# A Section-by-Section Summary of *Structure and Being*

The tasks of this essay are (1) to indicate concisely what is done in each of the many numbered subsections of *Structure and Being* (*SB*), (2) in doing so to clarify *SB*'s purely systematic presentation of the structural-systematic philosophy (SSP), and (3) to identify several important topics that *SB* treats in diverse sections but for which *Toward a Philosophical Theory of Everything* (*TAPTOE*) provides unified accounts.

## 1. Presystematic, Purely Systematic, and Metasystematic Levels of Presentation of the SSP in *SB*

Clarifying the second of this essay's tasks requires distinguishing among the levels named in this section's title. In a broader sense of "systematic," all three levels are systematic in that all are required by the SSP's method. In a narrower sense of "systematic"—"purely systematic"—the presystematic and metasystematic levels are not (purely) systematic because they are, in an important sense clarified below, historical.

*SB* identifies the three levels named in the title of this section in its account of the SSP's four-staged method (although *SB* does not use the term "presystematic"). Applications of the first stage of the SSP's method begin on what this essay terms the presystematic level of the SSP's development. The first step of that first methodic stage requires the collection of data, which are truth candidates available within both everyday theoretical frameworks and other scientific (including philosophical) frameworks. This first step is in one important sense historical rather than purely systematic because what truth candidates are available changes over time.

Presentations of the SSP that were purely systematic would not articulate any applications of this first step in the method's first stage; they would instead simply present the theories that result in part from the SSP's transformation and integration of some of those truth candidates. In many cases, *SB*'s presentation of the SSP is not purely systematic, in that it identifies some truth candidates that, having been assembled when the first step of the method's first stage is applied to a given subject matter, were rejected from rather than incorporated into the SSP. An example: *SB* 3.2.2.3.2.3 introduces as truth candidates two theses from Quine 1953/1980, Quine 1960, Quine 1981, and Quine 1985; the theses are (1) that singular terms can be eliminated—that, in an example from Quine 1985 (29), "A white cat is facing a dog and bristling" can be transformatively rephrased as "It's catting whitely, bristlingly, and dogwardly"—and (2) that the elimination of these terms has no ontological consequen–ces. *SB* incorporates a version of (1), but rejects (2). Alternative presentations of the SSP could—and *TAPTOE*'s Chapter 2 indeed does—dispense with references to the Quine texts, presenting the SSP's semantics and ontology purely systematically.

The second important sort of historical accounts included in *SB* comprises those that enter with the application of the fourth stage of the method. This stage is that of the metasystematic stabilization of the SSP, which includes demonstrations of its superiority to other available theories (and thus to other available theoretical frameworks).[1] Examples

[1] The metasystematics in question is, more specifically, intertheoretical intraphilosophical metasystematics. The various metasystematic levels of the SSP are clarified in *SB*'s Chapter 6, and in the summary of that chapter in 2.3.6, below.

include the critiques in 5.2.2 of theories according to which talk of being as such and as a whole cannot be meaningful because talk of totalities of truths involves self-referential paradoxes (comparable to the paradox arising from designating the sentence "This sentence is false" either as true or as false). Because prior to consideration of these theories the thesis that the SSP requires a theory of being as such and as a whole is already securely stabilized, the conflicting theories enter the account not as candidates for incorporation within the SSP, but instead as alternatives to the relevant components of the SSP, and thus, to a degree, to the SSP itself. Because alternatives to the SSP will continue to arise, metasystematic accounts of this sort are historical in the sense specified above.

The purely systematic level of the SSP would unfold most clearly if it did so without the intrusion of any presystematic or metasystematic accounts—if the metasystematic accounts required by its method were presented only following a purely systematic presentation—but *SB* includes the metasystematic thesis that as of the time of its initial presentation of the SSP, the philosophical milieu—the status quo of academic philosophy—required it to interrupt its purely systematic presentation with both presystematic and metasystematic passages. To put the thesis colloquially: if the book did not indicate, as its subtheories developed, why (in at least many cases) some available truth candidates were not incorporated into them or (in various other cases) why those subtheories were superior to available alternatives, then the book's presentations of its

subtheories, and hence the book itself, would not qualify as accounts to be taken seriously (see 73/98, 626–627/471).[2]

The distinctions introduced in the preceding paragraphs among the presystematic, systematic, and metasystematic levels of *SB's* presentation of the SSP reveal that there is a tension between the first two of the three tasks identified for this essay in its opening paragraph. One way—arguably, the best way—to clarify *SB*'s *purely systematic* presentation of the SSP (task 2) would be to ignore *SB*'s presystematic and metasystematic passages, but if this essay did that, it would not accomplish the first of its tasks: it would not concisely indicate what is done in each of *SB*'s numbered subsections. The essay attempts to do justice to both tasks by using a smaller font for many (although not all) of its summaries of presystematic and metasystematic passages.[3]

## 2 A section-by-section summary of *Structure and Being*

### 2.0 *SB*'s Introduction

*SB*'s Introduction consists of an opening paragraph followed by seven numbered subsections. The opening paragraph introduces two theses that led, historically, to the development of the SSRPP. These are,

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[2] This thesis concerning the philosophical milieu is of course an empirical one whose status, within the SSP, is peripheral; its rejection would have no significant effect on the thesis that the SSP's theoretical framework is the best currently available for systematic philosophy.

[3] Technically: the status of most of this chapter's summary of *SB* is immanently metasystematic; its summary of *SB* passages that are immanently metasystematic are often printed in normal type.

first, that throughout most of the history of philosophy, one central philosophical task has been that of developing a universal science, and second, that during the period in which the SSRPP developed to the point of its presentation in *SB*, that task had been abandoned.

Introduction [1] distinguishes between two senses in which philosophies can be termed "systematic": in one sense, "systematic" philosophical accounts are non-historical, in the other sense, they are comprehensive (or, again, universal). To clarify the former sense: "non-historical" philosophies—philosophies that are systematic in the first sense—are ones whose presentations do not centrally involve interpretations or criticisms of texts from the history of philosophy.

Introduction [2] briefly distinguishes between so-called continental and analytic philosophy[4], and considers how systematic philosophy has fared in each. The treatment of the former is briefer, noting only that since World War II, work in the continental mode on universal philosophy has been virtually exclusively restricted to reinterpretations of historical texts (especially those of Kant and Hegel). The consideration of analytic philosophy is more extensive, and focuses on (Michael) Dummett 1977/1978, "Can Analytic Philosophy Be Systematic, and Ought It to Be?" It rejects Dummett 1977/1978's theses (1) that analytic philosophy is systematic (in the sense of universal or comprehensive), (2) that "the analysis of language" is an adequate philosophical method, and (3) that that is a method that is widely accepted within analytic philosophy.

In the course of its consideration of Dummett 1977/1978, Introduction [2] presents several theses that are centrally important to the SSRPP. The first is that philosophy

[4] Readers unfamiliar with this distinction need know of it, for the purposes of this book, only the following: among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread agreement concerning the major European philosophers from the fifth century BC through the eighteenth century AD; many top-ten lists would begin with Socrates and end with Kant. For the period following Kant, there is no comparable consensus. Lists of major post-Kantian "continental" philosophers typically include Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger but not Frege, Russell, or Quine, and counterpart lists of "analytic" philosophers typically include the latter three but not the former.

should reject ordinary language, relying instead on an artificial, technical language. The second is that philosophical treatments of language, to be complete, must include treatments of ontology (of what kind or kinds of entities there are). The third is that any adequate philosophical methodology—including the four-stage method of the SSRPP—must involve much more than merely the analysis of language. The section closes by emphasizing the extreme fragmentation of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Introduction [3] presents the first of the Introduction's two overviews of *SB* as a whole. It begins by emphasizing the SSRPP's understanding of philosophy as a strictly theoretical enterprise, and then introduces several theses concerning theoretical frameworks. These theses are centrally important because *theoretical framework* is one of the two core ideas of the SSRPP (see 483). The section then presents the following quasi-definition (Q-Def) of the SSP: it is "a *theory of the most general or universal structures of the unrestricted universe of discourse*" (12/10). The individual terms used by the Q-Def are clarified in Chapter 1 (1.2.2–1.2.5) and, as Chapter 6 notes (623/468), the remainder of Chapter 1 and Chapters 2–5 explicate the Q-Def in detail.

Introduction [4] broaches the centrally important question concerning how the SSP as the *universal* science—the science whose subject matter or universe of discourse is *un*restricted, thus absolutely comprehensive—relates to other sciences, each of which has a *restricted* universe of discourse.

Introduction [5] presents a second overview of *SB*, identifying the central topics treated in each of its six chapters. Its overview of Chapter 2 first introduces the centrally important SSP theses that the subject, as knower and as speaker, is of only secondary and

derivative importance for the development and presentation of theories, and that, consequently, theorization must be disengaged from the standpoint of the subject as theoretician. Among the central points noted in the overview of Chapter 3 is that the semantics of the SSP is contextual rather than compositional, that is, that it accords semantic primacy to sentences rather than to words. The SSP's semantics thus is not directly linked to subject-predicate sentences; it is linked instead to sentences of the form "It's F-ing"—such as the ordinary-language sentence "It's raining"—and interprets the "It" in every such sentence as a syntactic placeholder with no semantic value. *SB* terms sentences of this form "primary sentences"; *BG* terms them "prime sentences"; *TAPTOE* terms them "sentencings."

Introduction [6] describes *SB*'s careful use of the term "system," and emphasizes that *SB* presents only a partial, not a complete, concretization of the theoretical framework of the SSP. Introduction [7], finally, notes that because the SSP as a whole is a theoretical network whose theses and subtheories are grounded (*SB*) or stabilized (*TAPTOE*) by being interlinked, the SSP's (partial) presentation in *SB* contains numerous cross-references, some repetition, and lengthy treatments of relatively central components of the theory.

### 2.2.1 *SB*'s Chapter 1

Chapter 1 presents a global determination of the standpoint of the SSP. 1.1 focuses on the complexity of the concept *theoretical framework* and of its presentation. 1.1[1] notes the historical importance of Carnap 1950/1956's introduction of the concept *linguistic framework*, but also emphasizes that the qualifier "linguistic" is not optimal, because the frameworks required for theorization

have non-linguistic as well as linguistic components. 1.1[2] preliminarily distinguishes between what it terms the abstract or underdetermined and the concrete or fully determined concept of the theoretical framework. 1.1[3] sharpens the distinction, noting in [i] that as the presentation of the SSP develops, the meanings of "framework" and "content" change, in [ii] that of particular significance are the changes in their meanings when the transition is made from Chapters 1–3 to Chapters 4–6, in part because the data considered in the first three chapters differ importantly from those considered in the last three, and in [iii] that the network structure of the SSP requires that its presentation rely, in some cases from the outset, on subtheories that are explicitly considered only later in the account (perhaps most clearly: its presentation relies from the outset on meaningful language, hence on semantics, but its semantic theory is not presented until Chapter 3). 1.1[4] notes an additional consequence of the network structure: it requires that the presentation be at times redundant and at times pedantic.

1.2 as a whole presents (1.2.1) and then clarifies the central terms of its quasi-definition of the SSP as "the theory of the most general or universal structures of the unrestricted universe of discourse." Its clarification of "theory" (1.2.2) introduces the centrally important distinction among theoreticity, practicity, and aestheticity. That distinction is elaborated in 2.2.3.1, 4.3.2.1.2, and 4.4.1; *TAPTOE*'s Chapter 5 contains a single, extended account of this distinction, drawing from all relevant sections of *SB* as well as enhancing the account provided in *SB*.

1.2.3 clarifies "structure," and 1.2.4, "unrestricted universe of discourse." 1.2.4[1][i] reiterates the controversial but vital thesis, first presented in the Introduction's summary

of Chapter 5, that the universe of discourse for systematic philosophy can be unrestricted because being is universally expressible, adding an argument against the thesis that all languages have limits that they cannot surpass. 1.2.4[1][ii] introduces and rejects the five most widely defended theses specifying restrictions on the universe of philosophical discourse (hence, denying that the universe of philosophical discourse is the *un*restricted universe of discourse). 1.2.4[2], finally, briefly considers the status of the data available to the theoretician whose domain of investigation is the unrestricted universe of discourse.

1.2.5 clarifies "most general or universal structures" by identifying such structures for universities. 1.2.6 considers the terms "systematic philosophy" and "philosophical system," noting that *SB* relies more heavily on the former, but does so only for historical reasons involving problematic connotations of the latter.

1.3 considers the dichotomy announced in the book's title: structure and being. 1.3[1] introduces six particularly important comparable dichotomies that are identified in various ways both in the philosophical tradition and at present. 1.3[2] notes that the SPP deems all of those dichotomies, as generally understood, to be inadequate with respect to what *SB* terms "unrestricted universe of discourse" and "being"; the section also briefly indicates how the dichotomy *structure and being* relates to the other dichotomies. 1.3[3] emphasizes that being, although distinguished in the dichotomy from structure, is not unstructured. Instead, it is initially available to the theoretician in the articulations of its structuration available within everyday theoretical frameworks and within the frameworks of extant theories; the task for the SSP is that of articulating its structuration more coherently and intelligibly. 1.3[4] is a brief reminder: the theoretical framework of the SSP can be at most the best currently available for systematic philosophy.

