Masha Gessen’s article on the issue of early death and depopulation in the Russian population is an interesting exploration of the root causes of this phenomenon; particularly when she quotes Eberhardt’s analysis that “…we would never expect to find premature mortality on the Russian scale in a society with Russia’s present income and educational profiles and typically Western readings on trust, happiness, radius of voluntary association, and other factors adduced to represent social capital.” The idea that the reason for Russia’s problems lie in some aspect of the population’s psyche, or the mental health of Russian society, is fascinating to me. That said, many studies have reinforced the connection between physical health and mental health, so this is less unbelievable than simply surprising, considering the number of people who must be affected by mental health issues for such a significant trend to appear.

It’s here that I take some issue with the idea that the explanation for Russia’s issues goes “beyond science”, in that neuroscience/psychology and its effects on very concrete bodily functions, hormones, etc. are not beyond science at all. Therefore, from my perspective, this article certainly brings to light Shapiro’s claim about “problem-oriented research” versus “method-oriented” in the sense that Eberhardt’s analysis was likely enabled and enhanced by some atypical and creative research, but does not sway me significantly to believe that there is some “truth beyond science”

The conclusion to Gessen’s article leaves me unsatisfied. To me, the idea that hopelessness is the cause for so much death, seems incomplete and untestable. The unavoidable flaw to the study lays in the fact that the subjects are all dead. Nonetheless, the piece highlights the importance of both qualitative and quantitative research to dig deep into the problem in Russia. Cultural research, institutional research, and historical context all play a critical role in untangling the anthropological question at hand—yet the final conclusion still feels shaky. The article reveals that in social science there is no ultimate truth; we can only approach truth and come short. There will always be alternative arguments, and we need multiple view points to help piece together a whole. So yes, there is a “truth” that lies beyond the grasp of social science. We should absolutely not stop striving for it.

Science is defined as “a systematically organized body of knowledge on a particular subject”—a concept seemingly straightforward. In the article “The Dying Russian”, Masha Gessen attempts to explain the phenomena of increased mortality in Russia through the lens of different stems of “science”— anthropology (Michelle Parsons) and economics (Nicholas Eberstadt). Gessen deems Parson’s attempt futile as her primary sources of information (Muscovites) have had their memories transformed by time, by years of social and economic upheaval. Gessen continues his account by examining Eberstadt’s conclusions in respect to the problem at hand. Gessen questions Eberstadt’s efforts to remain unbiased by looking solely at figures and ignoring culture. By contrasting these two different approaches of analysis, Gessen brings light to the Hedgehog/Fox argument. The two autonomous studies lack in the areas the other one excels in. Cultural analysis, although extremely useful in understanding issues on a ground-level, provides little concrete evidence. Statistical analysis, although extremely clear and straightforward, is unable to present enough context. The two are always in conjunction with each other as one, the representative of a hard “science”, apposes the other, an embodiment of a social “science”. The two, regardless, are variations of science.  These instruments may seem like mutually exclusive entities, their coexistence can produce an instrument of analysis that could allow us to go beyond the unreachable. Thus, in order to see the picture, the cultural understanding must enforce the statistical data and vice versa—one must be a fox, skilled in all fields.

When dealing with science, often there will be “truths” that lie beyond reach due to the many intangible factors that come across when determining a cause. In social sciences intangible factors include beauty, moral judgements, anomalies in human nature, and so on. There are even often peculiarities in medical science that have yet to be answered such as: the questions of why we dream, or why some have out-of-body experiences (OBE’s). There are some things that science has yet to answer and arguable can not, however, this should not be a reason to “stop striving for the unreachable”. Further, because of those who are answering these questions are most often human (flawed in nature) they come with their own biases and experiences that may subconsciously stray empirical information away from the truth. By attempting to answer these questions systematically, although we may not ever end up having a feasible answer, we can narrow down our search.

In the methodology of using “science” to answer the unexplainable/the more difficult to explain, it is easy to fall into the trap of “method-driven” ways of reaching a conclusion. The article, “The Dying Russians” authored by Masha Green is an example of such investigation. Green proposes the idea that “hope” is the reason for Russia’s high immorality rate in comparison the other developed countries. It can be criticized that a variable such as “hope” can be challenging if not impossible to answer because; how does one measure hope? Green finds this variable that may explain her theory and then draws conclusions and selective facts to fit her theory that “hope” is the culprit. It would have been more convincing had Green went into more detail as to how this variable of “hope” was measured/determined rather than making a broad, objective statement.

The most fascinating part of Gessen’s “The Dying Russians” was the lack of a substantial answer. In any kind of science– hard science, political science, or otherwise– truth is always the goal. In the article, Gessen looks for truth from both inductive and deductive scientists to find out why the mortality rate in Russia is so high. Michelle Parsons is described as an anthropologist looking at the cultural influences that would influence this phenomena. She uses deductive reasoning–finding evidence to falsify a hypothesis–to find the truth, and yet all she finds is a specific answer. Her evidence, found in the form of in-depth interviews with “average Muscovites,” does support a theory that the cultural shock of the collapse of the USSR, similar to the cultural shock after WWII is impacting the health and mental well-being of Russians today. Her method fails, however, as her scope is limited to the 1990’s and excludes many of the smaller, gradual changes of the previous decade, and her interviewees are also limited to survivors of two major mortality crises: following WWII and following the collapse of the USSR.  Nicholas Eberstadt, in comparison, uses an inductive system of reasoning, “systematically goes down the list of the usual suspects,” and crossing off those that would not explain the phenomena. Although the danger with inductive reasoning is the cherry-picking of data, Eberstadt fails to come up with any definitive answer, and Gessen is forced to conclude that there is no definitive truth regarding her question. Perhaps, ironically, the only truth of the entire article and the entire mortality situation, is that the truth has not been found yet. It makes me wonder whether truth has to involve a distinct answer–can truth be an unknown? If so, can we ever be content with an unknown truth?

