**SPECIAL FEATURE**: “In Defense of Property”: An Exchange

**EDITORIAL NOTE**

In 2009, the *Yale Law Journal* published the article “In Defense of Property,” co-authored by the legal scholars Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, and Angela R. Riley. The article reviews current thinking on the protection of indigenous heritage and makes an impassioned case that it is legitimate and useful to think of culture as a form of group property. In the words of the article’s abstract, the article “situates indigenous cultural property claims, particularly those of American Indians, in the interests of ‘peoples’ rather than ‘persons.’” Of equal importance is the authors’ assertion that when cultural heritage is at issue, conventional notions of property emphasizing such facets of ownership as the rights of exclusion and transfer must be subordinated to the concept of *stewardship*, which they identify as “an ongoing duty of care toward cultural resources in the absence of title.”

Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley frame their analysis by sharply contrasting it with the work of several scholars who raise a range of questions about the logic or practicality of classifying culture as a form of community property. Among these are the legal scholars Naomi Mezey and Eric Posner, as well as the cultural anthropologist Michael F. Brown.

“In Defense of Property” may well achieve landmark status among those interested in questions of cultural property because of the prominence of its publishing venue and the forcefulness with which its authors make their case. For this reason, *IJCP* offered Mezey, Posner, and Brown the opportunity to comment briefly on the article with the idea of opening a dialogue on these issues for the journal’s readers. Mezey and Posner were unable to write because of time constraints. Brown, however, has provided a comment, which is followed by a response from Carpenter et al. Our hope is that this exchange will advance understanding of the complexities and possibilities of global efforts to protect indigenous cultural heritage and defend it from misuse by outsiders.

**Culture, Property, and Peoplehood: A Comment on Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s “In Defense of Property”**

Michael F. Brown*

First, the good news: Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley make a compelling case that the venerable concept of property—long defined primarily by such principles as trans-
ferability and rights of exclusion and control—should be broadened to encompass a robust ideal of stewardship. In doing so, “In Defense of Property” (henceforth, IDP) renders property more compatible with the indigenous view of things. This significant contribution to ongoing global debates about the protection of indigenous heritage will be of great interest to readers of the *IJCP*.

Despite this achievement, however, Carpenter et al. also make various assertions that in my view potentially impede the development of pragmatic, cost-effective solutions to the problem of cultural appropriation. The authors also leave unresolved a number of pivotal questions about the scope of indigenous cultural property and its implications in a world that seems to be moving inexorably in the direction of commodifying every aspect of human identity. Here I briefly explore those questions in the hope that Carpenter et al. will view this as an opportunity to clarify and develop ideas advanced in their article.

**SOVEREIGNTY-THINKING AND THE CHIMERA OF CULTURAL AUTONOMY**

A pivotal move that shapes Carpenter et al.’s analysis is outright dismissal of efforts to strike a balance between concern for the legitimate interests of indigenous peoples and the global campaign to defend a shrinking public domain from privatization. Their underlying assumption is that because indigenous cultural productions are inadequately protected today, indigenous peoples have no stake in defending the global commons. For them, the public domain is at best irrelevant; at worst, it is a source of injustice because existing law defines indigenous cultures as largely situated in the public domain owing to their antiquity and “folkloric” nature.

By excluding concern for the public domain from their analysis, however, Carpenter et al. turn their back on an important pathway to social justice, one whose benefits could extend beyond the indigenous world. Cultural appropriation would become far less attractive if the intellectual property rights currently available to non-indigenous actors, especially those in industry, were subjected to aggressive challenge and ultimately rolled back. This is already occurring in countries such as India, where newly created traditional knowledge databases have been used to invalidate industrial patents that parasitize folk traditions. Vigorous defense of the tattered remnants of the public domain, in other words, should not be seen as incompatible with the movement to protect indigenous cultural expressions from exploitation by outsiders.

Recognition of the links between indigenous rights in heritage and parallel debates about the future of the public domain requires what I have elsewhere called an “ecological” approach, one that moves constantly between specific problems and the larger whole. Unfortunately, much recent work on strategies for defending indigenous heritage rejects this double vision. Legal scholarship in the United States, in particular, is so fixated on the doctrine of American Indian
sovereignty that it persistently fails to ponder sovereignty’s inherent limits and the extent to which dogmatic adherence to the sovereignty doctrine can be problematic rather than helpful. Even the most resilient political sovereignty cannot insulate a community from every outside influence. Familiar examples include the effects of global climate change or the intrusion of pollutants from beyond a nation’s borders.

Analyses between culture and the problem of environmental contamination are not as implausible as they might seem at first glance. Molecules are often mobile, combining readily with air and water, thereby incorporating themselves into living things. So, too, do elements of culture—memes, if you like—which subdivide and spread via global media and informal personal contacts in ways that are not readily subject to collective control. (Skeptics should ponder for a moment the infiltration of foreign words into spoken French despite the vigorous efforts of the Académie Française to maintain the language’s purity.) When Carpenter et al. insist that the doctrine of sovereignty entitles Native Americans to “legal protection of, and autonomy over, their cultural resources,” they are trafficking in a slogan rather than a policy that stands a reasonable chance of implementation. No society can accurately be said to enjoy “autonomy” over its cultural resources, although communities do have a modest ability to encourage and defend elements of culture that they value highly. The limits of this control are evident in the declining use of many Native American languages despite the unstinting efforts of tribal governments to preserve them.

Not only do Carpenter et al. overstate the level of conscious control that any community has over its heritage, their persistent focus on “culture” in the broadest sense renders the focus of this supposed right of ownership frustratingly vague. Few will contest the idea that cultural communities have a legitimate stewardship role with regard to their art styles, oral traditions, or religious rites. But how widely do such rights extend in time and space? Must we also conclude that a particular group “owns” bifurcate-merging kinship terminology, agglutinative verbs, or the custom of pointing with the lips rather than the index finger? It seems unlikely, although the imprecision of Carpenter et al.’s assertions makes it difficult to say.

Symptomatic of the trouble that Carpenter et al. get into because of their vaguely defined and expansive notions of culture and cultural property is their approach to the mascot controversy—that is, the formerly widespread, now thankfully declining, use of Native American names and images by sports teams throughout the United States. There is no question that a handful of mascots represent the appropriation of a specific tribal name with which the appropriator has no plausible connection. Use of these names violates widely accepted principles of the right of personality (individual or collective) and should therefore be prohibited on those grounds. Most mascots, however, are abstract invocations of native society in general (“braves” or “warriors” or “chiefs”) that have little to do with cultural property and everything to do with offensive, stereotyped represen-
tations of a category of people. Yet Carpenter et al. propose to treat this as a property issue when they declare that “indigenous peoples should have some power to steward the cultural images that define them in the eyes of the dominant society.”

Insistence that a people owns the “cultural images that define them,” presumably even when they are not the authors of those images, stretches the most elastic notions of political sovereignty and cultural property beyond the breaking point. By that same logic, any community could assert control over public discussion of its traditions or actions on the grounds that such representations are its property. This totalizing approach to cultural property, which one cannot imagine being put into practice by any nation with even a tepid commitment to free expression, would instantly put historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and even writers of fiction out of business unless they agreed to limit their observations to the cultural community of which they are a member.