1.4 preliminarily describes the methodological component of the SSP's theoretical framework. 1.4.1 briefly notes that throughout the history of philosophy and still at present, there has never been any widely accepted philosophical methodology, and then lists the four stages of the SSP's method. 1.4.2 summarizes the method's first stage, which involves assembling relevant data (truth candidates) and arranging those that satisfy conditions of consistency and plausibility into informal theories. 1.4.3 presents the second stage as involving putting the informal theories developed at the first methodic stage into proper theoretical form. Anticipating the extensive treatment in 2.4, 1.4.3[1] notes that a complete presentation of the SSP as a whole would include all of the items within the two components *structure* and *unrestricted universe of discourse* (or *being*), and the totality of the relations among them. For that theory as a whole, as well as for its subtheories, the two theory forms that are in principle available are the axiomatic form and the network form. 1.4.3[2] presents five types of axiomatic theory forms, and 1.4.3[3] indicates how the network form differs from the axiomatic form. 1.4.3[4] presents the network form as the globally appropriate one for systematic philosophy, noting that reliance on that form does not exclude the possibility of the inclusion of axiomatic subtheories. 1.4.3[5] notes that although all component theories of the SSP—as well as, in principle, the SSP as a whole—can be made precise formally, the SSP's method does not require that formalizations be presented in all or even in many cases.

1.4.4 briefly sketches the third methodic stage, which involves interrelating the theories developed at the second (or often, as a matter of convenience, at the first) stage into a comprehensive network. 1.4.5, finally, briefly introduces the fourth stage, which

involves the assessment of the adequacy of the theory as a whole. This stage is elaborated extensively in 1.5.2.2–1.5.2.3 and in Chapter 6.

1.5 is *SB*'s initial treatment of what it terms the issue of the (self-)grounding of the SSP. For reasons articulated in its section 2.2, *TAPTOE* avoids primary reliance on the language of grounding and self-grounding, using instead on the language of stabilization (which *SB* uses only in conjunction with what it terms innersystematic grounding; see 67); the following summary uses the latter terminology. 1.5.1 first distinguishes strongly between stabilization, as purely theoretical, and justification, as pragmatic (in that justification is always justification to or for one or more subjects). Justification is subordinate to stabilization in that the adequate stabilization of any thesis or (sub)theory within a given theoretical framework is adequate justification for any subject who accepts that theoretical framework. 1.5.1 also notes the widespread assumption that theses can be adequately stabilized only by being conclusions of sound deductive arguments, noting that that thesis itself cannot be adequately stabilized.

1.5.2 addresses the issue of stabilization in philosophy. 1.5.2.1 examines the non-systematic concept, generally articulated as that of justification, noting at the outset that demands for justification are usually themselves unstable in that they are not situated within frameworks that make clear what would satisfy them. The section then turns to arguments that adequate philosophical stabilization is impossible in principle. 1.5.2.1[1] introduces (Hans) Albert 1968's "Münchhausen trilemma" and (Karl-Otto) Apel 1973/1980's attempt to avoid it, noting that the accounts in both of those texts suffer from their failures to recognize the relativity of stabilizations (including groundings and justifications) to theoretical frameworks. 1.5.2.1[2.1] summarizes (Leonard) Nelson 1908's argument that stabilization is epistemologically impossible, then notes that that text's argument presupposes an idiosyncratic and rejectable understanding of epistemology. The lengthy 1.5.2.1[2.2] presents the variant of Nelson's argument

articulated in (Richard J.) Ketchum 1991 ([2.2.1]), and the inadequate response to Ketchum formulated in (Robert) Almeder 1994 ([2.2.2]). 1.5.2.1[3] shows that Almeder 1994's skeptical conclusion arbitrarily presupposes that stabilizations are all of a single type and on a single level, and that Almeder 1994 itself relies on a framework within which there a multiple types of stabilizations, on distinct levels. The section notes as well that extreme skeptical denials of the possibility of adequate theoretical stabilization are intelligible only if they themselves are adequately stabilized—or, differently stated, that themselves presuppose theoretical frameworks within which they are adequately stabilized, and are therefore self-destabilizing.

1.5.2.2 describes the SSP's process of stabilization. 1.5.2.2[1] reiterates the senselessness of demands for stabilizations (or justifications) of isolated sentences. 1.5.2.2[2][i] emphasizes that the first stage of the process—the incipiently systematic—is in no way definitive because the SSP as a whole is coherentist rather than foundational. 1.5.2.2[ii] corrects an error in Carnap 1950/1956 that has led to widespread confusion:[5] although that text asserts that framework-selection is a practical rather than a theoretical matter, the criteria it presents for such selections are theoretical ones. For anyone who makes the *practical* decision to proceed as a theoretician, the question of which theoretical framework to use is wholly *theoretical*: the framework that is the best currently available for the relevant subject matter is the one that must be accepted.

1.5.2.2[3] describes the innersystematic process of stabilization as multifaceted but nonetheless straightforward; it involves all of the inferential interlinkings of sentences and subtheories within the SSP. 1.5.2.2[4], finally, sketches the metasystematic process of stabilization, emphasizing in 1.5.2.2[4][i] that because the theory is coherentist rather than foundationalist, the strictly proper location of metasystematic stabilizations would

[5] A good example, postdating *SB*, is found in Cameron 2015 (*The Moving Spotlight*), e.g., p. 32.

come after the systematic presentation of the theory, and in 1.5.2.2[4][ii] that the SSP, in requiring ongoing metasystematic stabilization over the course of time as alternative theoretical frameworks develop, is in a position on a par with those of natural-scientific theories, which are also subject to alteration and abandonment as the historical process of theorization continues. The subsection then introduces coherence and intelligibility as criteria centrally relevant to the evaluation of theoretical frameworks for systematic philosophies. 1.5.2.2[4][a] notes that frameworks involving unintelligible components reveal themselves to be inadequate, and 1.5.2.2[4][b] adds that when there are multiple frameworks not including unintelligible components, the frameworks can be ranked in accordance with the degrees of intelligibility that they exhibit. The section closes by emphasizing that the comparisons must occur within metaframeworks, and noting four possible outcomes for such comparisons.

1.5.2.3 makes explicit that 1.5.2.2's description of the stabilization process is an idealization, noting in 1.5.2.3[1] that the innersystematic process is the least problematic, and in 1.5.2.3[2] that *SB* includes incipiently systematic and metasystematic accounts in various places and that although the fully appropriate systematic location for the latter would follow the presentation of the SSP, the current philosophical climate is such that including some metasystematic arguments within the body of *SB* is more appropriate.

## 2.2 *SB*'s Chapter 2

Chapter 2 treats the systematics of theoreticity. 2.1 briefly introduces the three dimensions of presentation (or, in *TAPTOE*'s terminology, arenas of engagement) theoreticity, practicity, and aestheticity, anticipatorily linking the three, respectively, with

truth, goodness, and beauty. The section then briefly considers theory forms (the topic of 2.4), and closes with an overview of the remainder of the chapter.

2.2 and 2.3, together, begin the tackling of a task that is resumed and completed in the extensive 5.1; this is the task of deposing the subject, as speaker and as knower, from the position it has held virtually throughout modernity of being a (or in some cases indeed the) factor of decisive importance to the project of theorization. The task, in other words, is that of showing that theorization has no unavoidable relativity to languages human beings happen to speak or to human cognitive capacities. 2.2 focuses on language, 2.3, on knowledge.

2.2.1 distinguishes artificial, theoretical languages from ordinary languages, emphasizing that the former require only indicative sentences (thus no imperatives, interrogatives, etc.). It introduces an important thesis that is stabilized in 5.1, i.e., that artificial, theoretical languages can be semiotic systems with uncountably many expressions.

2.2.2 treats in extensive detail the distinction between (artificial, theoretical) philosophical languages and ordinary languages, noting in its opening paragraphs that ordinary languages include primitive theoretical components. 2.2.2[1] surveys important positions held by philosophers concerning the philosophical status of ordinary language. 2.2.2[1.1] introduces three positions holding that ordinary language is in no way definitive for philosophy; the positions are those of (Richard) Montague 1974/1979 (2.2.2[1.1a]), Hegel's *Logic*, and Heidegger 1969/1972 (2.2.2[1.1b]). Of these, the one taken in Hegel's *Logic* is closest to that of the SPP. 2.2.2[1.2] introduces and criticizes the widely influential championing of ordinary language in Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. 2.2.2[1.3] notes that most philosophers take intermediate positions concerning the philosophical status of ordinary

language, granting it limited authority but authority nonetheless. The subsection presents the position taken in many of Quine's texts as "the definitive example." 2.2.2[1.3][i] introduces Quine 1960's thesis that regimenting ordinary language by means of first-order predicate logic simply paraphrases that language, but then points out that some of Quine 1981's "paraphrases" are problematically distant from anything recognizable as ordinary English. 2.2.2[1.3][ii] first anticipates centrally important arguments presented in detail in Chapter 3 by noting that Quine's reliance on first-order predicate logic is (at best) made problematic by his revolutionary thesis of the semantic primacy of the sentence—briefly, the rejection of the thesis that the meanings (semantic values) of sentences are functions of the meanings (semantic values) of the words that *compose* them (the principle of semantic *compositionality*) and the consequent acceptance of the thesis that words have semantic values only in the *contexts* of sentences within which they occur (the semantic *context* principle). The subsection next notes Davidson's disagreement with Quine, and that that disagreement is based in part on Davidson's thesis that because there is only one conceptual scheme, both ordinary and scientific languages must be included within it. The subsection closes by noting that the SSP has no counterpart to Davidson's thesis, holding instead that there are infinitely many possible and a great many actual theoretical frameworks that are genuinely distinct; 5.1.5.2.1 explains what such genuine distinctness involves.

2.2.2[2] introduces four general issues that must be clarified concerning the relation between theoretical and ordinary language. 2.2.2[2][i] notes that the issue of formalization is not of central importance, because languages of both kinds can be formalized; it notes as well that ordinary language provides the starting point for the development of philosophical theories. 2.2.2[2][ii] points out that although the vagueness and underdetermination of ordinary language do not prevent its fulfilling its communicative function, they do make it inadequate for purposes of theoretical presentation. 2.2.2[2][iii] remarks that this vagueness and underdetermination are manifest when theoreticians attempt to specify clear ordinary-language meanings for

terms important to theorization, and then notes the inadequacy, for the purposes of theorization, of the incipiently logical components of ordinary language. 2.2.2[2][iv] indicates that philosophy can adapt components of ordinary language, emphasizing in 2.2.2[2][iv][a] that the adaptations are transformations rather than simple inclusions, and in 2.2.2[2][iv][b] that such adaptations are not, in principle, indispensable. 2.2.2[2][v] considers and counters two possible objections to the theses introduced in the preceding subsections ([iv][a] and [b]), and introduces the thesis that a transformed version of Wittgenstein's notion of language games could be used to clarify the distinction between ordinary and artificial-theoretical languages.

2.2.3 considers philosophical language as (non-ordinary) theoretical language. 2.2.3.1 opens by noting the need for a linguistic criterion that identifies (more accurate would be: "linguistic criteria that identify") syntactically and semantically indicative sentences, thus theoretical sentences. 2.2.3.1[1] first introduces the syntactic criterion sentences must satisfy in order to be theoretical: they must be syntactically correct when preceded by the operator "It is the case that." To further clarify both this operator and theoretical sentences, 2.2.3.1[1] next introduces practical and aesthetic sentences, along with practical and aesthetic operators, and identifies some ways that the operators can, and cannot, be combined.

2.2.3.1[2] presents the semantic criterion that must be satisfied by theoretical sentences. 2.2.3.1[2][i] indicates that the semantic criterion is that of expressing a proposition in a specific manner that must be distinguished from the manners in which practical and aesthetic sentences express propositions. 2.2.3.1[2][i][a] indicates that the SSP rejects of the widespread presupposition that the semantic and ontological status of values (and norms)

differs fundamentally from that of facts, and that in the SSP, genuine values (and norms) are (in *TAPTOE*'s terminology) factings, and thus are identical with propositionings expressible by true sentencings. 2.2.3.1[2][i][b] indicates that practical sentences express propositionings in the mode of demand. 2.2.3.1[2][ii] specifies what distinguishes theoretical sentencings semantically: they aim "*directly and completely at objectivity*" (93). This aim is explicit when the theoretical operator is used in its fully determinate form, i.e., "It is true that…." The theoretical operator, in both of its forms, is the fundamental and universal operator because all sentences governed by the practical and the aesthetical operators become theoretical sentences when the theoretical operator is prefixed to them.

2.2.3.2 sketches the basic features of a program for the development of a systematic philosophical language. Any such language has, as a regulative ideal, complete transparency; such transparency presupposes clarification of the language's syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, logical, and ontological aspects. The section notes that the most controversial issue concerning how these aspects interrelate concerns the role of the pragmatic aspect. It briefly notes that the pragmatic aspect is presented as marginal in some texts, including some by Tarski, Carnap, and Quine, but central by others, including Wittgenstein's *Investigations* and Brandom 1994. The section introduces but does not develop three reasons for denying centrality to the pragmatic aspect. The section closes by indicating that the syntactic aspect is the one that is most easily clarified, and that in the SSP, the semantic and ontological aspects are maximally tightly linked.

2.2.4 explicitly draws a conclusion stabilized by what is said in the preceding sections of 2.2: in philosophy, language is a centrally important factor. 2.2.4 also introduces two important theses whose adequate stabilization requires additional

contexualization. One is that language in no way limits theorization, but instead makes universal theorization possible (this thesis is further stabilized in 5.1), the other, that according to the SSP (again in *TAPTOE*'s terminology), every true sentencing expresses a true propositioning that is identical to a unique facting—that is, that no two sentencings express the same propositioning and hence facting, and thus, that there is no full synonymy (this thesis is further stabilized in 3.2.2.4.2).

