"In order not to forget Heidegger’s Seinsvergessenheit [forgetfulness of Being/being (German Sein, Latin esse, etc.)], you say, one must use the term ‘be’ in every sentence."

AW: this thesis appears neither in Towards a Philosophical Theory of Being (TAPTOE) nor in “Rearticulating Being” (“RB”). The closest thesis is one drawn from the work of Étienne Gilson: every indicative sentence can be rewritten to include a conjugated form of the verb “to be.”

“In every sentence in which a form of the verb “to be” would appear, the following would happen: there would be an indefensible mixing of and therefore confusion between Sein/esse/Being and Seiende(s)/ens-entia/being(s)-be-er(s), because in every so-formulated sentence the conjugated form of the verb ‘to be’ would appear only in connection with a concrete case or a mode of a being/be-er/entity. Thereby one would reach only what Heidegger terms the Sein-des-Seienden (Being or being of beings or be-ers); Being/being itself or as such would not be articulated. For this reason, the use of such sentences would not only not overcome but would be instead petrify Seinsvergessenheit/forgetfulness of Being/being—precisely because only the Being/being of beings/be-ers would be articulated, not Being/being as such. So: your suggested use of a conjugated form of ‘to be’ in every sentence does not ‘enable the book to directly and explicitly articulate being and its ubiquity.’"

This objection appears in TAPTOE and in “RB” as one already found in the work of Gilson: every sentence of the form “S is P” or “S is” (the latter understood as roughly synonymous with “S exists”) only coarticulates being—each also articulates a be-er. The objector wholly misses the emphasis, in TAPTOE and in “RB,” on the sentence “It’s being” (also appearing as “It be being”). That is the sentence that, particularly in conjunction with the sentence operator “It’s being such that…” (or “It be being such that…”) makes possible the direct and explicit articulation of being and its ubiquity.