An alternative interpretation that could follow from Carpenter et al.’s approach is that American Indians constitute a de facto brand, the unauthorized use of which must be considered an illegal infringement. But this reduces fundamental issues of human dignity to a banal dispute over commercial representation, an argument that Carpenter et al. would doubtless reject.

A curious feature of their analysis—and, I believe, an inevitable result of sovereignty-thinking—is that it specifies no limits to the proposed stewardship rights of indigenous peoples over cultural productions, knowledge, and biological inheritance that they insist are theirs alone. Nevertheless, the global community might plausibly assert a legitimate interest in a range of resources routinely claimed by indigenous rights activists. Perhaps the most controversial of these is information embedded in human remains of great antiquity. Along with most anthropologists, I fully support the repatriation of human remains that have confirmed links to indigenous communities who seek their return, and I offer no defense for the shameful removal of burials from Native communities in the past. The situation becomes ethically murky, however, when we consider the status of remains dating back thousands of years. A given community might insist that these are their ancestors, but whose standard of proof should prevail? How can we begin to balance local claims of stewardship against the potential value of such remains to science and, given the direction of contemporary medical research, to the improvement of human health on a global scale?

Similar problems arise when considering the potential value to humanity of traditional ethnobotanical knowledge. Unfortunately, bioprospecting now evokes so much outrage—often justified, occasionally misplaced—that it is nearly impossible to discuss it in a dispassionate way. I would welcome the authors’ thoughts on whether there are circumstances in which indigenous stewardship claims need to be subordinated to those of the global community in much the same way that private ownership of great works of art is subordinated to global standards of heritage protection.
Let me make one thing clear: I am not challenging the view that sovereignty needs to be considered when envisioning effective mechanisms for the protection of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage. My point is that political sovereignty, even where successfully realized, has profound limitations when it comes to the management of heritage. In many cases, sovereignty-thinking and its conceptual baggage hinder the search for creative, pragmatic solutions to the unwanted circulation of traditional cultural expressions.

DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING FROM SPLENDID ABSTRACTION TO REAL-WORLD COMPLEXITY

A simple case study will serve to demonstrate why Carpenter et al.’s declaration that a people owns its culture is devilishly hard to move from theory to practice, especially given the way they have framed the relevant issues. The authors note in a brief aside\(^\text{12}\) that weavers of the Navajo Nation are distressed by the copying of specific Navajo rug patterns by non-Navajo manufacturers, as well as by the proliferation of more generic “Southwestern” designs. Published prices for rugs made by prominent Navajo weavers suggest that the market for weavings of the highest quality is reasonably stable; in contrast, rugs farther down the quality spectrum appear to be losing market share to Navajo-style rugs imported from abroad. The Navajo Nation has declared traditional rug designs to be sacred, thus attributing injury to the production of fake rugs that goes far beyond the narrowly economic. So let us follow Carpenter et al.’s lead by identifying the Navajo rug as a form of group property over which the Navajo people should be seen to exercise collective stewardship.\(^\text{13}\)

To protect something, we must first identify it and specify its boundaries. An immediate problem is that Navajo designs change over time. Each weaver brings an element of personal creativity to her work, and the combination of local micro-traditions and individual creativity crystallize in identifiable regional styles. So what exactly is “the Navajo rug”? Identifying Navajo rugs from the past would be a fairly straightforward matter, and it might be possible to prohibit unauthorized commercial reproduction of those rugs, a problem that goes back at least a century.\(^\text{14}\) But the riddle remains: How best to protect today’s Navajo designs and those that may emerge in the future? Should the Navajo Nation be given control over a specific palette of colors, shapes, and thread counts? In lieu of an attempt to stipulate the formal properties shared by all authentic Navajo rugs, might the federal government be obliged to empanel a group of latter-day Potter Stewarts who although unable to define the Navajo rug would be trusted to know it when they see it?\(^\text{15}\) Given the scale of the economic crisis currently confronted by the Navajo people and the U.S. government, one cannot imagine that legislators would be willing to institute such expensive and cumbersome regulation. And in the unlikely event that such a regulatory regime were implemented, it would doubtless
inspire a tsunami of litigation from manufacturers and artists, including weavers from other indigenous groups, arguing that the law infringes upon their creative rights or cultural patrimony.  

There is an alternative approach that builds on existing law while acknowledging the harsh realities of industrial production. Navajo weavers have every reason to be proud of their artistic traditions and angered by those who try to pass off fake Navajo rugs as the real thing. If any specific design is reproduced without the artist’s permission, tribal legal counsel and attorneys committed to the protection of Native American rights should sue the perpetrators for copyright infringement. Vendors who falsely claim that rugs are made by Navajos are guilty of fraud as defined by the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 and therefore potentially subject to criminal prosecution. It will be far more cost-effective to step up enforcement activities than to create an entirely new bureaucracy committed to the wholesale protection of Navajo culture. Enforcement of existing law could be enhanced by promotion of a fair trade system that assures buyers that rugs are made by Navajo weavers who receive a reasonable percentage of the profits from any sale.

The history of the indigenous art markets throughout North America and elsewhere shows that industrial production and the importation of facsimile products from low-wage regions almost inevitably depress the market for local artisanship of low to middling quality. The solution for indigenous artists has been to raise the quality of their work to secure the high end of the market, where buyers are willing to pay a premium for quality and authenticity. In deciding how best to protect the interests of its artists, policymakers for the Navajo Nation have little choice but to weigh the logistics of protecting weavers from competitive knock-offs against the cost of providing training that will help weavers raise the quality of their work to the level of the community’s most successful practitioners.

In the face of the complexities of this case, then, I find it hard to see how Carpenter et al.’s comprehensive claim of cultural ownership—however forcefully argued as legal theory—provides much purchase on the problems faced by Navajo weavers today. More prosaic intellectual property and trademark legislation, which has the virtue of already being in place, could help if vigorously enforced and, if necessary, expanded modestly in scope via legislative modification.

**THE RISKS OF EQUATING CULTURE WITH TERRITORY**

Let me turn now to the element of their argument that I find most troubling because of its implications beyond the specific realm of American Indian law. A central pillar of IDP is insistence that cultural stewardship is inseparable from an intimate relationship to land, from which, the authors argue, indigenous culture “grows.” To their credit, the authors admit that this observation flirts with cliché, that it dances with wolves on the edge of the noble savage stereotype. But
they ultimately endorse it anyway, thus committing themselves to the equation people = culture = land.