2.2.5 introduces a vitally important corollary to the thesis of the universal expressibility or articulability of being: anything whatsoever is articulable only if it is intrinsically articulated. The SSP terms the articulation that is intrinsic to being "originary language." That originary language—originary linguisticality—is intrinsic to being is a powerful stabilizer for the thesis that subjects, as language users, are of only secondary or derivative significance with respect to theorization. 2.2.5[i] emphasizes that being's intrinsic expressibility explains human beings' capacity to express it, and 2.2.5[ii], that originary language is not limited in the way that any human language, as actually used at a specific time, is limited.

2.3 turns from language, the medium of expression for theoreticity, to knowledge, the domain of the accomplishment of theoreticity. The opening paragraphs note that although throughout modernity, the subject as knower is taken to be at the heart of theoreticity, the SSP displaces that subject, according central status instead to theoretical frameworks (which of course include their languages).

2.3.1 focuses on the epistemic subject, not on knowledge, because of the importance accorded to that subject throughout modernity. It briefly mentions the three most widely held understandings of the epistemic subject, as follows:

[1] the subject as locus of propositional attitudes such as knowing that, believing that, and doubting that (the understanding most common within analytic philosophy)

[2] the subject as taking a determinative standpoint

[i] the standpoint is foundational (Descartes 1641)

[ii] the standpoint is pragmatic

[a] what is decisive is what is good for or useful to the subject (classical pragmatism; (Charles) Peirce 1877/165, 1903, (William) James 1907)

[b] what is decisive is what results from rational communication (various texts by Jürgen Habermas)[6]

[c] what is decisive is the activity of subjects engaged in social practices (Brandom 1994)

[3] the subject as decisively conditioning the possibility of its experience, hence of all that it knows (Kant *CPuR*)

2.3.2 thematizes the systematic status of the epistemic dimension. 2.3.2.1 notes the ambiguity of the term "knowledge" in ordinary language, emphasizing that determining how the term is best understood in philosophy involves taking into consideration both the verbal sense that involves the epistemic subject—as in "*S* knows that *p*"—and the nominal sense that does not—as in "The *Encyclopedia Britannica* contains knowledge amassed over the centuries." 2.3.2.2 turns to knowledge as a philosophical problem. 2.3.2.2[1] presents a definition from the *OED* that exposes the central issue of the relation of knowledge to truth. 2.3.2.2[2] introduces and then rejects the definition of knowledge as justified

[6] 2.3.2.4 (153f/114f, n16) points out a fatal flaw at the heart of Habermas's position.

true belief (JTB),[7] and 2.3.2.2[3] presents the following alternative definition as the one accepted by the SSP:

(K) S knows that *p* iff

(a) S believes that *p* is true, and

(b) S believes that S's belief that *p* is true is justified.

2.3.2[4] introduces alternatives to JTB and to (K), mentioning the position articulated in (Christian) Sartwell 1991 and 1992 and briefly describing that developed in (Timothy) Williamson 2000, but notes that all such alternatives are problematic in that they are defended in part by means of ordinary-language examples, whereas (K) makes no claim to adequacy to ordinary language. The section closes, however, by briefly defending the thesis that (K) most adequately incorporates the factors essential to characterizing the relevant ordinary-language uses of the term, i.e., truth, justification, and belief.[8]

2.3.2.4 treats subjectivity and knowledge with respect to systematicity. 2.3.2.4[1] specifies the task of 2.3.2.4 as clarifying the consequences, for theorization, of the human

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[7] Because *SB*'s rejection of the JTB definition is terse, because the issue is centrally important, and because an expanded version of the rejection clearly shows the relevance of theoretical frameworks, *TAPTOE* Chapter 4 includes such a version.

[8] One peculiarity of (K), in comparison with the most common philosophical characterizations of knowledge, is that it allows for the possibility of false knowledge. How widely held is the thesis that the phrase "false knowledge," in ordinary English, is oxymoronic is an empirical question whose answer has no definitive consequences concerning the inclusion of (K) within the theoretical framework of the SSP, but that this thesis is far from universally accepted is established by examples introduced in *TAPTOE* 4.3.

subject's intentional coextensionality with being as such and as a whole. 2.3.2.4[2] distinguishes between particularistic and universal understandings of subjectivity, introducing operators to clarify the statuses of relevant sentences. 2.3.2.4[3] analyzes a formalized example of a sentence governed by a particularistic operator. 2.3.2.4[4] introduces two significant problems plaguing all particularistic positions, indicating how the SSP avoids those problems. 2.3.2.4[4][i] presents the problem for particularistic positions of a relativism far more severe than any generally acknowledged in texts defending or presupposing such positions, and notes that the SSP avoids any such relativism by relying on the framework of rationality accessible to the subject understood as universal. It notes as well that the subject understood as universal is not a factor that requires explicit mention. 2.3.2.4[ii] notes an incoherence in the particularistic position: no subject who was restricted to a particularistic position would be capable of formulating the thesis that it *was* restricted to that position.

2.3.2.4[5] introduces and responds to two anticipated objections to the position concerning subjectivity that is presented in the preceding sections. The first objection is that subjects unavoidably have perspectives, and the response is that universality qualifies as a "perspective" of the sort that subjects cannot avoid having, but not as the kind of "perspective" that introduces any restriction or limitation. The second objection is that sentences presented within universalistic frameworks must have the status of being dogmas; the response is that this appears to follow only if the operator "It is the case that" is misinterpreted.

2.3.2.4[6] briefly introduces Gödel's incompleteness theorem. The general point stabilized by its introduction is that to demand that philosophies prove their theses incontrovertibly is, arbitrarily, to require that philosophies satisfy a criterion that even axiomatizations of elementary arithmetic cannot satisfy.

2.3.2.5 articulates the thesis, stabilized by theses presented in 2.3.2–2.3.2.4, that the subject is of secondary rather than of primary importance to the enterprise of theorization. 2.3.2.5[1] summarizes the previously introduced theses concerning universality, rationality, and objectivity. 2.3.2.5[2] distinguishes between normal and idealized or fully realized belief. "I have the fully realized belief that *p*" can be reformulated as "It is the case that *p*" because in both cases the sentences articulate primarily the status of *p*, and only secondarily and derivatively the status of any subject.

2.4 identifies the factors that are essential to the SSP *as a theory*. 2.4.1 notes that whereas 1.2.2 considers *external* factors—those distinguishing theorization from other activities—the concern here is with *internal* factors: what the SSP, as a theory, must include. 2.4.2 examines available theory-concepts for metalogic/metamathematics and philosophy of science. 2.4.2.1 sketches the "logical" theory-concept, according to which a theory is a deductively closed set of sentences generally presented in axiomatic form. 2.4.2.2 presents the first of two theory-concepts for the natural sciences presented by philosophers of science, the so-called received view. Like the logical theory-concept, the received view understands theories as axiomatically structured collections of sentences; of central importance to the received view is the distinction between observation vocabularies and theoretical vocabularies. In part because of the untenability of this distinction, the received view has been largely abandoned and has been replaced by two alternatives (Frederick) Suppe 1977 terms "*Weltanschauungen* analyses" and "semantic approaches." Because the former offer no resources incorporable into the SSP, *SB* does not consider them.

2.4.2.3 considers two forms of what are termed "semantic approaches," but misleadingly so, because each deemphasizes language. 2.4.2.3.1 thematizes the "constructive empiricism" developed in (Bas) van Fraassen 1980, 1989, and 1991, according to which theories should rely on set theory rather than on the language of first-order predicate logic, and theories are not collections of sentences, but are instead

mathematical models consisting "of entities and relations among those entities" (1989: 365n2). The section notes that this position is an anti-realism, holding that the goal of science is empirical adequacy, not truth (*SB* 5.1.4.3 considers the realism/anti-realism debate).

2.4.2.3.2 introduces the second "semantic" approach to the problem of what theories are, the structuralist conception. 2.4.2.3.2[1] attempts to clarify the sense in which the structuralist position has what van Fraassen 1989 (191) terms a "non-statement character." The most important clarifications are that neither truth nor statements are listed as components of theories. 2.4.2.3.2[2] notes that according to this position, theories are collections of (mathematical) models structured by informal set theory and defined by the introduction of set-theoretical predicates. 2.4.2.3.2[3] characterizes the components included in the structural core of any theory. 2.4.2.3.2[4] notes that theories as understood by the structuralist position include not only their cores, but also classes of intended applications.

2.4.3 presents the SSP's theory-concept. 2.4.3.1 specifies conclusions drawn from the considerations introduced in 2.4.2. 2.4.3.1[1] notes that "theory" is widely but carelessly used in contemporary philosophy. 2.4.3.1[2] points out that none of the theory-concepts considered in 2.4.2 could be directly appropriated by philosophy, because those theory-concepts aim to be adequate either for formal or for experimental-scientific theories, and philosophy does not develop theories of either of those two types. 2.4.3.1[3] asserts that none of the theory-concepts considered in 2.4.2 is adequate even for formal or experimental-scientific theories, but adds that the concepts can nonetheless be instructive. 2.4.3.1[4] indicates that none of the considered theory-concepts adequately takes into consideration either language or ontology. 2.4.3.1[5] praises the semantic approaches for relying on models, as structures, but criticizes them for relying on informal set theory, and, again, for paying insufficient attention to ontology.

2.4.3.2 presents the essential aspects of the theory-concept relied on by the SSP. 2.4.3.2[1] defines the SSP's theory-concept as having the components *structure* and *universe of discourse*, emphasizing that language is included within the former. 2.4.3.2[2] indicates that according to the SSP, there are three types of fundamental structures:

formal (logical-mathematical), semantic, and ontological structures. 2.4.3.2[2](i) notes the importance of the fact that by relying on a determinately interpreted language, the SSP avoids various problems that plague theories that begin with uninterpreted languages. 2.4.3.2[2](ii) notes that because the SSP's theory-concept explicitly integrates language, it has all the advantages of the logical theory-concept. 2.4.3.2[2](iii) adds that the inclusion of language in the theory-concept makes possible clarification of the truth-concept. 2.4.3.2[3] emphasizes the centrality to the SSP's theory-concept of the *relation* between the component *structure* and the component *universe of discourse*, noting that the relation could be listed as a third component of the theory, but also that because full explication *both* of the component *structure and* of the component *universe of discourse* includes explication of the relation between the two, listing the relation as a component of the theory is not necessary.

2.4.3.3 specifies that the SSP's theory-concept functions as a regulative idea whose full realization is neither requisite nor probable. 2.4.3.3[1] emphasizes the value of regulative ideas, noting the SSP's method as an example. 2.4.3.3[2] adds that the SSP develops within a milieu that includes a collection of available truth candidates whose exhaustive consideration is also a regulative idea.

2.5 is the first of two sections (the second being 3.3) devoted to the SSP's truth-theory (*TAPTOE* Chapter3 presents a version of that theory in a single, integrated account). 2.5.1.1 introduces problems with the word "truth" and the concepts historically and currently associated with it. 2.5.1.1[1] notes that in ordinary language, multiple concepts are associated with the word "truth." 2.5.1.1[2] introduces several unsatisfactory

approaches to the problem of truth. 2.5.1.1[2][i] distinguishes three such approaches in analytic philosophy. The first simply ignores problematic uses of the term, the second introduces different truth-concepts for different areas, and the third attempts to extend truth-concepts from the theoretical domain to other domains, such as the moral domain. 2.5.1.1[2][ii] identifies a fundamental confusion arising from a misguided choice in the initial translation of the Bible into Greek, and 2.5.1.1[2][iii], Heidegger's confusion of word and concept in his long-standing association of the German counterpart to "truth"—"*Wahrheit*—with the Greek term ἀλήθεια. 2.5.1.1[3] indicates that despite the confusions in ordinary language and in philosophy, Tarski provides a stable starting-point for examination of the truth relevant to the SSP by articulating the concept of truth that is relied upon, generally tacitly, within the formal and natural sciences.

2.5.1.2 introduces the great divide in contemporary truth-theories between what are often termed substantialist and deflationist theories, noting that the disquotational thesis accepted by all deflationistic theories is superficial with respect to semantics.

2.5.1.3 opens by noting that the SSP's truth-theory explains truth for its own theoretical language, not for ordinary languages (in part because the latter allow for problematically self-referential sentences such as "This sentence is false"). The SSP's theory thus need not explain all ordinary-language appearances of conjugates of "true," and can restrict its account to "true" as it appears in the operator "It is true that." Anticipating 3.3, the section notes that reliance on the truth operator—rather than on the predicate, as in "This sentence is true"—has far-reaching semantic and ontological consequences.

2.5.1.4 distinguishes between comprehensive theories of truth and sub-theories of truth, emphasizing that defining truth is importantly distinct from determining criteria of truth. *SB*'s sections 2.5 and 3.3 present a *definitional* theory of truth; the SSP's *criteria* of

truth are articulated in its account of its method (1.4, Chapter 6) and of its systematic concept of stabilization (1.5.2.2–1.5.2.3).

2.5.2 provides an initial articulation of the SSP's basic idea of truth. 2.5.2.1 introduces "the fundamental fact about language," i.e., that sentences require semantic determination—that, for example, the sentence "Snow is black" can express the proposition that snow is black, but can also appear (as it does within this sentence) as an example, in which case it need not express any proposition. The section then indicates how semantic determination is accomplished for formal languages. 2.5.2.2 first notes that the disquotation schema fails to take the requirement of semantic determination into consideration, and then introduces the three levels at which semantic determination can be accomplished: the lifeworldly-contextual (2.5.2.2[1]), the pragmatic (2.5.2.2[2]), and the semantic (2.5.2.2[3]). 2.5.2.3 shows how the three levels are connected: lifeworldly-contextually accomplished semantic determination can be explicitly articulated by means of pragmatic language, and pragmatically accomplished semantic determination, by means of semantic language. Semantically accomplished semantic determination explicitly articulates itself, and therefore does not require a higher-level language. 2.5.2.4 provides what it terms an informal-intuitive formulation of the SSP's concept of truth.

