A concept that I found particularly interesting in these readings–and one that many people have touched on in their blogs–was the distinction drawn between democracy and liberalism and Zakaria’s assertion that the two do not necessarily go hand in hand. Zakaria says that “liberal democracy seems to be one of the many exits on which the democratic experiment could end,” and while I had not previously thought of democracy in this way, I very much agree with this statement. As Illing puts it, “[democracy and liberalism] are often conflated,” and I think that this is especially true in the United States; traditionally–or at least until recently, according to the World Values Survey referenced in Foa’s and Mounk’s article–I think that Americans have held this kind of exceptionalist pride in our presidential democracy and its seemingly inherent emphasis on individual rights and checks on majoritarian power.

However, it is the presidential system–something which Americans have in the past taken great pride in–that, ironically, seems to be a major cause of Americans’ disillusionment with democracy as a whole. Foa and Mounk cite several reasons for Americans’ declining faith in democracy: “stagnating incomes” and the resultant decline in American optimism, “rising income inequality,” and the increasing importance of “paid influence and campaign spending.” Although each of these is both valid and interesting, I think that the largest threat to American democracy is immobilism, a concept discussed in Scott Mainwaring’s essay. Generally, I think that immobilism gives rise to polarization, which, as we’ve discussed in class, is another significant threat to democracy. As Mainwaring explains, immobilism results from the seemingly beneficial “balance and separation of powers” inherent in a presidential democracy, from the dual sovereignty of both the president and Congress. I believe that this in turn leads to frustration, placement of blame, and polarization, which then results in greater immobilism, thus creating a vicious cycle that is difficult to break.

It seems to me that Fareed Zakaria is on the right track, namely that democracy may not necessarily be disappearing, but liberal democracy is. When you look at the places around the world that have been recently becoming more and more authoritarian, whether that be Poland, the Phillipines, Turkey, or even to some extent America, it’s not the case that tanks are rolling through the streets and soldiers are taking people from their homes. All of those countries have regularly scheduled elections that are largely free and fair, yet authoritarianism keeps winning at the ballot box. It’s my belief that capitalism is largely to blame for this, particularly the income stagnation and general absurdity that has arisen from late capitalism. To put it in the most reductive and simplified way possible, it has caused people around the world to feel as though they have lost all agency and control over their lives and the world around them, and so they turn to populists and demagogues who promise to be their champion, in return for the people granting them even greater power. We’re seeing this scenario play out all across the globe, particularly in Europe these past couple years, though I don’t think many Americans paid attention until it happened in their own backyards. While I can see the crisis, I can’t see a solution besides the dismantling of the capitalist system, either in part (ala the return of New Deal/Keynesian economics) or completely (socialism). Democracy isn’t imperiled, but liberal democracy is currently on its knees.

The first article distinguishes between liberalism and democracy, and argues that countries such as the United States and Russia are becoming more illiberal, but are still democracies. I agree that the US under Trump and Russia under Putin are becoming increasingly illiberal, with attacks on the press and oppression of minorities. Civil society does not have the same positive effect that Tocqueville observed. This illiberal democracy has led to tyranny of the majority, electing populist leaders with little regard for minorities or the freedom of expression. At the same time, political parties have weakened, making it easier for populist politicians to run rampant. I would argue that these countries are becoming less democratic as well as being illiberal. As shown in the second article, American elections and policies are heavily influenced by the rich and powerful interest groups. Ordinary citizens don’t have as much say as the rich and powerful. This can hardly be a democratic process. Although I believe that liberalism and democracy are both imperiled, I think that we can return to a liberal democracy without a regime change. It will be difficult, but changes are possible within the existing system that will make these countries more liberal and more democratic. Restraints on campaign finance and lobbyists will help lead to more democratic elections and policy-making. Redistributive policies that improve lives will lead to more liberalism. Some of the majority who blamed their economic hardships on minorities might stop doing so. More leisure time and economic opportunities might lead to stronger associations and a stronger civil society that will in turn help liberalism. It is true that a liberal democracy is not inevitable, but I think we can get there if we make some changes.

I found it quite interesting that both the Illing and the Foa/Mounk articles noted the erosion of informal aspects of democratic checks as a potential trigger of the collapse of American democracy. These informal societal and cultural attributes appear to be needed now more than ever as some of the institutional checks have been done away with, most notably now having direct election of senators (Illing) and less strict campaign funding regulations (Foa). The two articles, however, seem to be at odds with each other over the biggest threat to American democracy. The Illing articles addresses President Trump’s populism, coupled with a lack of formal and informal systematic checks, as a danger. Conversely, the Foa articles points out the extreme influence of a small segment of the population, rich elites and specialized interest groups, on elections and policies. Both cases appear to be bad for American democracy, but the tyranny of the majority that the Founding Fathers were so insistent upon eradicating seems to be the bigger threat at the moment. As seen in the case of Putin’s Russia, populism can be very dangerous when the appropriate systematic checks are not in place. I believe the saving grace of American democracy will be something not even the Founding Fathers enacted, the presidential term limit via the 22nd Amendment. While the cultural aspects that have kept a liberal democracy in place might be eroding, many of the systematic checks are still in place. Even with a tyranny of the majority it would be quite a feat to dismantle the democratic system within 8 years, or two presidential terms. Culturally America seems to be at a crossroads as to which governing system should be utilized, but the institution is robust enough to weather a temporarily unsettled public.

Fareed Zakaria makes the claim that “the election is a necessarily democratic process, but not the choosing of the pool of candidates.” He also seems to be implying that this is at the core of the problems that American democracy faces. While Zakaria may be correct in arguing that allowing the public to choose candidates is dangerous, he overlooks that the decrease in faith in democracy is often attributed to the common opinion that the system is rigged, or simply not functioning as it should. The implication behind these rationales is that a large portion of the public does not feel that they’re voices are being heard. If this view is truly held by a large number of citizens, it would likely be counter-productive to attempt to limit one of the democratic aspects of the election process. Changing this process could feasibly be seen as a symbolic overhaul of part of democracy’s most important institutions, which would exacerbate the problem. From a different perspective, it is important to examine how giving this power to party officials would change the selection of candidates. In the case of the Republican Party, though citizens don’t directly choose the candidate anyway, it seems likely that little change would occur. If it were completely up to the party to decide, it is likely that the same choices would be made. The Tea Party’s influence on the Republican Party has forced them to gravitate towards an extreme point of polarization, threatening those in the party who were more moderate. This means that the party must mediate between the public and its internal conflict, and in the last election the solution to the problem seems to have been to pick the candidate that matched the public opinion and the Tea Party’s agenda, not the one that best represented the party. In this way, it seems that removing primaries might be symbolically dangerous and procedurally inconsequential.