I would be the last to deny that indigenous peoples feel a profound, emotionally intense connection to their ancestral territories. But so do many non-indigenous peoples, and it seems pointless to enter into a debate about whose love of natural landscapes is deeper or more genuine. What is at issue is whether this relationship to territory, this primordial affinity, is needed to establish a group’s rights in its traditional cultural expressions. Carpenter et al. present no convincing evidence that it is; they simply assume it. Moreover, invoking the people = culture = land equation, which may be defensible in discussions of federally recognized Indian nations in the United States, has the pernicious effect of implicitly delegitimating the cultural and intellectual property rights of people in folkloric communities removed from ancestral landscapes or who have long since adapted to urban settings. I refer to the millions of indigenous citizens who live in the sprawling cities of Latin America, the Pacific, and Africa, or non-indigenous peoples—Afro-Peruvians, Gujaratis in Panama, and countless other diasporic communities—who harbor distinctive musical, artistic, or culinary traditions. By directing their analysis only to indigeneity as understood by American Indians, Carpenter et al. offer a provincial vision of indigenous rights that is out of step with current thinking about the complexity of indigenous identities and the crisis of cultural and intellectual property at the global level.20

A community’s special relationship to ancestral lands cannot, of course, be removed entirely from considerations of indigenous rights. Clearly it is relevant when considering the social impact of policies that would disfigure landscapes of great spiritual significance. But treating people = culture = land as a universal principle is freighted with undesirable implications that merit critical attention.

**IS IT POSSIBLE TO DEFINE CULTURE AS PROPERTY WITHOUT COMMODIFYING IT?**

My final quibble is a philosophical one, although not entirely beyond the scope of Carpenter et al.’s elegant defense of the utility of property concepts in protecting indigenous heritage. Here I refer to questions raised by John L. and Jean Comaroff in their recent work *Ethnicity, Inc.* The Comaroffs focus their attention on ways that ethnic groups—and indigenous groups in particular—have come to commodify their cultures in order to survive amid the neoliberal economic policies that, with few exceptions, define the world in which they live. “Identity,” the Comaroffs declare, “is increasingly claimed as property by its living heirs, who proceed to manage it by palpably corporate means: to brand it and sell it, even to anthropologists, in self-consciously consumable forms.”21

Although indigenous peoples show admirable creativity in their use of capitalist techniques to resist the nation-state and fight for higher levels of self-
determination, such strategies may prove harmful over the long run. It is by no means clear that propertization—which, if I understand correctly, is what Carpenter et al. are defending as a way to advance indigenous people’s rights in their heritage—can be pursued without also fostering commodification. Carpenter et al.’s essay singles out the work of the legal scholar Margaret Jane Radin as providing a foundation for their insistence that property can have a salutary effect in establishing and maintaining identity. There is, however, another side to Radin’s work that Carpenter et al. choose to deemphasize. Although Radin makes a compelling case that some forms of propertization may empower individuals and, by implication, groups, she also acknowledges that underneath property concepts there always lurks the specter of commodification—that is, an inexorable tendency to treat property as fungible and alienable. In a market society, even a hint of alienability can have a powerfully corrosive effect on the moral standing of whatever has been propertized. “In the kingdom of ends,” Kant said famously, “everything has either a price or a dignity.”

Carpenter et al. express great confidence that commodification is unlikely to become a problem for American Indian nations, which have strenuously opposed the alienation of ritual objects, human remains, and sacred places. I agree that commodification is not a likely scenario in such cases. But as the Comaroffs observe, indigenous identity itself is increasingly commodified around the world, especially where its market value can be leveraged by political sovereignty. This has produced marked improvement in the fortunes of some indigenous peoples but also heartbreaking stories of communities disenfranchising members through the sudden imposition of more restrictive membership rules—the goal being, apparently, to reduce the number of people with whom the new wealth must be shared.

It should be obvious that I have been engaged by “In Defense of Property,” whose arguments for the propertization of heritage are as compelling as any in the current literature. Precisely because the essay is so important, I wish to challenge Carpenter et al. to stretch their arguments beyond the limited perspective of sovereignty-thinking and to spell out more clearly how they would put their ideas of cultural ownership to work in ways that would not unduly regiment and bureaucratize the creative lives of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples alike. I would also welcome their thoughts on how their arguments can be reconciled with what some scholars feel is the move toward commodifying indigenous identity in a world hungry for cultural difference.

ENDNOTES

2. The article is available for full-text download at (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1220665).
4. Carpenter et al. consign me to the ranks of “critics of cultural property protections” (IDP, 1042). I find this baffling inasmuch as the work they comment on, Who Owns Native Culture?, is entirely devoted to documenting the injustice of various forms of cultural appropriation and establishing that indigenous peoples have legitimate rights in their tangible and intangible cultural productions. I have been critical of current approaches to cultural property only when they are impractical, incompatible with the right of free expression, or insufficiently precise to offer a path to effective implementation.

7. Carpenter et al., IDP, 1059.
8. Ironically, even as legal scholars and political scientists are embracing the totalizing notion that “a people” has “a culture,” anthropologists are debating whether the culture concept should be jettisoned altogether because of the misconceptions that it fosters. Even some indigenous thinkers have noted that few indigenous peoples may be said to share a unitary culture. A recent editorial in Indian Country Today (“Respect Community Diversity,” www.indiancountrytoday.com/opinion43174012.htm, accessed 17 April 2009), a publication resolutely committed to the defense of American Indian sovereignty, declares that “it is hard to say that most tribal communities share a common or homogeneous culture,” even if their values continue to differ from those of Euro-American society sufficiently to justify their political sovereignty. For a sense of the current debate about the status of the culture concept in anthropology and the humanities, see, among many others, Eagleton, The Idea of Culture; Fox and King, Anthropology Beyond Culture; and Busse, “Epilogue: Anxieties About Culture and Tradition.”

10. Carpenter et al., IDP, 1111.
11. Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt.
12. Carpenter et al., IDP, 1064, n. 198, and 1085.
13. In the interest of conciseness, I will bracket from consideration the hybrid origins of the Navajo weaving tradition, which drew on knowledge garnered from Spanish colonists, Pueblo neighbors, and Anglo-American traders. For a thumbnail sketch of the impact of markets, technology, and intercultural contact on Navajo weaving, see Cowen, Creative Destruction, 43–46. M’Closkey, Swept Under the Rug, offers a broadly framed assessment of the economic history of Navajo weaving and its cultural significance.

15. The jurist Potter Stewart (1915–1985) served on the U.S. Supreme Court. He is remembered, among other things, for his declaration that although he couldn’t define pornography, “I know it when I see it.”
16. Asmah, “Historical Threads,” describes analogous efforts by Ghana to protect kente designs from appropriation by manufacturers in other countries. It is by no means clear from Asmah’s analysis that Ghana’s legislation has been (or can be) enforced or, even if it were, that other countries could not manufacture cloth that resembles kente and avoid prosecution simply by refraining from calling the fabric by that name.
17. For discussion of the complexities and limitations of this law, see Woltz, “The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation,” and Hapiuk, “Of Kitsch and Kachinas.”
18. This process has been ably documented for the American Southwest in Mullin, Culture in the Marketplace. The economist Cowen (Creative Destruction, 38–43) assesses the beneficial impact that competition with industrial production has had on producers of hand-woven fabrics in India, who were pressured to raise the quality of their work in ways that have given them an ever-expanding global market.
19. Carpenter et al., IDP, 1062.
20. For a nuanced view of the complex relationship between culture and place in a world characterized as much by diaspora as by long-term stability, see Clifford, “Varieties of Indigenous Experience.” In fairness to Carpenter et al., it bears noting that they are hardly alone in asserting the people = culture = land equation. It has become an article of faith in some indigenous rights circles,
as well as in documents emerging from the UN and UNESCO. Unfortunately, the equation’s racist
derpinnings and potentially damaging implications are rarely acknowledged.

23. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 42, emphasis in original.
24. Such internal membership struggles go back at least as far as the case Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation (28 Ct. Cl. 281 [1893]), but they have recently become more common among tribes with significant gaming enterprises. For examples, see James May, “Tribal Recall: Members Disenrolled After Financial Dispute,” Indian Country Today, December 8, 2003; and Marty Firerider, “The Red Path Has Turned Green For Some,” Indian Country Today, May 19, 2005.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Clarifying Cultural Property
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INTRODUCTION

Author Stephenie Meyer forever altered the cultural existence of Quileute Indians when she wrote them into her Twilight novels. Now a veritable global phenomenon complete with books, movies, and affiliated merchandise, the Twilight series depicts young, male members of the tribe as vampire-fighting werewolves who ferociously defend a peace and territorial treaty made with local bloodsuckers.¹ In reality, the Quileute Tribe consists of approximately 700 Indians, many of whom live on a remote reservation in the pacific Northwest, a tiny parcel of the once vast Quileute territory. Since Twilight’s unprecedented international success, the Quileute have been overwhelmed with fans and entrepreneurs, all grasping, quite literally in some cases, for their own piece of the Quileute.²

Meyer boasted on her own blog, in fact, that she took rocks from First Beach, which is located under the jurisdiction of the Quileute Nation, and placed them on her windowsill for inspiration when writing her novels.³ And that was just the beginning. Dozens of tourists have followed in her path and removed rocks from First Beach for their own collections. MSN.com even entered a reservation cemetery to film the graves of deceased tribal elders, later publishing a macabre video montage set to music on the Internet. Busloads of tourists roll through the reservation daily, throwing the spotlight on a tribe that never sought the attention.

With the recent release of the third Twilight movie in the series, the commercialization of all things Quileute—from movies and books, to charm bracelets and earrings—has spawned a multimillion-dollar empire. Yet, little of this benefits the Quileute people, who remain impoverished and are currently devoting most of

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: With thanks to Mack Eason for excellent research assistance and to Alex Bauer and Michael Brown for the opportunity to participate in this dialogue about indigenous cultural property rights. We dedicate this essay to the memory of Professor Philip Frickey.
their scarce resources to a fight with the U.S. government over their ancestral lands.\(^4\) At the same time, copyright, trademark, and other laws protect those who have commodified Quileute culture—giving everyone from Stephenie Meyer, Summit Entertainment, and a dozen online T-shirt sellers the legal “right” to profit from so-called Quileute creations.\(^5\)

This is, in our view, a cultural property story. For the Quileute, as for most indigenous peoples in the world, culture is tied to their lands, resources, language, religion, sovereignty, and the Seventh Generation. Since the arrival of Europeans in North America, the Quileute have suffered severe losses of all of these resources, with the \textit{Twilight} phenomenon representing only the most contemporary incarnation. Yet, like other indigenous peoples, the Quileute are not content to sit back while others commodify their cultural heritage. Instead, they are using legal tools to protect their cultural resources and navigate their participation in contemporary commerce.

In 2009, for example, the Quileute Nation complained to MSN.com that its video team had trespassed onto tribal land and caused “an enormous amount of pain and suffering to the Quileute Nation as a whole, but especially to the descendants of the Quileute chief” whose grave had been filmed.\(^6\) MSN.com issued a public apology and took down the video,\(^7\) and subsequent documentary crews have approached the Quileute Nation to negotiate the terms of filmmaking on the reservation, leading to insightful coverage of their tribal education and cultural history.\(^8\)

Recently, the tribe launched a \textit{Twilight at Quileute} web site to provide information about the tribe and to sell tribal baskets, necklaces, canned salmon, and clothing.\(^9\) As tribal Chair Anna Rose Counsell-Geyer explained, “Traveling across our great country and observing other native tribes commercially marketing their wares in a successful and respectful manner motivated us to explore the concept of promoting culturally appropriate authentic Quileute items online.”\(^10\)

While the playing field is hardly level between the Quileute and those who commodify their culture, the Quileute have begun to engage the outside world on their own terms. In these respects, the Quileute story also evokes some of the themes addressed in anthropologist Michael Brown’s \textit{Who Owns Native Culture?}, one of the first books to expose indigenous peoples’ attempts to protect their cultural heritage. Our own article, “In Defense of Property” (IDP), detailed a theory of indigenous cultural property generally and also responded to what we saw as a critical view, expressed by Brown and others, of property law’s role in indigenous cultural property claims. As a matter of property theory and practice, we argued that indigenous peoples have a legitimate interest in exercising a duty of care or “stewardship” over resources—intellectual, real, personal, and tribal properties—that express their collective identity or “peoplehood.” Brown’s current essay raises thoughtful and provocative questions regarding the intersection of sovereignty, property, and culture, and for this reason, we are especially grateful for the opportunity to discover common ground—while raising some points for further analysis and dialogue.
Moreover, a thoughtful discussion of these issues is quite timely. Even beyond the Quileute and other domestic matters, a burgeoning body of international human rights law is developing around the concept that many different components of indigenous peoples’ cultural property are interrelated. Path-breaking cases from in the Inter-American human rights system, such as those involving the Sawhoyamaxa, Mayans, and the Western Shoshone, among others—illustrate how claims for equality, human rights, access to culture, and rights to property cannot be disaggregated into separate pieces. Both the claimants and the tribunals go to great lengths to demonstrate how these claims are linked and interdependent.

In the landmark case of *The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua*, for example, the Awas Tingni, a small native community living on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, sued the Nicaraguan Government for granting a major logging concession to Awas Tingni territory without its consent. On one level the case was about the ways in which logging would interfere with the community’s subsistence practices. But it was also broader and deeper than that. The very methods of rotating lands for agriculture and hunting boar were aspects of the culture that would be severely, if not completely, disrupted by the logging practices. The contested lands were also the site of the community’s burial grounds and other spiritual elements. In the absence of property rights, the Awas Tingni could not protect these aspects of their culture against destruction by state or corporate interests.

In finding for the Awas Tingni, the court wrote that they have the right to live on their own territory based, in part, on the “close ties of indigenous people with the land.” These ties must be understood not merely as title claims but as the “fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.” For indigenous communities like the Awas Tingni, whose traditions include a communitarian conception of land ownership, the court explained that “relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element” of their culture. The right to occupy and control the use of traditional community territory is necessary not only to protect the human rights of current tribal members but to “preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.” Ultimately, the court ordered that Nicaragua demarcate the Awas Tingni lands, based on their customary use patterns, and to respect these lands as their legally protected property.