## 2.3 *SB*'s Chapter 3

Chapter 3 treats the systematics of structure, and thus, most centrally, the three types of fundamental structures. 3.1 clarifies what, most broadly, the systematics of structure involves. 3.1.1 presents the basic idea by noting that for all theories, the question arises of how their subject matters are to be conceptualized. It then notes that two extreme

possibilities are that either the domain of theorization (or conceptualization) or the domain of subject matter is a blank slate, attaining whatever determination it attains from the other domain. *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant) is introduced as lying close to the latter extreme, and *Science of Logic* (Hegel) as taking a superior position in that it identifies the determinations of *thought* as the determinations of *things*.

3.1.2 presents preliminary clarifications of various terms and concepts. 3.1.2.1 clarifies terms associated with the domain of structure or of theorization, as distinguished from the domain of what is theorized. 3.1.2.1[1] notes the central importance, in philosophy, of the term "concept," but also that what is meant by this term varies from philosophy to philosophy, in some cases enormously. Concepts are taken sometimes to be mental entities, sometimes abstract entities. In either case, concepts have contents, and that they do raises—or should raise—the question concerning the ontological status of those contents. Concepts are said in some accounts to "apply to" their contents, in others, to "designate" their contents; concepts are also commonly said to have both extensions and intensions. 3.1.2.1[2] notes that what is understood by "concept" changes if language is brought explicitly into consideration. It also notes that a distinction is often drawn between theories of reference and theories of meaning, and that the terminology in Frege's works is confused as a result of the fact that some works take their linguistic bearings from mathematics, whereas others take theirs from language. 3.1.2.1[3] notes that because of the ambiguity of the term "meaning," *SB* instead uses the term "semantic value." 3.1.2.1[4] notes that such terms as "thinking" and "thoughts" can be understood either mentalistically or linguistically-semantically, and that the SSP understands thoughts as propositions and propositions as expressa of sentences (thus not as objects of subjects' propositional attitudes). It also notes its synonymous uses of "proposition" and "state of affairs."

3.1.2.2 considers terms associated with the dimension of what is (only) theorized. 3.1.2.2[1] considers "object," "property," and "relation," their usual connection by means of predication, and the conflicting intensional and extensional understandings of predication. 3.1.2.2[2] notes the problematic status of *facts*

within object- or substance-based ontologies. 3.1.2.2[3] mentions various other terms, noting that all usually appear within substantialist frameworks.

3.1.2.3 considers the historically important term “category,” which is not decisively situated within either the domain of structure (of theorization) or that of being (of what is only theorized), noting that categories become less important when language is explicitly considered, and that conceptual schemes currently play the role most closely resembling the role played earlier in the tradition by categories.

3.1.3 makes explicit the central status, in the SSP, of *structure*, emphasizing that within its theoretical framework, all of the terms considered in 3.1.2 are understood as elliptical abbreviations for “structure.” 3.1.3 then presents a brief reminder of what is said about structure in 1.2.3.

3.1.4 sketches the program for the development of the SSP’s systematics of structure. 3.1.4[1] quotes a generally ignored passage in which Quine 1960 suggests that scientific conceptual schemes are ontologically revelatory, then notes ([i]) that *SB*’s systematics of structure qualifies, generally, as what Quine 1960 terms conceptual schemes. It then indicates ([ii]) that the SSP’s fundamental structures are structures intrinsic to being, not structures somehow imposed on being, and ([iii]) that Quine 1960, by including formal logic in the conceptual scheme shared by the sciences, accords it an ontological status.

3.1.4[2] notes first that the SSP recognizes formal structures as ontological, and sees those structures not as utterly distinct from contentual structures, but instead as falling at one end of a continuum whose other end is occupied by the most concrete structures. The latter are identified in 3.1.4[3] as semantic and ontological structures.

3.1.5 considers the status of language and semantics within the systematics of structure. 3.1.5[1] emphasizes that because conceptual contents are made explicitly

manifest only by means of linguistic articulation, semantic structures are superordinate to all such contents, including ontological contents and mental contents. 3.1.5[2] raises the question of whether semantic structures are likewise superordinate to formal structures, answering the question in the affirmative, but noting that the superordination is qualified by the fact that semantic and ontological structures (which include mathematical/logical structures) are maximally tightly linked.

3.2 presents the three levels of fundamental structures. 3.2.1 treats formal structures. 3.2.1.1 considers the interrelations among logic, mathematics, and philosophy. 3.2.1.1[1] notes that although logic and mathematics are sciences distinct from philosophy, they are also subject matters for philosophy. The two tasks that emerge for the SSP are clarifying the status of logical and mathematical structures (done briefly in 3.3.4.2), and explaining philosophy's reliance on logical and mathematical structures (done in greater detail in 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3). 3.2.1.1[2] presents logical and mathematical structures as distinct and mutually irreducible components of a comprehensive, unitary formal dimension, noting that logical structures are more comprehensive than are mathematical structures, and that logic thematizes its language(s), whereas mathematics generally does not.

3.2.1.2 treats mathematical structures. 3.2.1.2[1] notes that within contemporary mathematics, the status of mathematical structures is not fully clear, but that within the theoretical framework of the SSP, mathematics is the science of mathematical structures. 3.2.1.2[2] introduces Bourbaki's texts as presenting the most extensive available account of mathematical structures, but deems that account inadequate, in part because it does not directly broach the question

concerning the ontological status of mathematical structures. 3.2.1.2[3] suggests that fuller philosophical clarification of the status of mathematical structures may require theoretical advances within mathematics.

3.2.1.3 treats logical structures. 3.2.1.3[1] clarifies the distinction between syntax and semantics as it relates to logical structures, noting first that sentences expressing syntactic contents require semantics in order to be intelligible, and then that logical laws can be articulated as structures. 3.2.1.3[2] presents (Arnold) Koslow 1992 as clarifying the basic structurality of logic, but criticizes that book for failing to thematize language and truth.

3.2.2 treats semantic primary structures, with 3.2.2.1 devoted to their general characterization. 3.2.2.1[1] notes that *SB* does not include an explicit treatment of syntactic primary structures, and that its treatment of semantic structures is (purely) systematic in the sense that it includes no extensive treatment of alternative positions. 3.2.2.1[2] introduces the definitions of semantic structure and full semantic structure presented in Stegmüller and Varga 1984, and indicates that the function of semantic structures is to link signs to semantic values (in the SSP: sentencings to propositionings). 3.2.2.2 presents the SSP's semantics as ontologically oriented. 3.2.2.2[1] notes the SSP's radical divergence from the position taken by most analytic philosophers, a position relying (1) on ordinary languages whose most important structures are subject-predicate sentences, and (2) on first-order predicate logic. The strongest reason for the SSP's divergence are the unacceptable semantic and ontological consequences of that reliance, consequences generally not considered by those taking the position. One result of *SB*'s taking those consequences seriously is the SSP's maximally tight connection between its semantics and its ontology.

3.2.2.2[2] announces that *SB* proceeds to the SSP's semantics by way of an argument demonstrating the inadequacy of compositional semantics; that argument is presented in 3.2.2.3. 3.2.2.3.1 presents the basic features of compositional semantic theories, beginning in 3.2.2.3.1[1] with two formulations of the principle of compositionality (CPP) including, as the simplest form, the following:

(CPP) The meaning (or semantic value) of a complex or compound expression is a function of the meanings (or semantic values) of its parts or components.

It then notes that the CPP is sometimes interpreted intensionally, at other times, extensionally. 3.2.2.3.1[2] introduces a diagram and an example to clarify the CCP as a function. 3.2.2.3.1[3] reveals the position on the CPP articulated in Frege 1892a to be inconsistent with the position articulated in Frege 1918. 3.2.2.3.1[4] argues that the only ontologies allowed for by compositional semantics are substance ontologies.

3.2.2.3.2 reveals the unintelligibility of *substance* as establishing the inadequacy of all substance ontologies. 3.2.2.3.2.1 considers substance ontologies and their alternatives in contemporary philosophy. 3.2.2.3.2.1[1] introduces three versions of substance ontologies, and 3.2.2.3.2.1[2], four bundle ontologies, which are the most prominent alternatives to substance ontologies. 3.2.2.3.2.2 presents the root problem with all substance ontologies. 3.2.2.3.2.2[i] notes that the problem is not avoided by the inclusion of additional entities (such as events) within substance ontologies, because *substance* remains basic. 3.2.2.3.2.2[ii] formulates the root problem as that of the unintelligibility, within substance ontologies, of *substance*, and the unintelligibility, within compositional semantics, of predication.

3.2.2.3.2.3 begins the move away from compositional semantics by announcing the potentially revolutionary consequences of the taking of two steps announced but not fully exploited in Quine 1953/1980, Quine 1960, Quine 1981, and Quine 1985: according semantic primacy to sentences, and eliminating singular terms. 3.2.2.3.2.3[1] presents the procedure for eliminating singular terms articulated in Quine 1960 and Quine 1985. 3.2.2.3.2.3[2] indicates that the Quine texts do not fully develop this procedure. 3.2.2.3.2.3[2][i] notes that the Quine texts use the procedure only to solve the problem posed by singular terms that, like "Pegasus," have no referents, and that they accord to the procedure no ontological implications. 3.2.2.3.2.3[2][ii] analyzes an example from Quine 1953/1980 in order to show the potential importance of the procedure to ontology. 3.2.2.3.2.3[2][ii][a] points out that that text (8) presents the procedure as reducing or translating singular terms ("Pegasus") into general terms ("is-Pegasus" or "pegasizes"), and does not consider the possibility that the terms be taken instead to be reduced to or translated into sentences ("It's pegasizing"). 3.2.2.3.2.3[2][ii][b] notes that the latter option conflicts with a thesis central to many Quine texts, i.e., that predicate logic is "the adopted form, for better or worse, of scientific theory" (1985:170).

3.2.2.4 presents the basic features of the SSP's semantic theory, which relies on a version of the context principle (CTP) that is incompatible with any version of the principle of compositionality (CPP). 3.2.2.4.1 notes that texts defending versions of the CTP usually present it as compatible with the CPP, but 3.2.2.4.1.1 points out that because the CPP is presented by those texts as functional, it is incompatible with the CTP. 3.2.2.4.1.2 presents the basic features of and requirements for the SSP's version of the CTP. 3.2.2.4.1.2[1] reiterates the basic point that the sentences accorded primacy by the SSP's semantics are subjectless sentences—*SB*'s primary sentences, *TAPTOE*'s sentencings—and that the subject-predicate sentences it uses are convenient abbreviations of subjectless sentences. Semantically, sentencings (can) express propositionings. 3.2.2.4.1.2[2] indicates that this semantics requires an

ontology that must be explicitly developed. 3.2.2.4.1.3 treats the problem of identity conditions for propositionings and factings. 3.2.2.4.1.3[1] points out that because the SSP's semantics and ontology include no universals, they do not require conditions of individuation. 3.2.2.4.1.3[2] notes that what are crucial are semantic conditions of identity, because the ontological conditions follow from them. 3.2.2.4.1.3[2][i] adds that the SSP does not need a criterion determining when two (or more) sentencings express the same propositioning, because the SSP includes a thesis of semantic uniqueness, i.e., that no two no two sentencings express the same propositioning. 3.2.2.4.1.3[2][i][a] introduces, as a supplement to the thesis of semantic uniqueness, a thesis of semantic similarity, i.e., that the propositionings expressed by two sentencings can be similar to such a degree that it cannot be the case that one is true and the other false. 3.2.2.4.1.3[2][i][b] notes that the thesis of semantic uniqueness is stabilized by its connections to the SSP's tightly linked semantics and ontology, and to its thesis of the universal expressibility of being. 3.2.2.4.1.3[2][i][c] reiterates that presentations of the SSP can rely on syntactically subject-predicate sentences. 3.2.2.4.1.3[2][ii] presents the material and formal conditions of identity for propositionings, conditions that, because of the SSP's identity thesis (i.e., that every true propositioning is identical to a facting that is a constituent of primary being[9]), are also ontological conditions of identity.

3.2.2.4.2 presents propositionings as the SSP's semantic structures, relying on two formalizations. More strictly speaking, propositionings are components of the SSP's

[9] Primary being is actual being, whereas derivative being is possible but non-actual being; see the brief summary, below, of *SB* 5.2.3[4], or that section in *SB* (580–581/435–436).

semantic structures, but so too are sentencings. A semantic structure would, for example, map an element “It’s redding” from a set of sentences to an element *It’s redding* from a set of propositionings.

3.2.3 thematizes the SSP’s ontological structures. 3.2.3[1] presents a formalized definition. Anticipating 3.2.3.2[2]–[4], the definition may be paraphrased as follows: every ontological structure is minimally articulated by a sentencing “It’s self-identicalling.”

