (Comments on work by Jim Garson). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New York, June 18, 2000.
- "Cognition Over Systematic Domains" (Comments on work by Rob Cummins et al.). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of American Philosophical Association, Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 30, 1999.
- "Dual-Aspect Theories of the Causal Power of Consciousness" (Comments on work by Max Velmans). Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy & Psychology, Stanford University, California, June 20-24, 1999.
- "The Persistence of Reliabilism" (Comments on work by Casey Swank). Presented at the annual meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association, Kansas City, Missouri, October 11-12, 1996.