It is precisely because of the interrelated nature of such claims that an evaluation of the respective roles of property, culture, and sovereignty in indigenous peoples’ cultural property cases is indispensable. Toward this end, Brown’s provocative response to IDP pushes us to refine three points of analysis: first, whether or not indigenous peoples should, as both a descriptive and a normative matter, be afforded particularized treatment under cultural, real, and intellectual property law; second, to evaluate more precisely the operative principles behind our proposed systems of stewardship and governance; and third, to explore the implications of protecting—or commodifying—the cultural properties of indigenous peoples in
light of the public domain and the fluidity and hybridity that embodies our global culture. We respond to each in turn and appreciate the opportunity to delineate our ideas in greater detail.

1. SOVEREIGNTY AND PROPERTY

As a starting point, Brown offers a powerful objection to “sovereignty” and “property” as bases for indigenous peoples’ cultural property claims, pointing out that as a practical matter tribal assertions of sovereignty or ownership over cultural resources will do little to “insulate a community from every outside influence” or “assert control over public discussion” of Indian culture and traditions by outsiders. At the outset, we wish to clarify that many of the indigenous property claims we discuss within our article stem not from attempts to control public discussion, but from a desire to restore indigenous cultural properties to a comparable baseline of protections that many other social groups or individual property owners already enjoy. Presumably, Brown would not contest this point. He does, however, express discomfort with claims based on indigenous peoples’ status as such, questioning the workability of property claims based on the nuanced and complex aspects of indigenous identity. To the extent that this may be an issue of lawyers and anthropologists talking past one another, we are pleased to clarify some legal concepts.

As a matter of positive law, of course, indigenous groups have historically been treated as special subjects of concern in both American domestic and international human rights law. As the works of scholars like Will Kymlicka and S. James Anaya have detailed, their mistreatment has been vastly different in both degree and kind than that even of other colonized groups, justifying a particularized design and trajectory of legal entitlements. In this sense, we would situate IDP within these mainstream, accepted legal approaches, both domestically and internationally, that seek to extend basic notions of equality and nondiscrimination to indigenous peoples.

In the United States, Indian people and their lawyers often describe tribes’ legal status through the language of sovereignty, a term that strikes a discordant note with Brown, who says that we, like most legal scholars, “fail to ponder sovereignty’s inherent limits.” Admittedly, sovereignty is a deeply contested term, which has inspired far more scrutiny and criticism than can be conveyed here. But, quite simply, despite roots in the historical image of a European monarch’s absolute power over his subjects, current international, domestic, and indigenous legal practice treats sovereignty as connoting a sphere of governing authority, exercised in relationship with other states, peoples, and citizens. In the United States, there are three sovereigns—the federal, state, and tribal governments—whose concomitant presence and formal legal status give rise to a set of necessarily limited powers.
Thus, we use the language of sovereignty, not because we (mis)understand it as unlimited and unchecked, but because it accurately communicates the political status of American Indian tribes in relation to other governments within the U.S. legal framework. Undoubtedly, there exists some degree of contradiction in American Indian tribes’ status as “domestic dependent nations,” given that it simultaneously characterizes Indian nations as both dependent and independent vis-à-vis the nation-state. As Indian law scholarship explains, however, these seemingly contradictory positions are reconciled in the U.S. context by understanding that tribes’ “dependent” status obligates the federal government to act as a fiduciary or trustee to tribes, largely to protect and respect their independent status, in the form of nationhood and self-governance. In the international context—including as contained the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—this space of authority is described as a right of self-determination rather than sovereignty, but both terms underscore the call for indigenous peoples’ rights to autonomy over their cultural resources. Accordingly, we reiterate IDP’s appreciation of non-U.S. indigenous as well as nonindigenous cultural property claims and emphasize that our work does not, either conceptually or practically, preclude the possibility that other peoples can—and, rightfully, should— pursue their own claims for protection of their cultural property.

Clarification of property is also necessary here, as we respectfully suggest that Brown persists in equating property with ownership—a characterization that misses one of the central points of IDP (property interests are broader than ownership interests) and the significant body of property law, theory, and practice supporting that point. While U.S. contemporary property laws are influenced by the eighteenth-century Anglo-American ideal of owners’ right to do whatever they want with their own land or other resources, this classic conception has been thoroughly debunked on both descriptive and normative grounds by legal scholars going back to the 1930s. Today, a basic tenet of property law is that the proverbial bundle of rights can be disaggregated with title holders and nontitle holders having various rights and responsibilities to the property. Dozens of generic property law arrangements—landlord–tenant, copyright registrant–public, landowner–easement holder—illustrate the limited nature of property interests among participants in our system. Thus, we begin with the premise that all property rights are limited, to some extent, by competing interests, and that judgments about where to place the limits should reflect societal norms and values. So, from our perspective, assertions of cultural property rights will occasionally, but rarely, vest indigenous peoples with the absolute powers of control, exclusion, or alienation that Brown seems to fear.

2. STEWARDSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

With some of our foundational terms and principles clarified, we turn to Brown’s discussion of our stewardship model. He writes that our cultural property analysis
identifies “no limits to the proposed stewardship rights of indigenous peoples over
cultural productions, knowledge, and biological inheritance that they insist are
theirs alone.” Brown is not the only scholar to propound what we see as a limiting principles criticism of IDP. Expressing skepticism about whether one can become a steward without being so-designated by the owner, Kal Raustiala and Stephen Munzer further query:

Assume . . . that an indigenous people can appoint itself steward over its own [traditional knowledge]. If there are competing claims of stewardship, it is not evident how the law should adjudicate among them. . . . Could Jewish people appoint themselves stewards of klezmer, or African Americans appoint themselves stewards of jazz?

Like Brown, Raustiala and Munzer seem to worry that the “limitless” nature of indigenous claims to cultural property would be difficult to administer and threaten the legitimate interests of others in the same resource. In sacred sites litigation, courts have similarly wondered aloud if a tribe’s opposition to development in a particular area might actually represent broader Indian attempts to regain “rather spacious tracts of public property.” Litigating parties, with some sympathy from the courts, have also expressed fears that Indians might make a religious claim to the Lincoln Memorial or the color of government file cabinets.

We hear in all of these critiques a plaintive cry for limits—theoretical, doctrinal, and practical—to indigenous peoples’ cultural property claims. We make two preliminary responses to this concern. First, it is important to consider the operative legal context under which our stewardship claims are offered. Many areas of cultural property protection originate from baselines of zero legal protection for indigenous peoples’ cultural resources. Returning to the sacred sites cases, for example, under current U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the First Amendment has offered no protection for American Indian sacred sites located on federal public lands. Consider also the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which, among other things, provides tribes with the opportunity to consult on projects that will disturb burial sites on federal and tribal lands. NAGPRA was enacted, not to afford indigenous peoples special rights to graves protection, but because Congress acknowledged that state cemetery protection laws had not historically applied to—or protected—Indian cemeteries.