3.2.3.2 treats *simple* ontological structures, presenting three possible ways they could be understood (methodologically: three truth candidates). 3.2.3.2[1] rejects the thesis that simple ontological structures could be purely abstract structures (in the sense introduced in 1.2.3). 3.2.3.2[2] introduces the possibility that simple ontological structures could be determined solely by means of the relation of self-identity. 3.2.3.2[3] considers the possibility that simple ontological structures could be simple factings that are identical to their relation of self-identity. 3.2.3.2[4] clarifies the possibilities introduced in the two preceding subsections by noting that any simple ontological structure (as well as any complex ontological structure) can be articulated, thus determined, to varying degrees of specificity. Minimally, factings are determined only as self-identical (as self-identicallings). Further determination of complex ontological structures involves the articulation *both* of their own components *and* of the more complex structures of which they are components, including, for typical humanings, their families, their nations, the biosphere, the universe, and—ultimately—being as a whole. Because simple ontological structures have no components, their further determination involves articulating *only* the

complex structures of which they are components, again including, ultimately, being as a whole. 3.2.3.2[5] clarifies what is said in the preceding subsection by means of an example.

3.2.3.3 briefly treats forms of configuration as ontological structures. 3.2.3.3.1 indicates that logical/mathematical structures are themselves ontological structures when they configure factings.[10] 3.2.3.3.2 notes that propositional logic is fully consistent with the SSP, and that its ontologization is straightforward. 3.2.3.3.3 indicates that first-order predicate logic is incorporable into the SSP only if it is given a non-standard semantics; the section describes two alternative semantics presented in (Gary) Legenhausen 1985, but criticizes that text's ignoring of ontology. 3.2.3.3.4 points out that the SSP is open to a wide array of additional logics.

3.3 completes the presentation of the SSP's truth theory that begins in 2.5. 3.3.1 presents a more precise characterization of the SSP's basic idea of truth, first sketched in 2.5.2.4. 3.3.1[1] notes that the SSP's talk of truth-ascription as involving a "transformation" is similar to the talk of "transition," passing over," and "advance" in, respectively, Frege 1892a, Frege 1891b, and Frege 1892b. 3.3.1[2] adds detail to the account of semantic determination provided in 2.5.2.1, noting that Quine 1970a recognizes the inaccuracy of the disquotational schema. 3.3.1[3] points out that Tarski

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[10] 5.3.4[1] presents formal factings as constituents of being even when they do not configure factings: the formal domain is within the absolutely necessary dimension of being (see also 3.3.4.2). Formal factings—formal ontological structures—are constituents of the contingent dimension of being only if they configure factings within that dimension. Mathematical structures that have no models in that dimension are not constituents of that dimension.

1933/1956 likewise recognizes that inaccuracy. 3.3.2 notes that given the SSP's rejection of the thesis that truth is a property, the SSP does not acknowledge so-called truth bearers, but indicates that its analogues of truth bearers are (in order of importance) propositionings, sentences (of course including sentencings), and utterances.

3.3.3 presents the SSP's truth-concept as composed of three functions. 3.3.3.1 characterizes the truth-concept as cataphoric. To clarify "cataphoric," 3.3.3.1[1] briefly describes the alternative prosentential position, which is anaphoric. 3.3.3.1[2] notes that full explication of truth as cataphoric requires introduction of persentences and perpropositions, understood as sentences and propositions to be fully semantically determined. 3.3.3.1[3] presents typography as the simplest way to indicate the ontological import of truth in written texts (*SB* uses boldface, *TAPTOE*, small capitals), but adds that more detailed and indeed pedantic explanation is appropriate; the subsection then presents one such explanation in the form of a chain of equivalences. 3.3.3.1[4] formally defines the first two of the three equivalences by introducing the first two of the three functions composing the truth operator. 3.3.3.2 is a more detailed presentation of the third function, articulated as the identity thesis, i.e., that true propositionings are identical to factings within primary being. 3.3.3.2.1 notes that even some deflationistic texts acknowledge, albeit somewhat inconsistently, that full semantic determination of language requires explicit inclusion of the ontological dimension. 3.3.3.2.2[1] notes that identity theories of truth have been spoken of for some time, but also that the identity thesis is only one component of the SSP's truth theory. 3.3.3.2.2[2] introduces the identity thesis articulated in Frege 1918, but notes that that text fails to clarify the ontological status of facts. 3.3.3.2.2[3] explicitly formulates the SSP's identity thesis as a function.

3.3.3.2.3 explicates the ontology of factings as the ontology appropriate to the SSP's truth theory, emphasizing in more detail that the ontological status of facts remains unclear in the available identity theories of truth, whereas that of factings in the SSP is not.

3.3.4 considers three additional topics closely related to truth. 3.3.4.1 tackles the problem of falsity, noting that the problem cannot be solved by the introduction of negative factings. 3.3.4.1[1] considers the first of three theses (three truth candidates) available to the SSP as solutions to the problem; that thesis would characterize false sentences as expressing propositionings fully determined as false, but inclusion of that thesis would introduce the problem of determining the status of false propositionings. 3.3.4.1[2] indicates that classifying false propositionings as not fully semantically determined would leave their status unclear. 3.3.4.1[3] presents as the SSP's solution to the problem the identification of false propositionings as fully determined as identical to factings in possible worlds and not in the actual world (*TAPTOE*: factings within derivative being).

3.3.4.2 briefly considers the ontological import of the truth of formal propositionings and structures, presenting the actual world (the contingent dimension of primary being) as embedded within the far more extensive dimension of formal structures (a subdimension of the absolutely necessary dimension of primary being), which includes a great many structures that have no models in the actual world.

3.3.4.3 presents the SSP's moderate relativism with respect to truth, noting that the thesis that all truths are relative to theoretical frameworks is fully consistent with the thesis that there are absolute truths if the latter are understood as truths having

identifiable counterparts in all possible theoretical frameworks. 3.3.4.3[1] clarifies the complex metasystematic status of such absolute truths, and 3.3.4.3[2] explains why the SSP's moderate relativism does not reduce scientific or philosophical theories to anything like the level of mere opinion.

## 2.4 *SB*'s Chapter 4

Chapter 4 thematizes some of the philosophically most important aspects of the actual world (*TAPTOE*: of the contingent dimension of primary being). The chapter begins by noting important ways that Chapters 4 and 5 differ from Chapters 1–3; as indicated above, the subject matters in Chapters 1–3 are means of theorization as well as topics for theorization, whereas the subject matters in Chapters 4–5 are topics for theorization but not means of theorization. 4.1 clarifies "world." 4.1.1 introduces the three significations of "world" found in contemporary philosophy, noting that a key question for the SSP concerns the adequacy of reductive interpretations—most importantly, the reduction of the world to the domain thematized by physics.

4.1.2 identifies the most important domains or subdimensions of the actual world. 4.1.2[1] reiterates the centrally important points that the world is initially available to the theoretician as it is veridically articulated within all adequately determinable theoretical frameworks, including everyday frameworks, and that the philosophical task is that of articulating or facilitating its clearer and more intelligible articulation. 4.1.2[2] identifies the philosophically most important subdivisions of the actual world as the natural world, the human world, and the historical world (although the chapter adds the aesthetic world (4.4)).

4.2 is devoted to the natural world, the latter understood as the contingent domain of primary being excluding human beings as minded (it includes human beings as animals). 4.2.1 notes that determining the tasks and status of philosophical treatments of the natural world requires consideration of the development of the experimental sciences. Over the course of five subsections ([1]–[5]), 4.2.1.1 reveals the incoherence of the naturalism articulated in Quine 1974, 1975, 1981, 1985, 1990, 1992, and 1996. As a whole, 4.2.1.1. argues that the "robust realism" defended in some of these texts is inconsistent with the thesis, also defended in various of these texts, that the philosopher is confronted with a "barren scene" for semantics and epistemology; the barrenness of the scene is such that no ontology, and thus not "robust realism," can emerge as superior to any other.

4.2.1.2 presents philosophy and the natural sciences as interdependent. All natural sciences investigate restricted universes of discourse, but presuppose structures that transcend those universes; physics, for example, depends on (among other things) mathematical and inferential structures that are not included within its own subject matter, and each of the natural sciences presupposes that there are entities that it itself does not study. The section notes in addition that there are no fully clear or changeless borders between philosophy and the natural sciences.

4.2.2 sketches two of the major tasks and global theses of a philosophy of the natural world connected to the natural sciences. 4.2.2.1 introduces the task of articulating the categorial-structural constitution of the natural world, noting that the natural sciences generally presuppose substance ontologies, but also that the flexibility of the SSP's ontology of factings meshes incomparably more smoothly with the entities posited by contemporary physics, many of which are quite unlike the familiar things or objects presupposed as paradigmatic by most substance ontologies. 4.2.2.2 introduces the task of

articulating how the natural world relates to the other domains of the unrestricted universe of discourse, including the human world and the formal dimension.

4.3 treats a few of the many important philosophical topics within the human world. 4.3.1 considers some topics in what the continental tradition generally terms philosophical anthropology and the analytic tradition philosophy of mind. 4.3.1.1 clarifies the structure INDIVIDUAL, indicating that 4.3 concerns human beings as robust, minded individuals. 4.3.1.2 has two tasks: clarifying persons as configurations of factings, and determining whether persons can be adequately understood physicalistically. 4.3.1.2.1[1] introduces as the core components of every person as a complex structure a center and the capacity to articulate itself by relying on first-person singular pronouns. 4.3.1.2.1[2] considers whether any available formal instruments can adequately clarify persons as structures that include these components. 4.3.1.2.1[2.1] considers and rejects set theory, and 4.3.1.2.1[2.2] does the same for mereology. 4.3.1.2.1[2.3] notes that persons as complex structures can be articulated accurately but not adequately as propositional-logical conjunctions, and concludes that no available formal instrument is adequate to the task.

4.3.1.2.2 raises the question whether human persons can be adequately understood as complex factings. 4.3.1.2.2.1 introduces important methodological-systematic factors. 4.3.1.2.2.1[1] notes that persons are initially available to the systematic philosopher as they are articulated in everyday theoretical frameworks relying on ordinary languages (or: at the levels of structuration articulated within everyday theoretical frameworks relying on ordinary languages). 4.3.1.2.2.1[2] notes that human beings know themselves better than they know anything else, and introduces the important distinction between immediate

sentences, for example “I’m thinking” and “I’m awake,” which provide data philosophical theories of persons must explain, and categorially mediated ones such as “Persons are composed of bodies and souls,” which are prestructurations open both to radical restructuration within and to rejection from philosophical theories. 4.3.1.2.2.2 introduces the components (factings) constituting persons. 4.3.1.2.2.2[1] presents three modal forms of such components: those that are absolutely essential, those that are relatively/historically essential, and those that are contingent. 4.3.1.2.2.2[2] notes the variety of domains of the components of persons, including among many others the domains of the mental, the social, the sensory, and the inorganic. 4.3.1.2.2.2[3] presents as data that must be incorporated into rather than rejected from any adequate philosophical theory of persons their experiencings of themselves as highly complex unities of all of their components.

4.3.1.2.2.3[1] introduces, as the factor configuring the configuration (or structuring the complex structure) the unifying point, “an absolutely singular, unique concept that can be articulated only on the basis of a concrete and penetrating analysis of the phenomenon ‘experience of personal unity’” (368/275). 4.3.1.2.2.3[2] notes that whereas all organisms have environments within which alone they can flourish,[11] only persons have

[11] Strictly speaking, this is a thesis within the theory of the natural world; it is importantly linked to the principle of ontological relativity, which is introduced in 5.3.4.2[ii] (604/454).

worlds, in that only they are intentionally[12] coextensive—via thinking, willing, and being-conscious—with the unrestricted universe of discourse. 4.3.1.2.2.3[3] reconsiders the unifying point, and 4.3.1.2.2.3[4] notes that the unifying point requires a much more detailed account, but that that account is not provided in *SB*; instead of extending that account, the subsection presents identity conditions for persons as complex configurations of factings.

4.3.1.2.2.4 tackles the topic of intentionality and self-consciousness. 4.3.1.2.2.4[1] notes that thinking and willing, as forms of intentionality with different aims, are not further considered in *SB*. 4.3.1.2.2.4[1.1] presents being-conscious as intentional in that it is "caused or occasioned by elements of the world" (372/278). 4.3.1.2.2.4[1.2] distinguishes between egological and non-egological accounts of being-conscious, noting that there are problems involving regresses and circularities with both types of accounts. 4.3.1.2.2.4[1.3] introduces and criticizes the positions articulated in a series of texts by Dieter Henrich. 4.3.1.2.2.4[2] notes that given the SSP's thesis that being-conscious is a form of intentional coextensivity with the unrestricted universe of discourse, it is clear that it must include self-consciousness (being-conscious-of-itself), because it itself is of course included within the unrestricted universe of discourse.

4.3.1.2.3 considers and rejects the thesis that human persons can be explained physicalistically. 4.3.1.2.3.1 comments briefly on current discussions of this issue. 4.3.1.2.3.1[1] identifies

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[12] The relevant intentionality is not purposiveness, it is instead the necessary involvement of content that characterizes thinking, willing, and being-conscious: there is no thinking, willing, or being-conscious that is not a thinking, willing, or being conscious *of* something or other.

eliminativism, reductive physicalism, and non-reductive physicalism as the three available physicalist alternatives. 4.3.1.2.3.1[2] introduces the two best-known non-reductive physicalist positions, and criticizes both for lacking developed, coherent ontologies. 4.3.1.2.3.1[3] exposes the incoherence of the non-reductive physicalism articulated in (John) Searle 1992 and 1995. 4.3.1.2.3.2 presents an argument against physicalistic explanations of human being. 4.3.1.2.3.2[1] sketches four anti-physicalist arguments in the contemporary literature, and 4.3.1.2.3.2[2] presents an argument emerging within the theoretical framework of the SSP. In a nutshell, the argument is that there can be no physicalistic explanation of the fact that human beings assimilate truths about such phenomena as far-distant galaxies—more precisely, that human beings assimilate factings that are, physically, enormously distant from their bodies—because such explanations would require signals to travel at speeds exceeding the speed of light. 4.3.1.2.3.2[3] considers the possible objection that human beings assimilate only light rays, not galaxies, and then counters the objection by noting that knowledge concerning the galaxies is not dependent on any knowledge concerning light rays.

