As countries transition from military dictatorship to democracy, there is the question of what to do with criminal officials who ordered both torture and murder. While in a perfect world they would be put on trial and imprisoned, it is rarely that simple. Generally many officials retain their position in the military during the transition. This means they have the power to end the process of democracy whenever they feel threatened. Perhaps the best example of this is in Uruguay. When the population voted on a referendum asking whether crimes of the former military dictatorship should be prosecuted, there was a general fear that the military would take the government back. This was fueled by the military’s ambiguous answers as to whether or not they would comply with the referendum.
Everyone can agree that former officials should be prosecuted for their former crimes. However, there are rarely systems that can handle this sort of pressure. Lawrence Weschler seems to struggle with this question throughout his book. He paints Uruguayan officials in a very negative light while also begrudgingly accepting what they have to say. Aiming for a democratic future is the best thing new officials can do to ensure the crimes of the past nothing happen again. Once a strong core is established, the question of punishment can be revisited when the threat to a democratic future disappears.
I disagree with your claim that “Everyone can agree that former officials should be prosecuted for their former crimes.” I believe transitions of power are rarely that simple. Elements of the old regime sometimes must be implemented into the new regime in order to achieve smooth transition. An official from the previous regime could have been negative in his old position for one reason and an asset to the new regime for another. There are fewer clean cuts than might be imagined in regime change and the establishment of democracy. The question of punishment and forgetfulness should only be addressed on a case by case basis.