Concomitantly, we point out that to the extent that the law has evolved through statutory and administrative reforms, American Indians are still often afforded only a procedural right to participate in consultations about the treatment of their cultural property, but seldom possess any substantive right of access, title, maintenance, or representation. Consider, for example, (1) the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) program in which universities are encouraged to seek tribal consent and participation vis-à-vis controversial tribal mascot use; (2) the National Historic Preservation Act’s (NHPA’s) requirement that public land use agencies consult, on a government-to-government basis, with Indian nations on
federal undertakings that may adversely affect sacred sites;\textsuperscript{35} and (3) NAGPRA’s provisions that federally funded museums must inventory their collections of indigenous human remains and associated funerary objects, and then notify and work with tribes to facilitate their repatriation.\textsuperscript{36} These are all extremely modest legal rights that, in our view, do not scream for limits.

Second, we do agree that, in some instances, indigenous peoples’ claims may need to accommodate others’ interests in science, speech, or invention. This is fully consistent with our theoretical and doctrinal approach to property and sovereignty in which the legal system should acknowledge stakeholders with a legitimate claim to certain entitlements. However, to assert that indigenous groups might legitimately—pursuant to our theory—appoint themselves stewards of the Lincoln Memorial demonstrates both a factual and legal disconnect with the way stewardship works in indigenous communities. The duty to steward cultural resources originates in tribal customary law, which articulates the relationship between the people and the world around them.\textsuperscript{37} In most instances, tribal customary law dates back to the tribe’s very creation story, identifying certain resources as critical to the community and thereby necessitating human care. Because tribal law on cultural resources is ancient, predating the arrival of Anglo-American legal principles, its stewardship principles are not dependent on Anglo-American notions of property in which the owner usually has the power to designate someone else as the steward of his property. And yet, as we argued in IDP, we believe that Anglo-American property law is sufficiently flexible and capacious to encompass an indigenous stewardship model.\textsuperscript{38}

Both contemporary cases and recent scholarship have begun to demonstrate how tribal law and custom place explicit limits on an indigenous community’s rights and duties to cultural resources.\textsuperscript{39} In Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service, for example, several tribes sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to stop the desecration of the San Francisco Peaks, a holy site where the Forest Service had approved the use of wastewater in snowmaking for a private ski resort. The en banc Ninth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association,\textsuperscript{40} rejected the tribes’ arguments, in part because it could see no limits to the Indians’ claims. Surely, in the majority’s viewpoint, the government could not function if the Indians were free to designate any mountain on the public lands to be “sacred” and thus require federal accommodation under federal statutes. Dissenting Judge Fletcher pointed out the fallacy of this argument, noting:

The majority’s implication rests upon an inadequate review of the record . . . while there are many mountains within White Mountain Apache, Navajo, and Havasupai historic territory, only a few of these mountains are “holy” or particularly “sacred.” . . . For the Navajo, there are . . . four holy mountains. They are the San Francisco Peaks, the Blanca Peak, Mt. Taylor, and the Hesperus Mountains.\textsuperscript{41}

Then Judge Fletcher described in great detail the tribal custom associated with San Francisco Peaks, including the story of the Navajo deity Changing Woman,
who resided there at the time of creation, and the contemporary religious practices involving water and plants that would be desecrated by the proposed use of waste material. The Navajo creation story—and the legal and cultural responsibilities it sets forth—is told through a specific set of locations, events, and values. Such customary law provides no basis for the Navajo people to claim themselves stewards of a limitless number of mountains or other resources across the southwest. Through this analysis, Judge Fletcher was able to discern a “substantial burden” on Navajo (and Hopi) religious practices that did not implicate the entire land holdings of the federal government.

Judge Fletcher’s opinion, albeit a dissenting one, thus provides a practical view of tribal customary law as providing discernible limits on Indian cultural property claims. It is one example that may respond to Brown’s worry that IDP has “difficult[y]” in “getting from splendid abstraction to real-world complexity.” That said, we agree that IDP is primarily a theoretical work. In articulating a theory of property based in conceptions of peoplehood and stewardship, we did not, for example, propose model legislation to modify or extend existing property rights (though we have made such suggestions elsewhere). Given the scope of subject matters, geographies, and peoples we are talking about—everything from botanical claims in Peru to sports mascots in Illinois—it would be extremely difficult to propound a particularized set of formulations to determine where such limits should lie in every conceivable case.

The bridge, in our view, between theory and practice relies on engaging with a governance approach to cultural property disputes that does support real-world solutions, just as Judge Fletcher’s dissent suggested. Indeed, an empowered governance approach to cultural property disputes seems to be gaining currency across academic disciplines and around the world. Since we wrote IDP, for example, Arizona State University (ASU) entered into a settlement with the Havasupai Indian tribe to “remedy the wrong that was done” when an ASU geneticist, having obtained Havasupai blood samples for diabetes research, also used the samples in research on Havasupai mental health and tribal origins without the donors’ consent. The geneticist, to this day, maintains that she “was doing good science.” But many institutions and researchers understand that such studies, no matter how important from a scientific perspective, should only occur with meaningful indigenous consent. For example, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research has recently promulgated guidelines in which researchers working with aboriginal communities should obtain the community’s consent, undertake research of benefit to the community, and translate resulting publications into the community’s language. This would seem to be a governance approach in which indigenous peoples are empowered to negotiate the terms of the scientific research that draws resources from their communities.

More generally, groups such as the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) are working diligently to find ways both to protect indigenous peoples’ intangible culture and to balance critical interests of creativity and
free speech.\textsuperscript{49} These are formidable projects, indeed. As Rosemary Coombe has suggested, it may take more conversations like this one between scholars from divergent disciplines to address practical issues of cultural property governance.\textsuperscript{50}

3. COMMODOIFICATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

In the third part of his response, Brown expresses a great deal of discomfort with the idea of commodification generally. Brown appears to be rightly concerned with the “direction of commodifying every aspect of human identity,” as he poses the provocative question: “is it possible to define culture as property without commodifying it?”\textsuperscript{51} In support of his critique, Brown discusses a book by John and Jean Comaroff, \textit{Ethnicity, Inc.}, which decries the association of property with identity. “‘Identity,’ the Comaroffs declare (29), ‘is increasingly claimed as property by its living heirs, who proceed to manage it by palpably corporate means: to brand it and sell it, even to anthropologists, in self-consciously consumable forms’ [emphasis in original].”\textsuperscript{52} This is admittedly a complicated observation, which Brown advances by suggesting that it is quite difficult to pursue the goals of propertization without some form of commodification.

