The most fascinating part of Gessen’s “The Dying Russians” was the lack of a substantial answer. In any kind of science– hard science, political science, or otherwise– truth is always the goal. In the article, Gessen looks for truth from both inductive and deductive scientists to find out why the mortality rate in Russia is so high. Michelle Parsons is described as an anthropologist looking at the cultural influences that would influence this phenomena. She uses deductive reasoning–finding evidence to falsify a hypothesis–to find the truth, and yet all she finds is a specific answer. Her evidence, found in the form of in-depth interviews with “average Muscovites,” does support a theory that the cultural shock of the collapse of the USSR, similar to the cultural shock after WWII is impacting the health and mental well-being of Russians today. Her method fails, however, as her scope is limited to the 1990’s and excludes many of the smaller, gradual changes of the previous decade, and her interviewees are also limited to survivors of two major mortality crises: following WWII and following the collapse of the USSR.  Nicholas Eberstadt, in comparison, uses an inductive system of reasoning, “systematically goes down the list of the usual suspects,” and crossing off those that would not explain the phenomena. Although the danger with inductive reasoning is the cherry-picking of data, Eberstadt fails to come up with any definitive answer, and Gessen is forced to conclude that there is no definitive truth regarding her question. Perhaps, ironically, the only truth of the entire article and the entire mortality situation, is that the truth has not been found yet. It makes me wonder whether truth has to involve a distinct answer–can truth be an unknown? If so, can we ever be content with an unknown truth?