In comparison to Fukuyama\u2019s end of history theory, I find it difficult to falsify the \u201cunversal-made-particular\u201d theory put forth by Michael Walzer. Both theories ignore, and supersede the question of \u201cwhen\u201d or under what circumstances these things will happen in society. Fukuyama\u2019s argument remains debatable until there is somehow a way to prove that ideological struggle no longer exists\u2013this seems near-impossible to me. Walzer\u2019s theory also escapes any limit of time. He argues that \u201cunless we can identify a neutral starting point from which many different and possibly legitimate moral cultures might develop, we can\u2019t construct a proceduralist minimum.\u201d Certain values like \u201ctruth\u201d or \u201cjustice\u201d have no identifiable conception or expiration date for Walzer and, rather, are universally understood (though they are implemented on a case-by-case basis). Both these claims function on the basis that we simply haven\u2019t reached a point in time when we are able to disprove them. They resonate equally with me, and I am convinced that they are true. However, I am skeptical that either of them could yet (or ever) be disproven with concrete examples, which for me, undermines the legitimacy of the theories as compared to others that might be more debatable.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In comparison to Fukuyama\u2019s end of history theory, I find it difficult to falsify the \u201cunversal-made-particular\u201d theory put forth by Michael Walzer. Both theories ignore, and supersede the question of \u201cwhen\u201d or under what circumstances these things will happen in … Continue reading