At the outset, we note that Brown’s concerns about commodification focus almost exclusively on intangible cultural property, a category that we concede is incredibly complex. Yet, we reiterate here that those claims compose only one (albeit important) aspect of achieving an overall understanding of the protection of cultural property. In our view, many of the most salient issues regarding cultural properties—including native peoples’ efforts to protect sacred sites, hold on to their ancestral territory, and repatriate and rebury ancestors and funerary objects currently held \textit{en masse} in museums—do not involve commodification.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, many of these claims concern nonfungible properties that, by definition and as a matter of tribal law, would fall within a protected sphere of inalienability.\textsuperscript{54} Here, we think it is important to distinguish between the property law concepts of title (classically defined as evidence of one’s ownership interest, including the right to alienate) and custody (connoting guardianship or a duty of care). While the issue of title certainly connects to Brown’s skepticism regarding commodification, much of what we are concerned with regarding tangible property (funerary remains, sacred sites, etc.) involves the stewardship values inculcated by custody over inalienable goods that elide Brown’s concerns about commodification. Indeed, since so much of our commentary gravitates toward the goal of custody rather than title, it is important to observe, at the outset, that protection of some cultural objects does not always lead to market-based solutions; in fact, quite the opposite.

Nevertheless, here and elsewhere Brown expresses his deep concern over the “crisis of the public domain” and, from his perspective, our failure to resolve this issue of real concern.\textsuperscript{55} Here, we sympathize with Brown’s desire to preserve the public domain, but we part ways with Brown’s suggestion that protecting intangible as-
pects of indigenous culture is at odds with this goal. Three arguments may be made to respond to Brown’s quite understandable concerns, however. First, many ethnicities of all races, colors, nationalities, and tribal and nontribal affiliations commodify different aspects of their identities by selling cultural objects, propertizing aspects of their culture, or holding cultural events, either to develop cultural awareness or monetary gain. Many nonethnic groups do the same—universities, sports teams, labor unions, political movements, and the like. Brown’s expression of concern, we respectfully suggest, fails to adequately capture precisely why indigenous groups should be singled out for more critical attention than any other ethnic or nonethnic group that may pursue the same goals of commodifying aspects of their cultural identity.

Consider, for example, Brown’s point that the protection of Navajo rug designs is impractical. The issue, for Brown, it seems, is not that there cannot be intellectual property protection in rug designs, but that indigenous peoples have somehow missed—and are trying to perhaps overstate—their rights to commodify. If, for example, the Navajo had trademarked symbols and used them in commerce, under the federal Lanham Act they could continue to be used in perpetuity, presumably without opposition by Brown and his counterparts, even though this, too, would shrink the public domain. To this end, Brown offers the solution of copyrighting Navajo rug designs for infringement (plus a fair trade solution to prevent misappropriation), and we heartily applaud this as a potential solution, though we note that this, too, fails to resolve Brown’s concerns regarding the public domain.

Second, if indigenous groups and tribes are somehow less able to commodify elements of their cultures—whether it be traditional knowledge, artifacts, or other types of fungible goods—then it paves the way for what we believe is already taking place: a significant scale of appropriation without remuneration or attribution. (One only need to look at our introduction to this essay to see a poignant example). To be sure, Brown is sensitive to these concerns, a point that intersects precisely with his suggestion of increased enforcement of intellectual property interests, complemented by a fair trade regime that protects native interests. At the same time, however, Brown suggests that his ultimate goal is to expand the public domain, making information more “free.” Yet, we respectfully observe that many of his illustrations refer to indigenous intangible cultural property that is currently commodified—rarely by or for the benefit of the native peoples that may have participated, willingly or unwillingly, in its creation. Brown’s examples—such as Native American mascots (protected by federal trademark law to the monetary benefit of the universities who use them) and traditional ethnobotanical knowledge (protected by patent law to the benefit of the patent holder, typically corporations or research universities)—do not currently exist in the public domain, free for the taking. They are ardently protected by intellectual property rights holders and backed by American courts. In short, if indigenous peoples cannot commodify their culture, some other nonindigenous entrepreneur will surely take
their place, risking not only the quality of the goods that may be produced but also potentially diluting the goods’ association with tribal origins, and concomitantly denying indigenous peoples the opportunity to participate in the profits.

Third, and finally, it is important to separate out discomforts that surround commodification (with which we share some of Brown’s hesitation) from Brown’s other arguments concerning identity. He contends, using the example of Indian gaming, that cultural commodification can also add to the formation and reification of political differences based on identity-based categories, pointing out stories of individuals facing disenfranchisement from their tribal communities as a result of new membership restrictions. While we agree that such instances might be problematic, we think it is important to note that the problem of membership reclassifications is not necessarily brought about by protecting cultural property. Though capitalism and commodity certainly may bring about undesirable results at times, the contention that commodification leads to membership disputes is misguided; rather, while commodification may influence such identity classifications in some instances, it certainly should not shoulder the blame exclusively.

CONCLUSION

In closing, we agree with Brown that culture is messy, unpredictable, and suffused with contradictions. Ultimately, even as we decidedly advance a theory for the protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural property, we do, in fact, share a great deal of common ground with Brown and some of our other critics. We absolutely agree, for example, that cultural property claims—like all property claims—must have limits, and we appreciate the opportunity to identify indigenous customary law as one meaningful source of such limits, in addition to some that already exist within the law. But in our view, enabling the law to continue to work so clearly for the benefit of those with power—and so clearly against those without—calls for a reorientation of indigenous proprietary interests that integrates notions of fairness, equality, and distributive justice.

In closing, contrary to Brown’s fear that cultural property protections serve as a way to justify cultural purity, the deification of tradition, or societal isolation, we wish to note that, like Brown, we too believe in cultural hybridity, fluidity, and evolution. In fact, we see these values reflected in many cultural property programs, particularly those like NAGPRA and NHPA that emphasize consultation between indigenous peoples and other stakeholders, thereby facilitating discussions and cooperative solutions between groups that might not otherwise interact at all. Yet, we reiterate here that, at times, the law—with its emphasis on rules and state-sponsored enforcement—does not always offer an appropriate solution to these conflicts, and exploring questions of ethical protocols, alternative dispute resolution, or “best practices” might be more salient. We see great hope in the work of WIPO, as well as international tribunals and some domestic courts that
have been struggling with these issues for years. Even though some resolutions of cultural property disputes are indisputably imperfect, we think it is possible, and necessary, to account for and accommodate society’s competing interests, even when those interests complicate and disrupt existing hierarchies.63

Finally, we emphasize that IDP was written as an invitation to dialogue. It is a conversation, not a conclusion. We fully recognize the complexity of the issues we address and hope that this response—like IDP—facilitates a deeper conversation about the ways in which law and politics shape the lives and potential for meaningful cultural survival of the world’s indigenous peoples.