4.3.2 treats moral action, moral values, and ethics, noting at the outset that this is but one of many important philosophical topics in the practical domain. 4.3.2.1 points out that there are millennia-old confusions in philosophy concerning the relation of the practical and theoretical domains, and announces that *SB* avoids the confusions by clarifying the theoretical character of practical sentences. 4.3.2.1.1 distinguishes between primarily practical sentences and theoretical-practical sentences. 4.3.2.1.2 distinguishes between theoretical-deontic sentences and theoretical-valuative sentences. 4.3.2.1.2[1] distinguishes between deontic predicates and deontic operators, and introduces the example sentence “O(A),” where “O” is “It is obligatory that” and “A” is a sentence (in what follows “A” stands for “In answering

the question, you tell the truth"). 4.3.2.1.2[1][i] interprets O(A) as a primarily practical sentence expressing the imperative *In answering the question that has been posed to you by the District Attorney, tell the truth*. 4.3.2.1.2[1][ii] presents two kinds of readings of O(A) as theoretical-deontic. In readings of the first kind, O(A) formalizes theoretical-empirical deontic sentences; on one of many possible such readings, it expresses the proposition *It is established by the empirical laws of the United States that it is obligatory that in answering the question that has been posed to you by the District Attorney, you tell the truth*. In readings of the second kind, O(A) formalizes theoretical-universal deontic sentences; so understood, it could formalize a sentence expressing the proposition *It is established by universal ethical laws that it is obligatory that in answering the question posed to you by the District Attorney, you tell the truth*. The final paragraph on 294 could reasonably begin with the label [iii], because it introduces operators and subscripts clarifying the various readings of O(A) introduced in the preceding subsections.

4.3.2.1.2[2] introduces the second type of normative/practical sentences; these are practically *valuative* sentences such as "It is good for the snake that the snake eats the frog" and "It is bad for the frog that the snake eats the frog." Within the theoretical framework of the SSP, such sentences can be true.

4.3.2.2 considers the ontological dimension of ethical truth. 4.3.2.2[1] briefly surveys some currently held positions on the question of whether—and if so, how—ethical sentences can be true, but asserts that none of those positions includes an adequate ontology. 4.3.2.2[2] articulates the position of the SSP: there are true ethical sentences, and such sentences express propositionings identical to factings within primary being.

4.3.2.3 introduces the centrally important distinction between basal-ontological practical values[13] and moral-ontological values. 4.3.2.3[1] presents a sentence that can be read either as basally practically valuative or as morally valuative. Read basally practically valuatively, the sentence "It is non-contingently the case that it is bad for the innocent human being that that human being is executed" expresses the proposition that, broadly stated, being killed (and therefore being executed) is detrimental to the flourishing of human beings (and therefore of the specific human being in question, who happens to be innocent). Read morally valuatively, the sentence expresses the proposition that, again broadly put, it is wrong to execute innocent human beings. 4.3.2.3[2] clarifies the terminology: the first reading is *basal* because the detrimentality to human beings of their being killed is the *basis* of the moral prohibition of executing at least some of them.

4.3.2.4 treats the ontological status of basal practical values. 4.3.2.4.1 introduces the ontological thesis that all entities—far and away most clearly and most importantly, organisms—are constituted ontologically such that they flourish to greater or lesser degrees. 4.3.2.4.1[i] notes that the ontological constitution that brings with it varying degrees of flourishing provides for each entity a value: for any given entity, whatever contributes to its flourishing is good (for it), whatever detracts from its flourishing, bad (for it). 4.3.2.4.1[ii] draws from what is said in [i] the additional thesis that every entity has a value in that entities are better and worse at being the kinds of entities that they are. 4.3.2.4.1[iii] notes the additional consequence that entities have domains of values, and

[13] Basal-practical values could also be introduced within the SSP's account of the natural world.

4.3.2.4.1[iv] identifies these domains as fully ontological: that it is bad for the frog that its leg is broken is a fact whose status is in no way inferior to that of the fact that the frog is an amphibian.

4.3.2.4.2 steps from the domain considered in 4.3.2.4.2 to the domain of human beings. 4.3.2.4.2[1] notes that in contemporary philosophy, this domain is generally not considered to be importantly distinct, ontologically, from the physical domain, and that if it is not, according ontological status to moral values is at best extremely problematic. 4.3.2.4.2[2] introduces the thesis that because humanings are intentionally coextensive, both theoretically and practically, with the unrestricted universe of discourse, they are ontologically constituted as capable not only of situating themselves theoretically in relation to anything whatsoever, but also, practically, of re-situating themselves unrestrictedly, i.e., in the sense that there is no facting that evades the scope of their attempts at practical re-situation. In Kantian terms, human beings are, basally ontologically, ends in themselves precisely because of this capacity.

4.3.2.5 articulates the ontological status of moral values. 4.3.2.5[1] notes the widespread view that moral norms differ so fundamentally from what are generally recognized to be entities that they should not be accorded ontological status, but points out that considerations of that sort should require in addition the rejection of various sorts of entities spoken of by contemporary physicists. 4.3.2.5[2] presents moral values as having, within the SSP, a second-order ontological status in that they enter the universe only with the appearance of human beings.

The final two paragraphs in 4.3.2.5 could reasonably appear in a subsection 4.3.2.5[3]. The first of these paragraphs indicates that practical sentences, including

practical-deontic sentences, present propositions, but do so in the mode of demand. The final paragraph specifies how the two types of ethical sentences can be true.

4.4 treats the aesthetic world. 4.4.1 introduces the three central logical-semantic forms of aesthetic sentences. 4.4.1[1] notes that here as elsewhere, clarity is served if the focus is on sentences rather than on judgments. 4.4.1[2.1], [2.2], and [2.3] explicitly present the three forms. 4.4.1[3] reconsiders theoreticity, practicity, and aestheticity as the three modes of presentation, introducing passages in which Kant makes comparable distinctions, but criticizing Kant's attempted clarifications of them. 4.4.1[4] focuses on the aesthetic operator. 4.4.1[4.1] introduces the first of two factors that, jointly, sufficiently characterize the aesthetic operator. Anticipating theses introduced and stabilized in 4.4.2 and 5.2.4[2][v], it presents as the basal or indirect factor the fact that aesthetic presentation involves but is distinct from both theoretical and practical presentation; the anticipated theses are that beauty is central to aesthetics, and that beauty is a harmony or consonance that includes truth (as intelligibility, coherence, and articulability) and goodness. 4.4.1[4.2] presents the determining or direct factor as involving the subject's lived experience. *TAPTOE* characterizes the arena of engagement (*SB* "dimension of presentation") indicated by the aesthetic operator as global and integral (*SB*, as "expressive"). This engagement is global in that it includes the assimilation of factings (thus the theoretical mode of engagement) and the mode of demand (thus the practical mode of engagement; the demand is colloquially articulable as "Pay attention!") as well as the specifically aesthetic factor being-pleased-by.

4.4.1[5] compares *SB*'s position to Kant's, in order to increase the intelligibility of the former, identifying as a Kantian thesis rearticulable with the SSB that the experience of beauty involves a harmony both within the experiencer and between the experiencer and what is experienced as beautiful.

4.4.2 presents beauty as fundamental to the universal aesthetic dimension. 4.4.2[1] notes that although beauty is central to traditional aesthetics, its role diminishes in, in some cases to the point that it vanishes from, contemporary aesthetics. 4.4.2[2] indicates that beauty's systematic explanation must satisfy three requirements: (1) it must be situated within the SSP's comprehensive theoretical framework, thus within its theory of being; (2) it must clarify the three forms of aesthetic sentences; (3) it must distinguish among domains wherein beauty is found. Again anticipating 5.2.4.2[v], 4.4.2[2][i] satisfies the first requirement by identifying beauty as a universal, immanent characteristic of being as such and as a whole, specifically, as the consonance or *perfectio* of the other such characteristics. 4.4.2[2][ii] treats sentences again, noting the relevance of the subject, and its introduction via the factor of the subject's being-pleased. 4.4.2[2][iii] identifies as the most important domains those of nature and of art.

4.4.3 turns to the specific dimension of art. 4.4.3[1] notes that Hegel's theory focuses on this dimension, and that that focus is maintained in most subsequent theories, often to the point that nature is simply excluded. This subsection also introduces the five types of aesthetic theories currently most prevalent, noting that the SSP's theory is distinct from all but can draw on all. 4.4.3[2] characterizes works of art as idealized presentations of transformed worlds, noting that this thesis presupposes that the actual world is infinitely open to idealizations, and that this openness qualifies the aesthetic world as the grand domain of human freedom. 4.4.3[3] emphasizes that much more detail is needed, but treats only two additional points.

4.4.3[3][i] notes that although artistic beauty involves possible worlds, it is not a part of the SSP's theory of possible worlds, because the aesthetic mode of presentation differs from the theoretical. 4.4.3[3][ii] stresses the second-order ontological status of works of art, noting that theories also have second-order ontological status.

4.4.4 introduces and responds to two anticipated objections to the aesthetic theory sketched in the preceding subsections of 4.4. 4.4.4[1] rejects the objection that such works of art as abstract paintings and "absolute" music are not presentations of anything that relates to the world, and 4.4.4[2] explains how works of art presenting imperfections can be beautiful.

4.5 turns to the world as a whole, first distinguishing the world as a whole from being as a whole, and then identifying three topics to be treated: natural-scientific cosmology (4.5.1), religion (4.5.2), and world history (4.5.3).

4.5.1 notes that although cosmology is a traditional philosophical topic, its treatment is now generally restricted to physics; it notes as well that the rubric "theory of everything" is quite misleading when it is used to characterize theories within the science of physics. 4.5.1[1] reveals the ambiguity of the concepts *origin* and *beginning* in natural-scientific cosmologies, introducing as an example the description in (Stephen) Hawking 1988 of the big bang. 4.5.1[2] notes that there are both theistic and atheistic interpretations of big-bang theories, and that because such theories, as theories in physics, cannot get beyond the big bang, they cannot pose the philosophical/metaphysical question concerning the origin of the contingent dimension of being (physics is restricted to that dimension, so cannot raise questions about what could be beyond it). 4.5.1[3] registers the alternative to big-bang theory presented in Hawking 2001. According to that text, the alternative theory disproves the thesis that the universe results from creation. 4.5.1[3] but rejects that contention as depending on a naïve and indefensible concept of creation. 4.5.1[4]

rejects the thesis that the physical universe could be self-explanatory, and briefly introduces the anthropic principle.

4.5.2 turns to the topic of religion, noting in 4.5.2[1] that the topic is appropriate within 4.5 because religions are found in all societies and cultures, and because at least the most fully developed religions include comprehensive views of the world. 4.5.2[2] addresses the question of how philosophy best approaches the phenomenon of religion. 4.5.2[2][i] introduces the thesis that religion is best understood as based on the intentional coextensivity with the universe characteristic of human beings, and as a way of their seeking to understand their status within the universe; via religion, they understand that status in relation to God (or to Gods). 4.5.2[2][ii] characterizes the SSP's approach to the topic of God as starting from its theory of being as a whole, which is presented in part in *SB*'s 5.3. That theory includes the thesis that there is an absolutely necessary dimension of being as well as a contingent dimension, and that the absolutely necessary dimension is free, minded, creative being. 4.5.2[3] indicates that for the further theorization of free, minded, creative being, religions—and especially the scientific theology developed by Christian thinkers—are important sources of data.

4.5.3 broaches the topic of world history, noting that although this is a topic often considered in the philosophical tradition, it has been largely ignored by post-Hegelian philosophers. 4.5.3.1 considers the relation between the philosophy of world history and the science of history, noting that the latter provides data for the former, and that no firm line separates the two. 4.5.3.2 presents, as a task the SSP must tackle, the determination of the ontological status of world history. 4.5.3.2[1] introduces currently available approaches to the ontology of world history, which include three that are metaphysical—the classical-metaphysical approach first taken in

Augustine's *The City of God* (4.5.3.2[1][i]), the cosmological-materialistic approach exemplified by Engels's *Dialectics of Nature* (4.5.3.2[1][ii]), and the idealistic approach taken in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* (4.5.3.2[1][iii])—and three that are not—the transcendental approach, based on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (4.5.3.2[1][iv]), the typical analytic approach, which focuses virtually exclusively on epistemological problems (4.5.3.2[1][v]), and the hermeneutic approach taken most notably in Gadamer's *Truth and Method* (4.5.3.2[1][vi]).

4.5.3.2[2] describes the approach taken by the SSP. 4.5.3.2[2][i] presents as its starting point the task of explaining the significance of the emergence within the universe of human beings. 4.5.3.2[2][ii] emphasizes that of central importance to it is humanity as a collective.

4.5.3.3 addresses the question whether world history has an inner structure. 4.5.3.3[1] articulates the ontological structure of the collective HUMANITY. 4.5.3.3[2] identifies WORLD HISTORY as a processual facting that is a third-order configuration—a configuration of all human SOCIETIES, all such societies being configurations of human INDIVIDUALS. 4.5.3.3[3] introduces the thesis that among the structural features of world history are increases in human knowledge and in human freedom. 4.5.3.3[4] briefly introduces Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) as an incomplete account of the end of world history.

