In comparison to Fukuyama’s end of history theory, I find it difficult to falsify the “unversal-made-particular” theory put forth by Michael Walzer. Both theories ignore, and supersede the question of “when” or under what circumstances these things will happen in society. Fukuyama’s argument remains debatable until there is somehow a way to prove that ideological struggle no longer exists–this seems near-impossible to me. Walzer’s theory also escapes any limit of time. He argues that “unless we can identify a neutral starting point from which many different and possibly legitimate moral cultures might develop, we can’t construct a proceduralist minimum.” Certain values like “truth” or “justice” have no identifiable conception or expiration date for Walzer and, rather, are universally understood (though they are implemented on a case-by-case basis). Both these claims function on the basis that we simply haven’t reached a point in time when we are able to disprove them. They resonate equally with me, and I am convinced that they are true. However, I am skeptical that either of them could yet (or ever) be disproven with concrete examples, which for me, undermines the legitimacy of the theories as compared to others that might be more debatable.
Introduction to Comparative Politics: Nationalism, Ideology, and State Power
Professor Shervin Malekzadeh
I agree with your evaluation of both theories. Or else, put otherwise, that it is impossible to actually evaluate them due to their specially and temporally ambiguous nature. Regarding the inability to falsify these theories, and thus their lack of legitimacy, it is hard to even acknowledge their significance. They serve as a statements of fact, observations of the human experience that apply more directly to a world that may never exist, so while it makes sense to consider them, they ultimately lead us down a road of intangible and questioning hope, and little else.