Beyond *TAPTOE*: further clarifications of being.

*TAPTOE*’s account of the neglectfulness of being requires expansion. One way of neglecting being is that exemplified in the passages considered from Krauss, van Inwagen, and Lowe: that is neglecting the being of be-ers. But a second way—and the one emphasized by Heidegger—is neglecting being as such, that is, recognizing only the being of be-ers. *TAPTOE* does not explicitly identify this second way of neglecting being.

Similarly, *TAPTOE*—unlike *Structure and Being* and *Being and God*—does not explicitly treat being as such. The quickest and most concise way to remedy this would be to alter the paragraph beginning on 146 to read as follows:

Being as articulated in the sentence “It be being” may appear to be, in Gilson 2002’s terms, “universal and abstract,” but is is straightforwardly and transparently concretized via that sentence’s expansion into the operator “It be being such that,” which can govern any and every sentence that expresses a propositioning. This makes possible the direct and explicit articulation both of being as such and of the being of be-ers. Being as such is directly and explicitly articulated in such true sentences as “It be being such that it be being-intelligible,” “It be being such that it be being-coherent,” “It be being such that it be being-expressible,” “It be being such that it be being-good,” and “It be being such that It be being-beautiful.”¹ The being of be-ers is articulated in such sentences as “It be being such that It be Alan Whiting such that It be revising It be *TAPTOE*ing”—a sentence true as of the time of its composition. …

¹ See *SB* 5.2.4 and/or *BG* 3.3[2]. The author thanks Johan Siebers and Lorenz B. Puntel for helping him to see the need for adding this point.