4.5.3.4 addresses the question whether world history has a meaning. 4.5.3.4.1[1] specifies that the meaningfulness in question would require both that world history be coherent and that it be univocally positive in the sense of being a process to which human beings contribute. 4.5.3.4.1[2] distinguishes between restricted and unrestricted (hence comprehensive) theories addressing the issue of the meaningfulness of world history;

theories of the latter sorts must include metaphysical components. The section then presents the descriptions of M-Theory in Hawking 2001 as misrepresenting that restricted theory as comprehensive, adding that that theory's determinism is refuted by human freedom.

By way of considering the reflections on the meaning of life in Thomas Nagel's *What Does It All Mean*? (1987), 4.5.3.4.2 introduces reasons for the necessity of a comprehensively systematic theory of world history. 4.5.3.4.2[1] notes and rejects Nagel 1987's assumption that the question whether life is meaningful is ultimately a religious question rather than a philosophical one, then introduces passages in which Nagel 1987 argues that attempts to answer the question lead to infinite regresses. The first is a regress of why questions, the second, of what-is-the-point questions. 4.5.3.4.2[2] argues that Nagel 1987's support for both the theses introduced in the preceding subsection is based on misunderstandings. 4.5.3.4.2[2][i] rejects the thesis that why questions can always be meaningfully asked; it notes that the series of why questions ends, within a given theoretical framework, with an answer of the general form, "Because, within this theoretical framework, such-and-such." Assuming that such an answer is adequately stabilized within its framework, additional why questions reasonably address the status not of that point but instead that of the theoretical framework. 4.5.3.4.2[ii] notes that a variation of the argument presented in the preceding subsection shows that there is likewise no problematic regress of what-is-the-point questions. 4.5.3.4.2[3] concludes on the basis of the preceding subsections that the thesis of universal intelligibility requires a comprehensive theory of world history: world history must be situated, intelligibly, within being as a whole.

4.5.3.4.3 articulates the major presupposition for a comprehensive systematic theory that clarifies the meaning of world history. According to 4.5.3.4.3[1], world

history's being comprehensively meaningful requires the thesis that human being continues beyond earthly death, noting that the question answered by this thesis, although currently often considered by philosophers to be religious rather than philosophical, is considered philosophical throughout much of the tradition, even prior to the emergence of Christianity. 4.5.3.4.3[2] presents the first of two arguments provided as stabilizations for the thesis that human being extends beyond death; the argument is that this thesis is integral to the best explanation of the efforts human beings make to contribute to developing the various non-physical worlds (the worlds of science, of the arts, and so forth) that outlive them. 4.5.3.4.3[3] argues that because human minding is intentionally coextensive with being as such and as a whole, it extends beyond the body in such a way that it cannot cease when the body ceases to live. The section emphasizes the importance and the extreme difficulty of developing well-stabilized theories concerning death as a transition (rather than as an end). 4.5.3.4.3[4] notes that data available to the philosopher seeking to develop a theory of the comprehensive meaning of world history are provided virtually exclusively by religions—and particularly by Christian eschatology—rather than by available philosophical theories.

### 2.2.5 *SB*'s Chapter 5

Chapter 5 treats comprehensive systematics. 5.1 presents this systematics as a comprehensive theory more precisely characterized as a theory of being as such and as a whole, noting that before the distinction between being as such and being as a whole is explained, in 5.2.1, it must be shown that a comprehensive theory is possible. 5.1.1 presents comprehensive systematics as the SSP's metaphysics, noting that the history of the term "metaphysics" makes its use both problematic and reasonable: the SSP's comprehensive systematics is significantly similar to traditional metaphysics, but also

innovative in ways that become evident only in the course of its exposition. The section also identifies, as the major obstacle to the development of comprehensive systematics, the thesis that there is an unbridgeable gap separating the subject or theoretician from being, such that the subject matter of theories is not being, but instead appearance (in some sense or other). 5.1.2.1 articulates the putative problem of the gap. 5.1.2.2 introduces several failed attempts to solve the problem. Sections 5.1.2.2[1]–5.1.2.2[3] trace the trajectory of positions defended in texts by Hilary Putnam, from metaphysical realism ([1]) through "internal realism" ([2]) to "natural realism" ([3]). 5.1.2.2[4] notes that Putnam 1994's natural realism accepts the important thesis, formulated also in (John) McDowell 1994/1996, that there is no medium or interface between the subject and reality, but asserts that the reliance of both Putnam 1994 and McDowell 1994/1996 on Wittgenstein's *Investigations* prevents them from adequately developing that thesis. 5.1.2.2[5] argues that Rescher 1992 fails to overcome the gap because its is a purely epistemic perspective. 5.1.2.2[6] acknowledges that McDowell 1994/1996 takes a helpful step in speaking of the "unboundedness of the conceptual," but criticizes that text for ignoring ontology.

5.1.3 presents four theses that make possible the overcoming of the putative problem of the gap. The first is that philosophy relies solely on theoretical sentences (5.1.3.1), the second, that semantics and ontology are linked maximally tightly (5.1.3.2), the third, that being is universally expressible (5.1.3.3), and the fourth, that theoretical languages are languages of presentation rather than of communication (5.1.3.4).

5.1.4 clarifies philosophical languages. 5.1.4.1 articulates in additional detail the difference between presentation and communication. 5.1.4.2 presents intelligibility as the fundamental criterion for determining the basic structures of adequately clarified philosophical languages. 5.1.4.3 explains at some length (500/374–524/392) how semiotic systems with uncountably many expressions can qualify as languages, and why adequate philosophical languages must be such systems. In order to do the latter, 5.1.4.3.1 introduces the

realism/anti-realism debate, emphasizing that at its heart is the problem of clarifying the sense or senses in which philosophers have access to a world that is independent of language and mind. 5.1.4.3.1[1] introduces as one of two errors made by participants in the debate the assumption that the independence in question must be independence from *our* languages and minds, with the "*our*" indicating some significant restriction. 5.1.4.3.1[2] presents as the second error the failure to take the expressibility of being adequately into consideration. 5.1.4.3.1[2][i] notes that according to anti-realism, being is inexpressible, and that this makes the success of our predictions simply inexplicable. 5.1.4.3.1[2][ii] points out that although metaphysical realists acknowledge the expressibility of being, they do not recognize that its expressibility entails that our languages not be merely *ours* in any restrictive sense. 5.1.4.3.1[3] reiterates the central importance of the thesis of universal expressibility.

5.1.4.3.2 turns to semiotic systems with uncountably many expressions. 5.1.4.3.2.1 establishes the possibility, in principle, that there be such systems. 5.1.4.3.2.1[1] notes that the expressions in question are types rather than tokens (i.e., correctly formulable expressions rather than actually formulated expressions), and that ordinary languages contain at least countably infinitely many sentence types. 5.1.4.3.2.1[2] notes that philosophers and linguists generally presuppose that languages can have at most countably many expressions, and that when this is not simply presupposed, it is generally supported only by the underdeveloped notion, based on the principle of compositionality, that only such systems could be learned. The subsection then introduces an argument, drawn from (Philip) Hugly and (Charles) Sayward 1983 and 1986, demonstrating that from the resources of any semiotic system including countably infinitely many expressions, it is possible to construct a system with uncountably many expressions.

From 5.1.4.3.2.1[2] emerges as central the problem of whether semiotic systems with uncountably many expressions qualify as languages; 5.1.4.3.2.2 tackles this problem. 5.1.4.3.2.2[1] introduces the theses of Hugly and Sayward 1983 that semiotic systems qualify as languages only if all their expressions are tokenable by perceptually distinguishable particulars satisfying specific

requirements, and that not all of the expressions in systems with uncountably many expressions are tokenable in ways that satisfy these requirements. 5.1.4.3.3.2[2] notes that Hugly and Sayward 1983 understands tokenings in terms of communication, not of presentation. 5.1.4.3.3.3 considers the status of tokening systems for theoretical languages, hence, for languages of presentation rather than of communication. 5.1.4.3.3.3[1] notes that Hugly and Sayward 1986 is arbitrary in limiting tokenings to items satisfying its requirements. 5.1.4.3.3.3[2] points out that not even ordinary languages such as English satisfy the tokening requirements of Hugly and Sayward 1986, and that such languages are never available in their entireties to language users. 5.1.4.3.3.3[3] introduces various examples of nonproblematic tokenings that do not satisfy the requirements of Hugly and Sayward 1986.

5.1.4.3.3 clarifies the segmental character of effective theoretical languages. 5.1.4.3.3[1] examines how sentences map to factings in order to show that there cannot be any facting that could not be expressed by a sentence. 5.1.4.3.3[2] reiterates that theoretical languages are components of theoretical frameworks, and that concretizations of frameworks never exhaust the resources of their languages. 5.1.4.3.3[3] asserts that the thesis of universal expressibility presupposes that semiotic systems with uncountably many expressions qualify as languages. 5.1.4.3.3[4] completes *SB*'s critical response to Hugly and Sayward 1983 and 1986. 5.1.4.3.3[4][i] notes that the tokening requirements of Hugly and Sayward 1986 hold, if at all, only for languages of communication. 5.1.4.3.3[4][ii] reveals in a slightly different way that those requirements are too stringent even for ordinary languages such as English. 5.1.4.3.3[4][iii] argues that Hugly and Sayward 1983 and 1986 are not sufficiently clear concerning the status either of the sentences they themselves rely on or of the "objects" of which they speak.

5.1.4.4 argues that there are uncountably many entities. 5.1.4.4[1] presents Rescher 1987's inadequate argument leading to the conclusion that there are uncountably many entities. 5.1.4.4[2] notes

that because the SSP's ontology includes mathematical factings and there are uncountably many such factings, the SSP's ontology includes uncountably many entities.

5.1.4.5 clarifies just what languages are. 5.1.4.5[1] indicates that the section is devoted to the first of two questions that emerge from 5.1.4.4; the first question concerns the ways in which languages (as clarified in the preceding subsections of 5.1) are, and are not, human productions, and the second (treated in 5.1.5), the ontological consequences of there being a multiplicity of languages. 5.1.4.5[2] notes that the distinction between actual and possible languages is not of great importance, and that the distinction between languages that are actually used and languages that are not is more important. 5.1.4.5[3] raises the question whether languages systems are best understood as human products. 5.1.4.5[3][i] notes that originary or maximal language—the language or linguisticality intrinsic to being—must be structured not only syntactically, but also semantically and ontologically. 5.1.4.5[3][ii] notes that syntax suffices for pure semiotic systems, but 5.1.4.5[3][iii] points out that philosophical languages are not pure semiotic systems, and therefore must be interpreted. 5.1.4.5[4] identifies linguistic characters (for most languages, phonemes and graphemes) as human products, but denies that any other aspects of languages are human products.

5.1.5 presents an ontological interpretation, and then examines several consequences, of the fact that there is a plurality of languages. 5.1.5.1 notes the incontestable fact that there are multiple languages that differ in their semantic and ontological structurations. 5.1.5.2 considers the ontological ramifications of this plurality. 5.1.5.2.1 introduces several approaches to this issue. 5.1.5.2.1[1] reveals that Rescher 1982 exaggerates the differences among languages. 5.1.5.2.1[2][i] introduces (Charles) Peirce 1868/1965's thesis that at the end

point of theorization there will be only a single language, 5.1.5.2.1[2][ii] introduces several approaches postulating pluralities of worlds, and 5.1.5.2.1[2][iii] introduces (Karl) Popper 1972's notion of verisimilitude. The final two paragraphs of 5.1.5.2.1 could reasonably be preceded by "[iv]," because they briefly indicate why each of the approaches introduced in the preceding subsections ([i]–[iii]) is untenable.

5.1.5.2.2 presents a three-step solution to the problems raised by the plurality of languages. 5.1.5.2.2.1 presents as the first step the full ontologization of human beings and thereby of the theoretical sphere. 5.1.5.2.2.2 presents as the second step the changing of the focus of philosophy from the subject to being, noting that the theoretical sphere then comes into view as an ontological arena. 5.1.5.2.2.2[1] emphasizes that ontologizing human beings involves ontologizing all that they do, and understanding comings-to-know primarily not as achievements or accomplishments of subjects, but instead as occurrences within the world. 5.1.5.2.2.2[2] reiterates that the theoretical operator makes mention of the subject superfluous, and introduces a reading of the theoretical operator that makes explicit the status of sentences explicitly or implicitly governed by it as articulating self-disclosures of being. 5.1.5.2.2.2[3] notes that human beings can situate themselves within being, via multiple theoretical frameworks, on various levels.

5.1.5.2.2.3 presents as the third step required for the solution of the problems posed by the multiplicity of languages three parameters providing criteria for ranking theoretical frameworks in terms of ontological adequacy, noting that this step is decisive because it explains how being's many ontological arenas interrelate. 5.1.5.2.2.3[1] reiterates and further develops the thesis that true indicative sentences emerging within everyday theoretical frameworks are genuinely ontologically revelatory. 5.1.5.2.2.3[2] introduces the thesis that the multiple theoretical frameworks and thus ontological arenas are not

disparate, but instead are all components of a single comprehensive structuration of being. 5.1.5.2.2.3[3] introduces the three parameters or continua announced in the title of 5.1.5.2.2.3. 5.1.5.2.2.3[3][i] introduces the continuum of greater and lesser depth, 5.1.5.2.2.3[3][ii], that of degrees of fineness of grain, and 5.1.5.2.2.3[3][iii], that of coherence, noting that greater coherence is attained in one way by the inclusion of more data, and in a second by that of more extensive stabilizations. 5.1.5.2.2.3[4] notes that these ontological consequences seem strange only because of the power of the legacy of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

5.1.6 completes 5.1 by summarizing its overcoming of the gap problem, and thereby articulating comprehensive systematics as universal theory. 5.1.6[1] presents as the first step toward overcoming the gap problem the demonstration that the gap thesis is untenable. 5.1.6[2] shows that there is no gap within the SSP because it presents structure and being as primordially unified.