This study certainly differs in many ways than the ones I read about in my Econ and Stats classes. Gessen takes a interesting approach to solving the problem of the dying Russians. As is traditional, the topic is approached with empirical methods of analysis, researching STD rates, smoking rates, and other possible culprits for the high mortality rate in Russia. And eventually one is found: a high rate of cardiovascular diseases. However, this is where the research veers from the norm. When a cause for the high rates of heart attacks isn’t found, there is a turn away from the more “traditional” science approach. Instead, the culture and history of Russia is analyzed, and from there we seem to get our true culprit for the high mortality rate: a lack of hope. I certainly don’t disagree with the conclusion of the article, I can completely understand how the society that Russians live in has had an effect on their health in ways that may not be immediately clear through an empirical approach. However, I felt as though the authors of the research were too quick to conclude that this must ultimately be the reason why Russians are dying. I feel as though there was a lot left on the table that’s still worth researching, both from an empirical standpoint and from a method-driven approach.

While it is interesting to examine death rates through a social/psychological/historical lens, Gessen runs into fairly predictable dead ends. Historical facts are important, however it appears that Gessen overlooks the importance of how the Russian people view their history as well as their current society. With Gaventa and Scott, we have established that as an outside observer, it is important not to assume that anyone views their situation as owe view it, regardless of how clearly we feel we’ve analyzed it. Interviewing the wrong people might also have played a role here. Clearly, interviewees who are not of the appropriate age or who are not among those reporting to experience exceptionally low “hope levels” would not be able to provide accurate insight into the social causes, as they would not be operating with the same private transcript. Finally, the psychological correlation that Gessen proposes seems somewhat misplaced. A correlation based on odd statistics seems to be the least direct way to approach the problem. Not only is a correlation untrustworthy, but statistics, especially concerning something like “hope,” are also a questionable approach to a phenomenon that is clearly complex, especially when the statistics represent a large variety of people. Furthermore, this seems impersonal in that it doesn’t deal with the individuals’ conceptions of hope. Overall, it seems as though Gessen would do well to look to anthropology’s more immersive approach. While she seems to attempt a Middle-Range approach, she misses the importance of depth in her three approaches. Rather than search further socially, it seems as though Gessen would rather search for the answer elsewhere. While it is essential to conducting research that one is searching for something, it seems that the lesson here is that searching means nothing without adequate depth and constant re-evaluation.

The article “The Dying Russians” presents the studies done surrounding the increasing death rates and depopulation of Russia over the past few decades. One study was done by Michelle Parsons, an anthropologist. It largely focuses on the cultural influences that could have led to this “problem.” Much of her research and conclusion, while based on cultural observances, fails to be based on facts that focus on the gradual and smaller changes that occurred in Russia that led to its depopulation. This leads to her study being less accurate because instead of focusing on the many little things that have led to this problem in Russia, she only focuses on general trends. As we have learned, the answers are usually found in the smaller details rather than the larger overviews. Parsons’s methods and conclusions are then contrasted with Nicholas Eberstadt’s methods and conclusions. Through this contrast, it is easy to see why a focused study is important. By looking at many little facts, researchers are able to gain a more accurate picture of what was happening during the time period they were studying and why it was happening. His study was extensive, analyzing not only what the causes could be, but also what the causes could not be. While not a perfect study, this study is much more reliable and believable. It behaves more like the common scientific studies we know. We will never be able to know for sure what the definite reasons for Russia’s depopulation are; however, in a way, that is the beauty of political science. Some say that there should be no distinction made between sciences (i.e. social sciences, natural sciences). However, I think that this article shows exactly why those distinctions are necessary. The different sciences are inherently different. That statement does not mean that one is necessarily better or more accurate than another, but just that they are different and should not be treated as entities that are one in the same.

Gessen’s investigation into the high mortality rates in Russia represents a symbolic struggle for truth which may be beyond the grasp of social or physical sciences. Gessen clearly uses ‘empirically’ valid approaches to solve this underlying question, to find the greater answer to the stories of individual events she had been writing about for years. First is Parson’s extensive set of interviews that aim to get past the public mask and to the private one, which, as she points out, is inherently flawed as the subjects are naturally the survivors, not the victims. Beyond this, even if Parson was hypothetically able to interview victims, a person outside this private mask will never know if the subjects account actually represents the private mask or is simply a false layer of the public one. Second is Eberstadt’s in depth approach of a range of demographics. This clearly points to another issue; again, these are simply observations and numbers, upon which an analytical framework based in hindsight is used to find causation. But the “why?” in social science cannot be based on general statistics, as the field is innately made up of individuals with personal private masks and (perhaps) differing motivations for action. Thus, any cultural, institutional or historic methodology to understand the grand truth, by definition, approaches it asymptotically, serving only as the most current and closest estimation of what is actually occurring.