ENDNOTES

1. Meyer, Twilight, 124.
5. Sellers of “Quileute” items range from independent entrepreneurs like the Twi-Space Fan Shop to major retailers like Nordstrom.com. Interestingly, when we last visited Norstrom.com, its “Quileute” products were still showing but listed as “currently unavailable.” See, for example, The Twilight Saga, New Moon for BP, “Quileute” Hoody, “Quileute Tattoo” Tee, and “Quileute Tattoo” Earrings.
7. MSN Entertainment, Apology.
8. Babette Herrmann, “Quileute Tribe Embraces ‘Twilight’ Buzz,” Indian Country Today (Canastota, NY), November 11, 2009. For video of an elder sharing the Quileute creation story with filmmakers, see Spotlight—Quileute Nation. The tribe has posted its laws, applicable to all within its sovereign territorial boundaries, alerting visitors that entry into burial grounds and ceremonies is prohibited. Quileute Nation, Indian Country Etiquette.
9. Quileute Nation, Twilight at Quileute. The store’s tagline is “Be authentic!”
75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.17, doc. 1, rev. 1 (2002) (holding that the U.S. had violated plaintiffs’ and other Western Shoshone members’ rights to equal treatment under the law by “extinguishing” title to Western Shoshone lands without the participation and adequate representation of tribal members).

12. See for example, Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, para. 118 (Considerations of the Court) (The culture of indigenous communities “reflects a particular way of life, of being, seeing and acting in the world, the starting point of which is their close relation with their traditional lands and natural resources. . .”); Also see, Dann v. United States, 60 (Position of the petitioners) (“As the Western Shoshone culture is dependent upon the land and the natural resources upon it, the Petitioners argue that the State’s actions are directly threatening the Danns’ enjoyment of Western Shoshone culture.”)

13. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C), No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001) (holding that land claims based on traditional occupation and spiritual importance were protected under right to property provisions of Inter-American Convention on Human Rights).

14. See Vuotto, “One Year After Breakthrough Court Order.”


17. We admittedly cabin the claims asserted in IDP by focusing more specifically on American Indian tribes. But not, as Brown claims, because we are “out of step with current thinking about the complexity of indigenous identities,” but rather to achieve specificity in our subject and, correspondingly, precision in our arguments. Brown, “Culture, Property, and Peoplehood,” this issue, p. 575. We read this criticism as rooted in a definitional argument against notions of indigeneity altogether, which is beyond the purview of both IDP and this response but has been the subject of a variety of commentaries. See, for example, Waldron, “Indigeneity”; Tsosie, “The New Challenge.”


21. See, for example, Cohen, Handbook, 169.


24. Brown’s tendency use of the terms “ownership” and “stewardship” interchangeably, as in his analysis of sports mascots, causes him to overstate our analysis. Brown, “Culture, Property, and Peoplehood,” this issue, p. 571. A point of clarification: We did not call for tribes to become “owners” of mascots. Instead, we approvingly described the NCAA guidelines that encourage teams to engage tribes in discussions about their use of Indian mascots and to negotiate mutually acceptable outcomes in these instances. This, in our view, is “stewardship”—exercising a duty of care over property, even in the absence of title to that property. See NCAA, NCAA Executive Committee Issues Guidelines.
27. Raustiala and Munzer, “The Uneasy Case,” 66. This quote is taken from a longer passage in which the authors suggest that stewardship must be an attribute of ownership, a relationship in which “it hardly seems that someone who does not own the property could appoint herself or another as steward over the property” (65–66).
29. See Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F.Supp. 641, 645 (D. Utah 1977) (comparing native plaintiffs’ claim based on historical and ongoing religious practice to hypothetical land claim by a visitor to the Lincoln Memorial who might also claim a “profound religious experience”).
30. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986) (plaintiff “may no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government’s use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government’s filing cabinets.”).
34. See NCAA, NCAA Executive Committee Issues Guidelines.
36. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, U.S. Code 25 (2007) 3003, §§ 5(a) (inventory of human remains and funerary objects), 5(d) (notification of tribes), and 7(a) (repatriation of identified remains).
37. For an example of tribal customary law and its provisions for the stewardship of cultural resources, see Bowers and Carpenter, “Lyng v. Northwest” (on stewardship duties in Yurok tribal law).
39. Anthropologist and legal scholar Justin Richland has recently authored a series of articles considering the limits of Hopi traditional knowledge as they relate to questions of jurisdiction and sovereignty. See, for example, Richland, “Hopi Sovereignty,” 89–112; Richland, “Hopi Tradition.”
42. While not cited in the Navajo Nation opinion, Navajo legislation also enumerates by name the “sacred mountains,” which “must be respected, honored, and protected” by the Diné who “were designated as the steward for these relatives.” General Provisions, Navajo Nation Code Title 1 (1995), Sec. 205 (B)–(D).
44. See Riley, “Recovering Collectivity”; Carpenter, “Property Rights”; Katyal, “Trademark Intersectionality.”
47. Harmon, “Indian Tribe.”
49. See, for example, WIPO, Creative Heritage Project; Vézina, Traditional Cultures; UNESCO, Convention; UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Text of the Convention.
51. A similar critique appears in Busse, “Epilogue,” 364–65, claiming that IDP does not address the “dimension of property that interests many . . . anthropologists: social identity and social relations per se and in particular relations between persons (or peoples) with respect to things.” Along with Brown’s critique that we fail to provide sufficient “evidence” for the relationship between land, culture, and people, we may have to address Busse’s “law and culture” point in subsequent works.


53. Brown mentions repatriation only once, where he addresses the repatriation of “human remains of great antiquity” on which he ultimately takes no identifiable position. Brown, “Culture, Property, and Peoplehood,” this issue, p. 570.

54. In IDP, we discuss in greater detail the concepts of nonfungibility and inalienability under tribal customary law. See Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley, “In Defense of Property,” 1048–50, 1085–87 (discussing sources including *Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson*, 20 Indian L. Rep. 617 [“Whale house artifacts” are “clan trust . . . property” which cannot be alienated outside of the tribal community]).


56. See, for example, *Irish & St. Patrick’s Day Shirts* (justirishstuff.com), *Oktoberfest Decorations* (OktoberfestHaus.com), and *Cinco de Mayo Party Supplies* (cincodemayoparty.com).


58. See Chander and Sunder, “The Romance of the Public Domain.”


62. See Anderson, “Discursive Disorder.”

63. See *Milpurrurruru v. Indofurn* (1994) 54 FCR 240, 280 (Federal Court of Australia) (copyright infringement damages awarded to Native plaintiff reflecting “cultural” harm resulting defendants’ reproducing sacred imagery on woolen carpets for sale, signaling possible expansion of damages regime beyond strictly economic harm); *Bulan Bulun v. Re&T Textiles Proprietary Ltd.* (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244, 247 (Austl.) (protecting indigenous artwork through copyright principles); *Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Austl.* (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481, 24 (“the question of statutory recognition of Aboriginal communal interests in the reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for consideration by law reformers and legislators.”) (Federal Court of Australia) (rejecting an Australian Aboriginal artist’s challenge to a bank’s reproduction on a $10 note of one of his designs of the Morning Star Pole, but noting that because the plaintiff had created his design subject to the traditional norms of custodial management and not those of copyright ownership, “a serious misapprehension” may have occurred).
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MSN Entertainment. *Apology to the Quileute Nation.* (http://msntwilight.com) accessed 9 July 2010. For text of the apology, click on the link titled “Apology to the Quileute Nation.”