5.2 clarifies structure and being as primordially unified by presenting the basic features of the SSP's theory of being as such and as a whole. 5.2.1 clarifies the phrase "being as such and as a whole." 5.2.1[1] notes that if the SSP did not include a theory of being as such and as a whole—or of being in its entirety, no matter what terminology is used—it would fail to be comprehensive. 5.2.1[2] explains why *SB* uses the term "being" for the comprehensive dimension/domain. 5.2.1[2][i] considers and rejects such alternative terms as "existence" and "nature." 5.2.1[2][ii] makes some additional terminological clarifications, noting that "being as such" requires more detailed explication. 5.2.1[3] introduces four traditional ways of understanding what *SB* terms the dimension of being, designating the SSP's as the comprehensively systematic way. 5.2.1[4] criticizes the treatments of being in Heidegger1936–38/1999 and

1969. 5.2.1[5] introduces the central thesis, which is implicitly presupposed in and thus stabilized by 3.2.3.2[4] (284/212–287/214), that "any and every specific being is *a determinate or specific configuration of all and only of all of what is termed 'being*.'"

5.2.2 introduces and responds to several arguments concluding that talk of the comprehensive totality is beset by insoluble problems. 5.2.2[1] summarizes van Fraassen 1995's semantic objections, and argues that that text relies on arbitrary and untenable presuppositions. 5.2.2[2] announces as the next topic the consideration of weightier objections based in logical and mathematical considerations. 5.2.2[3] introduces (Patrick) Grim 1991's argument that any putatively complete list of truths can be shown to be incomplete. 5.2.2[4] presents an incomplete but adequate response to Grim 1991. 5.2.2[4][i] notes that Grim 1991's argument depends on a specific version of set theory, and that the problem that text identifies does not arise in accounts relying on the alternative set theory presented in (J. L.) Kelley 1995. 5.2.2[4][ii] points out that Grim 1991's arguments that there is no totality of truths introduce, in some of their premises, precisely that totality. 5.2.2[4][iii] criticizes Grim 1991 for its reliance on the untenable presupposition that set theory is a formal instrument both necessary to and adequate for the purposes of philosophical theorization, and 5.2.2[4][iv] emphasizes that clarifying this issue requires reliance on metasystematic theses concerning theoretical frameworks. 5.2.2[5] concludes that the most that Grim 1991's arguments show is that according to some set theories, the universe cannot be a comprehensive set. 5.2.2[6] notes that the SSP is an articulation of the maximal totality, not of anything less, although it is not an absolutely adequate articulation of that totality. 5.2.2[7] concludes that there are no problems in principle with talking about being as a whole.

5.2.3 treats the issue of possible worlds. 5.2.3[1] introduces actualism and possibilism as the available variants of possible-worlds theories, and notes that no available version of either thematizes the dimension of being. 5.2.3[2] introduces central theses of (David) Lewis 1986's "modal realism," and raises the question whether that position requires it to thematize of the totality of possible worlds. 5.2.3[3] considers the language of possible-world theories, noting that Lewis 1986 is inconsistent in its use of "actual." It then notes that Lewis 1986's position presupposes that the theoretician has access to all the

possible worlds, precisely because the text speaks of all of them, but also that the text never thematizes this totality. 5.2.3[4] presents the position of the SSP: there is only one actual world, so possible worlds *are* only in a secondary and derivative sense.

5.2.4 articulates the inner structurality of the primordial dimension of being by introducing its most universal immanent characteristics. 5.2.4[1] notes that—in part because it is not sensible to ask *what* the primordial dimension of being *is*—it is most appropriate to speak of the self-explication of this dimension. 5.2.4[2][i] introduces intelligibility as the first of being's most universal immanent characteristics, 5.2.4[2][ii], coherence as the second, 5.2.4[2][iii], expressibility as the third, 5.2.4[2][iii], goodness as the fourth, and 5.2.4[2][v], beauty as the fifth. 5.2.4[3] notes the similarity of these characteristics to those identified in the metaphysical tradition, but notes as well that the SSP characterizes not only every being but also primordial being as intelligible, coherent, expressible, good, and beautiful.

5.3 presents the starting points for a theory of absolute being. 5.3.1 indicates that the account gets underway by relying on modalities as ontological structures. 5.3.2 introduces the distinction between the absolutely necessary dimension of being and the contingent dimension of being. 5.3.2[1] explains that the section is structured as a reductio of the thesis that everything (all that is, being as a whole) is contingent. 5.3.2[2] presents the individual steps of the reductio in [i]–[v], and then its core in three steps. 5.3.3 presents additional clarifications and remarks. 5.3.3[1] notes that the proof can appear to be absurd, but indicates that the true absurdity is treating absolute nothingness as capable of somehow being. 5.3.3[2] compares the SSP's proof to traditional so-called proofs of God's

existence, noting three differences: (1) the SSP's procedure proves that primordial being includes an absolutely necessary dimension, not that it includes God; (2) the traditional proofs (with the partial exception of the ontological proof) never bring the dimension of being into view, arguing instead on the basis of specific aspects of the universe; and (3) the traditional proofs conclude that there is a being of some specific sort, but do not prove, although they do assert, that that being is God. 5.5.3[3] notes in more detail how the SSP's proof differs from the "third way" to God in Aquinas's *Summa Theologia*. 5.5.3[3][i] notes that that way begins with the phenomenon of contingency rather than with being as a whole, and 5.5.3[3][ii] identifies a quantifier-shift fallacy contained in its formulation.

5.3.4 takes additional steps in the determination of the absolutely necessary dimension of being, beginning by noting that the steps require considering how the absolutely necessary dimension and the contingent dimension are related. 5.3.4[1] situates the formal dimension within the absolutely necessary dimension of being, but accords it a derivative status therein. 5.3.4[2] presents two arguments stabilizing the thesis that the absolutely necessary dimension of being is minded. 5.3.4[2][i] argues that inclusion of this thesis within the SSP significantly increases the SSP's intelligibility. 5.3.4[2][ii] introduces the principle of ontological rank, according to which the ontological rank of the absolutely necessary dimension of being cannot be lower than is the ontological rank of any contingent being. 5.3.4[2][iii] considers the issue of how the principle of ontological rank relates to the theory of evolution. 5.3.4[2][iii][a] introduces two ways of understanding evolution that are inadequate for philosophy, and 5.3.4[2][iii][b] introduces as the adequate understanding the one that recognizes the importance of conditions of possibility as ontological potentialities. 5.3.4[2][iv] states the thesis, stabilized by (and stabilizing) what is said in the preceding subsection, that the principle

of ontological rank does not contradict evolution, and summarizes the argument, which relies on that principle, that determines the absolutely necessary dimension of being as minded. 5.3.4[3] shows that the absolutely necessary dimension of being must be determined in addition as personal and creative, noting that this position is not onto-theological in the sense articulated in various texts of Heidegger, and that determining absolute being as freely creating does not entail the thesis that it intrudes into the contingent dimension of being. 5.3.4[4] emphasizes that the absolutely necessary dimension of being is not yet determined as God, and asserts that the only way to stabilize its determination as God would be via examination of the history of its free acts.[14] For this, the history of religions would provide the most important data.

### 2.2.6 *SB*'s Chapter 6

Chapter 6 treats metasystematics. 6.1 articulates the status of metasystematics. 6.1.1 notes that every discipline requires a metadiscipline that clarifies its status, but that philosophy is unique among disciplines in that all of metaphilosophy is itself philosophical. 6.1.2 treats the metasystematic self-determination of the SSP and the criteria of relatively maximal intelligibility and coherence. 6.1.2[1] notes that the account that follows distinguishes total or absolute from partial or relative self-determination. As is fully clear only in subsequent sections (esp. 6.4[2]), absolute metasystematic self-determination would be possible only for a systematic philosophy that aspired to be absolutely definitive; according to the SSP, no such philosophy is possible. 6.1.2[2] indicates that relatively maximal coherence and intelligibility must be determined not

[14] *BG* 3.7.1 *does* introduce the term "God" at this point, as does *TAPTOE*.

completely, but to a degree sufficient to allow them to function as criteria. 6.1.2[3] points out that coherence requires more than consistency and, unlike consistency, comes in degrees, as does intelligibility. It notes as well that the SSP aims for maximal coherence and intelligibility relative both to its own framework (it aims to be the best concretization of its abstract theoretical framework) and to available alternative frameworks (it aims to provide greater coherence and intelligibility than is provided by any such framework).

6.2 treats immanent metasystematics, which is the SSP's thematization of itself. 6.2.1 clarifies immanent metasystematics as the architectonic of the theory. 6.2.2 introduces three of its aspects present in *SB*: 6.2.2[1] presents the Table of Contents as a comprehensive overview, 6.2.2[2] identifies the description (not the applications) of the SSP's method as a component of its immanent metasystematics, and 6.2.2[3] notes that the many immanently metasystematic remarks that recur throughout the book are not repeated in Chapter 6. These include the initial descriptions of the SSP's task, in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, by the quasi-definition of the SSP; the self-explication of the quasi-definition extends through the end of Chapter 5.

6.3 turns to external metasystematics, which thematizes how the SSP relates to various domains that are outside the SSP in the sense that they are not data to be restructured within the systematic framework of the SSP, but are instead to be situated, as is, in relation to the SSP. 6.3.1 notes that external metasystematics considers how the SSP relates on the one hand to other theoretical dimensions, and on the other to non-theoretical dimensions. 6.3.2 treats the first of these relations, with 6.3.2.1 considering how the SSP relates to other philosophical theories (hence, the designation

“intraphilosophical”). 6.3.2.1[1] notes that Chapters 1–5 include various accounts that are metasystematic in this sense. 6.3.2.1[2] reiterates the account in 1.5.2.2[4][ii][b] (95/71) of the four possible results of framework comparisons. 6.3.2.1[3] notes that appropriate criteria for framework comparisons must always be introduced, emphasizing that the problem of introducing them is exacerbated by the diversity of activities and accounts that are currently termed philosophical. 6.3.2.1[4] indicates that every comparison requires that an adequate metaframework be developed. 6.3.2.1[5] distinguishes various kinds of discussions that are, in the broadest sense, intraphilosophical. 6.3.2.1[5][i] considers two types of discussions that occur within shared theoretical frameworks. If the frameworks are relatively complete, the discussions concern how the frameworks are best concretized (or, often, how works within the frameworks, e.g., those of Aristotle or Kant, are best interpreted). When the frameworks are only loosely determined, as in the exemplary case of analytic philosophy of mind, there is less common ground. 6.3.2.1[5][ii] considers encounters between fundamentally different schools of philosophical thought; in cases of such encounters, the common ground can be minimal. 6.3.2.1[6] returns to the problem of determining adequate metaframeworks. Those involving the SSP will rely, perhaps among others, on criteria of greater intelligibility and coherence. Intelligibility and coherence are greater ([i]) on the one hand when more data are incorporated, and ([ii]) on the other when components of the theory are more tightly interlinked. 6.3.2.1[7] notes that the treatment of external intraphilosophical metasystematics in 6.3.2.1[1]–[6] is of necessity abstract, because the process is concretized only when specific frameworks are compared.

6.3.2.2 treats the relation of the SSP to non-philosophical sciences, noting that Chapters 1–5 consider this relation in various places, and reiterating that in many cases, strict lines between philosophy and non-philosophical sciences cannot be drawn, in part because both philosophy and the other sciences continue to develop. The section distinguishes the absolutely universal framework of the SSP's theory of being as such and as a whole from the relatively universal frameworks of the subtheories that develop within its theories of the dimensions of the world (some of which are partially presented in *SB*'s Chapter 4). 6.3.2.2[i] indicates that each such framework is relative to its subject matter, but universal in that it considers how that subject matter relates to the dimension of being. 6.3.2.2[ii] notes that the science named "physics" could develop into a comprehensive theory, but could do so only by explicitly treating the domain of the mental; if it did so develop, it could cease to be distinct from philosophy.

6.3.3 considers the relation of the SSP to non-theoretical domains. It notes that there are various non-theoretical views about philosophy, but emphasizes that none is authoritative for philosophy. Philosophy is dependent on non-theoretical domains in a practical sense in that it requires institutional support, but it is also the case that it can clarify non-theoretical domains, and thereby be valuable to them.

6.4 reconsiders the issue of the SSP's self-grounding (*TAPTOE*: self-stabilization). 6.4[1] reiterates that because the self-stabilization is coherentist, it can come only at the end, and 6.4[2], that because theoretical frameworks can continue to emerge, the SSP's self-stabilization is a continuing process. The subsection then notes that *SB*'s concretization of the SSP's theoretical framework can be confronted on relatively

peripheral issues, intermediately situated issues, and central issues. Superior treatments, within the SSP's abstract theoretical framework, of peripheral and of at least some intermediate issues would result in theories that would qualify as superior concretizations to the SSP, whereas if superior alternatives to core elements were to emerge, that would bring the SSP's self-situating to a close in that as a result of comparing itself to frameworks including those alternatives, it would situate itself as inferior.